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This book is based on the proceedings of the international workshop ‘Is‐
lamic Peace Ethics: Legitimate and Illegitimate Violence in Contemporary
Islamic Thought’, which were held by the Institut für Theologie und
Frieden (Institute for Theology and Peace) (ithf) 15-17 October 2015 in
Hamburg, Germany.
A significant characteristic of these proceedings is taking into account
the confessional, geographical, and ideological diversity of contemporary
Islamic peace ethics. The book includes papers discussing peace ethics
from different groups and scholars representing both Sunni and Shi‘ah
branches of Islam, as well as different positions towards violence from
pacifism and traditionalism to fundamentalism. The contributors are aca‐
demics from different countries including Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, Ger‐
many, UK, US, and Belgium. The papers discuss peace and war in con‐
temporary Islamic thought from different disciplinary perspectives such as
theology, philosophy, religious studies, cultural studies and the political
sciences. They are divided into three parts: a. Methodology and Theory, b.
Jus ad bellum1 and c. Jus in bello.
Methodologies and Theories of Islamic Peace Ethics
The main emphasis of this book is on the methodological aspects of Islam‐
ic peace ethics. In addition to the papers in the first section, the ‘Method‐
ology and Theory’, which deal directly with methodological issues, the
papers in two other parts, ‘jus ad bellum’ and ‘jus in bello’ focus on the
methodology and structure of arguments used by contemporary Muslim
scholars for legitimizing and delegitimizing violence.
One of the methodological issues that are discussed is the normative
disciplines in Islamic knowledge culture that have dealt or can deal with
I.
1 Jus ad bellum is a part of just war theory in the Roman-Catholic tradition that dis‐
cusses the conditions in which a war can be justified. Other parts are jus in bello,
the rules of doing a war, and post in bellum, the rules of ending a war and what
obligations exist post war.
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issues relating to peace and war. In ‘Some Methodological Remarks on Is‐
lamic Peace Ethics’, Heydar Shadi problematizes the almost exclusive fo‐
cus of current debates in Islamic peace ethics on the legal tradition
(Shari‘ah-fiqh), and argues for a more comprehensive approach by taking
into consideration the non-fiqhi and non-legal fields such as philosophical
and mystical ethics, political philosophy (for example Farabi) and adab
literature. Referring to the diversity of Islamic normative fields, Shadi
points out that comparative studies on Islamic and Jewish peace ethics can
be very helpful because the knowledge culture of Islamic and Jewish tradi‐
tions have some significant similarities. Shari‘ah with halakhah, adab
with mussar, as well as philosophical ethics in both traditions, are compa‐
rable. Another strand in Shadi’s ‘methodological remarks’ is problematiz‐
ing the theological approach to violence. Warning of ‘over-theologization
of socio-political problems’, Shadi holds that emphasizing the relationship
between religion and violence, including research on this topic, can cause
not only ignorance about violence, by not recognizing the real causes of
violence, but become counter-productive by causing (epistemological) vi‐
olence, through underestimating and masking the real (socio-political)
causes of violence, and falsely laying blame elsewhere.
Other papers point out the difficulty of using the adjective ‘Islamic’ in
current debates on violent phenomena. In ‘Discussing Islamic Peace
Ethics: Conceptual Considerations of the Normative’, Sybille Reinke de
Buitrago maintains that the workshop title implies that Islam and/or Islam‐
ic thought encompasses forms of violence. While any religion can be used
for the legitimization of violence, some parts of current political and pub‐
lic discourse portray Islam as violent – and thereby also Muslims. In polit‐
ical terms, she adds, the inquiry into Islamic peace ethics can also be seen
as a Western application of power. Thus, Islam and Muslims may be de‐
valued and diminished, while the Western self is safeguarded. Reinke de
Buitrago then remarks on two conceptual themes. The first theme relates
to the normative, and in particular the plurality versus the universality of
norms. Should we take the world’s cultural and socio-political diversity as
a principle to guide us? Or, following those who are against relativizing
culture and norms, should we maintain the dominant position by asserting
our norms? The second and linked theme is one of the self-other construc‐
tions and the processes of Othering. As identity is formed in its difference
from an ‘other’, self-other constructions are a normal part of human exis‐
tence. Yet, hierarchical self-other constructions that lead to processes of
Othering, and even dehumanization of the ‘other’, enable violence and are
Introduction
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highly destructive. Western thinking about Islam often illustrates such
hierarchical self-other constructions and the associated processes of Other‐
ing. When we inquire into Islamic peace ethics, we thus need to remain
self-reflective and open to unknowns and alternatives to enable an under‐
standing that does not reproduce Western biases. Insights generated in
such a manner can aid a renewed dialogue with the ‘other’, and help to
deal with self-other difference non-violently.
This kind of labelling and adopting of a religious approach in peace/war
studies is discussed as being part of the problem, creating bias and hostile
Othering and producing further violence. Therefore, the theologization
and Islamization of violent phenomena can be regarded as epistemological
violence. These approaches, accordingly, can be used for legitimizing the
violence of the centre and delegitimizing the defense of the oppressed.
In ‘Is it Essentialism to Claim that Some Religions Foster Violence –
and Some Do Not?’ Dirk Ansorge also takes on this problem. He asks
whether it exclusively depends on circumstances that religions either fos‐
ter or discourage violence? Is it really impossible to identify a core mes‐
sage from religions in reference to violence? And how might an affirma‐
tive answer to these questions escape the allegation of essentialism?
Oliver Leaman’s article, ‘Peace and Violence in Islam: Philosophical Is‐
sues’, uses deontological and consequentialist approaches in philosophical
ethics to analyze different methodologies among contemporary Muslim
scholars towards violence. According to Leaman, both absolutist and con‐
sequentalist approaches can be found in Islamic discourses on violence.
The absolutists, Leaman maintains, tend to concentrate on particular ayat
in the Qur'an, and their accompanying hadith, and use them to defend
wide ethical principles that forbid or permit certain kinds of peaceful or
violent behaviour. This approach tends to defend the status quo, since it
often rules out violence in the ways it is often used to bring about regime
or radical change. The ethical principle involved here is that, whatever the
consequences, there are certain things that must never be done, and that
obviously restricts aggressive actions from a moral point of view. On the
other hand, according to Leaman, there are the consequentialists, who ar‐
gue that Islam justifies radical steps in order to bring about the correct sort
of objectives, those that are of course themselves justified by religion.
Those ayats, which the absolutists appeal to, are of course respected by
the consequentialists but they are put within a context which restricts their
scope and does not interfere with consequentialist ethics. According to
Leaman, religions have the ability to make harmony between these two
Introduction
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ethical schools. In the Islamic case, Leaman believes, hadith literature has
the greatest potential to realize this harmony.
Jus ad bellum
It is held that Islamic classic peace/war ethics were engaged mostly, if not
exclusively, with regard to jus in bello, the rules of fighting in a war,
rather than jus ad bellum, rights to war. However, due to modern develop‐
ments in international law, there is an increasing interest in jus ad bellum
in Islamic discourses on peace and war, where the conditions and princi‐
ples of a just war are discussed. The articles in this section are all case
studies that focus on a contemporary Muslim scholar or Muslim commu‐
nity. Out of seven articles, four are about Sunni scholars or contexts, two
are about Shi‘ah scholars and one is about Sufi discourse.
Asfa Widiyanto discusses the arguments of Habib Rizieq Syihab, an Is‐
lamist scholar from Indonesia, about religious violence using the concept
of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’. According to Widiyanto, the
founding fathers of FPI (most notably Habib Rizieq Syihab) thought that
the government of Indonesia remained silent towards evil events which
spread throughout the country and accordingly felt the necessity of ‘com‐
manding good and forbidding evil’, by organizing some actions to bring a
halt to evil in Indonesian society. Widiyanto focused on Syihab’s book en‐
titled Hancurkan Liberalisme, Tegakkan Syariat Islam (Destroy Liberal‐
ism, Enforce Islamic Law, 2011) and discusses subsequent problems: (a)
How does Syihab justify the violence in the corpus of Islamic doctrines?
(b) What are the rhetorical modes that Syihab employs in his book Destroy
Liberalism, Enforce Islamic Law? (c) What agency does Syihab use in
transmitting his idea of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’ and (d)
What are the socio-political factors which surround Habib Rizieq Syihab’s
ideas on violence?
The next two articles address Pakistani discourses on peace and war.
Najia Mukhtar discusses in her paper, ‘Ideas on Citizenship and Violence
against Religious Difference in Contemporary Pakistan’, a problematic in
the argument of both religious extremist groups and moderate groups in
the Pakistani context. Mukhtar shows that moderate Muslim scholars justi‐
fy, rather as extremists do, religious violence against rebels, by excluding
them from citizenship. Remarking that the Pakistani Taliban targets reli‐




responses of two contemporary Pakistani figures who actively criticize re‐
ligious violence: the ‘moderate’ Sunni scholar, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi and
the Sufi scholar, Tahir-ul-Qadri. Specifically, she examines their notion of
citizenship, constructed from Islamic source materials such as the Qur’an,
hadith, and fiqh, to guarantee religious freedoms. However, inclusive citi‐
zenship that offers protection against violence directed at religious differ‐
ence must also exclude certain types of religious difference, in order to be
practicable. Both Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri argue for eliminating,
through violent or coercive means, ‘terrorists’ and ‘militants’. These peo‐
ple are categorized as dissidents and rebels, using the same Islamic source
materials. Citizenship (in their versions of Islam) thus constitutes guaran‐
tees of protection from illegitimate violence against religious difference,
necessarily predicated on the legitimate violent suppression of rebel citi‐
zens. By extension, the rebel’s struggle (jihad) is illegitimate, whilst the
state’s jihad against the rebel is deemed legitimate.
Charles M. Ramsey, in his article ‘Blessed Boundaries: Javed Ahmad
Ghamidi (b. 1952) and the Limits of Sunnah in Legitimize Violence,’ in‐
troduces a reformist voice on Islam and violence from Pakistan. Ramsey
discusses how Javad Ahmad Ghamdi rejects the legitimization of violence
through Sunnah by limiting the authority of Sunnah to religious matters
rather than worldly and state matters. According to Ramsey, there is an es‐
tablished consensus that the exemplary way of the Prophet as recorded in
hadith is a foundational source for prescribing licit behaviour. However,
there is disagreement among scholars regarding which facets of the
Prophet’s example are applicable. Is Sunnah limited to Prophetic testimo‐
ny pertaining to matters of religion (din), or does this include matters of
state (dunya) as well? While some groups such as clerics of the Deoband
(mamati) faction, like Abdul Aziz Ghazi, khatib of Lal Masjid in Islam‐
abad, appeal to a prophetic example in order to legitimize attacks not only
on government forces but also on their dependents. Representatives of the
Islahi School sternly disagree. A leading example of this position is Javed
Ahmad Ghamidi (b. 1952), a student and then critic of the late Maulana
Mawdudi (d. 1979). Unlike Ghazi, Ghamidi argues that Sunnah does not
include the Prophet’s actions as a statesman.
Two articles on jus ad bellum in Shi‘ah contexts discuss the ideas of
Seyyed Muhammad Husain Fadlallah (Lebanon) and Ayatollah Khoei
(Iraq). Bianka Speidl analyzes in her paper ‘The Rhetoric of Power in
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah’s al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa’ how
rhetoric supports a theory of empowerment that conveys the call to action
Introduction
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and justifies violence. She identifes the rhetorical patterns and devices ap‐
plied by Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah in his book al-Islam wa-mantiq al-
quwwa (Islam and the Logic of Power). Speidl examines the rhetorical
strategies and the various rhetorical tools that Fadlallah's philosophy of
power transmits. Fadlallah's writings, according to Speidl, include argu‐
ments from scripture, necessity, virtue and instrumentality. Fadlallah has
recourse to rhetorical questions, antinomy, metaphors and repetition to
make his discourse convincing and effective. Moreover, he uses master
narratives to frame his view of power in Shi‘ah salvation history. Spiedl
shows how Fadlallah supports his argument with Qur’anic references as a
final authority, and quotes from the Qur’an widely to legitimize power and
the use of force. Speidl concludes that Fadlallah’s discourse constructs a
religious ideology in which force is understood as virtuous, instrumental
and inevitable. Each element of his rhetoric is aimed mainly at reassuring
the quietists that the quest for power is justified, and at mobilizing the
Shi‘ah to take action, even if it leads to violence.
Yahya Sabbaghchi’s article, ‘A Qur’anic Revision of Offensive War
with Emphasis on the Views of the Late Ayatollah Khoei’, presents a criti‐
cal reading of the late Ayatollah Khoei's view on the legitimacy of offen‐
sive jihad. Sabbaghchi argues that a holistic reading of violence in the
Qur’an rejects offensive jihad. According to Sabbaghchi, Allah introduces
Islam as a global and pervasive religion and promises its conquest over
other religions. In order to spread Islam, Muslims are encouraged to
preach its teachings. This has prepared the ground for Islamic jurists and
commentators to understand jihad verses in the Qur’an as the heavenly
way of spreading Islam. In his paper, Sabbaghchi explains some Qur’anic
theoretical principles, such as no compulsion in religion, the Prophet’s du‐
ty being only to communicate, emphasis on applying reason and proscrib‐
ing blind adherence, the importance of human dignity and the authenticity
of peace as the framework for jihad verses. By considering this frame‐
work, he argues for the inconsistency of offensive war (jihad ebtedaei)
and the unassailable principles of the Qur’an, concluding that the defen‐
sive jihad is the genuine tenor of jihad verses.
In a geographical case study, Simona Merati discusses diverse views on
violence among Muslims in post-Soviet Russia. According to Merati, Is‐
lam has flourished in post-Soviet Russia, revamping a long-professed
faith, and reconnecting with the global ummah. The combination of old
traditions with new Islamic influences from abroad, has enriched Russia’s
Muslim communities, but has also created social friction. Particularly con‐
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troversial is the (self)-positioning of Russia’s Muslims toward the state.
Merati adds that official Islamic institutions embrace the state-supported
notion of Russian ‘traditional Islam’ (indicating the forms of Islam histori‐
cally practiced in Russia) and its belonging to a ‘Russian civilization’.
Russian muftis reject assumptions that Islam is a violent religion and Mus‐
lims are enemies of the state. Some Muslim leaders and prominent
scholars of Islam emphasize Islamic wasatiyyah (‘moderateness’, umeren‐
nost’) as preventing social conflict, even in multi-religious societies. Con‐
versely, other Muslim thinkers find inspiration in the Iranian revolution,
reinterpreted through the lens of Russian-Soviet history and traditional
Russian messianism, to envision a new society based on ‘justice’ (al-
‘Adalah, spravledivost). Additionally, jihadist claims appear throughout
Islamic discourse, especially in areas of conflict (North Caucasus). Sepa‐
ratist groups like Imarat Kavkaz are close to international terrorism, Al-
Qaeda, and the Islamic State, with whom they are in considerable agree‐
ment.
The last chapter of the jus ad bellum section of the book is the only pa‐
per in this collection that sets out the non-violent approach in contempo‐
rary Islamic thought. In his article ‘Jawdat Sa‘id and the Philosophy of
Peace’, Abdessamad Belhaj discusses the philosophy of Jawdat Sa‘id, a
Sufi and activist from Syria. Inspired by Gandhi, Mohamamd Iqbal and
Malik Bin Nabi, Jawdat Sa‘id is, according to Belhaj, a leading voice for
pacifism in the Islamic context, who has criticized both Islamist Seyed
Qutb and the secular regime of Asad. Belhaj points out that peace has
been a marginal topic in the main Islamic intellectual fields, namely fiqh
and theology. According to Belhaj, Jawdat Sa‘id owes his pacifism neither
to fiqh nor to theology, but to sufism and philosophy.
Jus in bello
In the only jus in bello chapter of the book, Seyed Hassan Eslami Ar‐
dakani discusses ‘Lying in War’ in the Islamic tradition. According to Es‐
lami Ardakani, on the one hand it is held that lying is a vice and prohibited
from an Islamic standpoint. On the other hand, it is agreed by all Muslim
ethicists and jurists, or fuqaha, that a Muslim army can lie in wartime. But
the question is, how they can justify this? After briefly reviewing three
main arguments for allowing lying in war in the Islamic tradition, he intro‐








I. Methodology and Theory

Some Methodological Remarks on Islamic Peace Ethics
Heydar Shadi
Sankt Georgen Graduate School of Philosophy and Theology,
Frankfurt a.M., Germany
Institut für Theologie und Frieden (ithf), Hamburg, Germany.
Abstract: This paper contains some methodological remarks on research into Is‐
lamic peace ethics. It can be interpreted also as a meta-ethics or analytical ap‐
proach that tries to analyze and clarify the concepts and presuppositions of the
topic. It discusses critical features of both mainstream research and the secondary
literature in Islamic peace ethics:
I. First it reflects on ‘peace’ and ‘ethics’ in the phrase ‘Islamic peace ethics’ - us‐
ing it as the title for this book - examining the problems that arise, because the
literature in this area tends to concentrate more on the law of conduct in war (fiqh
al-jihad) rather than peace ethics (akhlaq al-salam). 2. The second point reflects
on fiqh as the almost exclusive normative discipline that the current literature on
Islamic peace ethics uses, and asks whether fiqh is the only discipline in this re‐
gard or whether there are other normative fields in the Islamic knowledge tradition
that discuss violence, peace and war issues. 3. The third point concerns the adjec‐
tive ‘Islamic’ in the title and asks what does ‘Islamic’ mean in ‘Islamic peace
ethics’? Examining the Islamic, (the religious), and Islamicate, (the culture and
civilization), it warns against confusing the two, risking reducing the Muslim
world to a religious-theological dimension alone. This confusion can lead to neg‐
lecting non-religious normative resources in Islamic societies and the over-Is‐
lamization of Muslims. 4. The fourth point reflects on epistemological violence
that results from locating Islam in a position of suspicion and relating violence to
theology and religion when dealing with socio-economic-political phenomena (an
over-theologization of violence). 5. The final remark warns about the danger of
dealing with visible manifestations of violence and ignoring the ontological, an‐
thropological and epidemiological aspects of the subject.
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Introduction
Institut für Theologie und Frieden (ithf), which conducts peace research
from a Catholic-Christian perspective, had the intention of launching a re‐
search project about Islamic peace ethics. This research project was de‐
signed originally in order to ‘acquire analytical knowledge about contem‐
porary Islamic peace ethics’. The proposal stressed that ‘besides finding
and studying the main topics and positions in the Islamic world about
peace-related issues, the focus will be on the reasons behind the positions.
The methodologies and structures of the peace-related arguments in Islam‐
ic ethics will be studied in order to reconstruct the internal architecture of
these positions.
Soon after the beginning of the research project, it became clear to the
author that some methodological and conceptual presuppositions related to
the research project should be noted and revised. One of the first difficul‐
ties that encouraged him to devote more time to the methodological di‐
mension of the project, was choosing Muslim scholars, whose methodolo‐
gy and arguments on the peace/war issue needed to be studied. The
question that suggested itself was what was meant by ‘Muslim scholars’?
To which normative discipline should they belong? Jurisprudence (fiqh),
theology, Sufism or philosophy? These questions led in turn to a general
question about the normative system and normative fields in Islam. What
are the normative sources and disciplines in Islamic tradition? One
question that required further investigation was in regard to Islamic knowl‐
edge culture. What are the main knowledge categories and methodologies
in the Islamic tradition? What is the position of reason and scripture in Is‐
lamic knowledge culture? What are the relationships between normative
fields, as well as their relation to non-normative Islamic sciences?
Another question that suggested itself was the religious and secular dis‐
courses on peace and war in Islamic countries. What do we mean by
‘Muslim scholars’? Do we mean those scholars in Islamic countries who
are religious and argue religiously, or do we mean those with an Islamic
background, even without religious argumentation? The original proposal
used the terms ‘Islamic peace ethics’ (Islamische Friedensethik) and
‘Peace ethics in an Islamic shaped cultural sphere’ (Islamisch geprägten
Kulturkreis) alternatively. This usage of terms betrayed a confusion be‐
tween Islam as religion and Islam as culture and civilization (Islamicate).
This confusion can be the result of a reductionist approach, however un‐




that can hinder a comprehensive and objective understanding of the ongo‐
ing related debate.
Yet another conceptual question concerned the political-social dimen‐
sions and implications of this research project. Does this question presup‐
pose the Islamic nature and background of some current conflicts? Is this
research project politically correct? Does it not produce epistemological
violence by putting Islam in a position of suspicion in the current cultural-
political asymmetries?
This text discusses these and some other methodological and introduc‐
tory points about the research project. It interrogates the basis of the re‐
search project, in order to reconsider some presuppositions. Indeed, this
essay aims at developing a methodological introduction to Islamic peace
studies.
To challenge the nature of the research project is understandable, if we
take into account that there have been an increasing number of works ad‐
dressing the topic in recent decades in Western scholarship. However, this
scholarship is usually, as Ahmad Al-Dawoody, the author of The Islamic
Law of War: Justifications and Regulations, shows,1 accused of misunder‐
standing, oversimplification and manipulation. If Islam is, as Reuven Fire‐
stone holds, ‘perhaps the most misunderstood religion to the West, and
many stereotypes still hinder clarity about its tenets and practices’,2 then
jihad is according to James Turner Johnson the most misunderstood topic.
Johnson writes, ‘between Western and Islamic culture there is possibly no
other single issue at the same time as divisive or as poorly understood as
that of jihad.’3 Onder Bakircioglu, the author of a new book on the subject
Islam and Warfare writes in a similar vein, ‘The question of how Islamic
law regulates the notions of just recourse to and just conduct in war has
long been the topic of heated controversy, and is often subject to oversim‐
plification in scholarship and journalism’.4
In order to avoid yet another book contributing to this misunderstanding
in the field, it may be helpful to continue to question the approach of the
1 Al-Dawoody, Ahmad. The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations.
New York, 2011, p. 2.
2 Firestone, Reuven. Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. New York, 1999, p. 13.
3 Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions.
Philadelphia, 1997, p. 19.
4 Bakircioglu, Onder. Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with Interna‐
tional Law. New York, 2014.
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research project, and try to provide a sound methodological groundwork
for the research. Therefore, before talking about peace and violence poten‐
tialities in Islamic thought, or investigating the methodologies and ap‐
proaches of contemporary Muslim scholars towards violence and peace, a
methodological suspension of the research will be undertaken. This
methodological suspension may help to detect the possible blind spots of
the dominant paradigm and discourse about the topic, and develop new
approaches and insights into this problem. Some introductory remarks that
are briefly described in this text as methodological challenges for the re‐
search project are: intercultural and (cultural) translation challenges; the
over-jurifidication of the Islamic normative system; the over-Islamization
of Muslim societies; and the over-theologization of social-political prob‐
lems.
What does ‘peace’ mean in ‘Islamic peace ethics’? Peace ethics or fiqh
al-jihad (law of war)? An inter-cultural and translation challenge
There is a widespread view in secondary literature about the Islamic ethics
of war, that the classic Islamic tradition has focused on jus ad bellum and
that it has reflected very little on jus in bello. Ahmad Al-Dawoody writes
in this regard:
Despite the vast extent of the literature written on jihad since the first century
of Islam [...] much disagreement and misunderstanding still exist about the
subject, mainly regarding the Islamic justifications for going to war. This is
partly attributed to the fact that classical Muslim jurists give scant attention to
the justifications for going to war compared with their extensive treatment of
the rules regulating the conduct of Muslims during war. It is ironic that, con‐
trary to the classical Muslim jurists, Western scholars have focused mainly on
the justifications for jihad and almost disregarded the Islamic regulations for
the conduct of war.5
If this is the case, one might suggest that we cannot talk about ‘Islamic
peace ethics’ but just ‘Islamic jus in bello’ or fiqh fi jihad (law in war).
However, the situation has it seems changed in post-classical Islamic
2.
5 Al-Dawoody, Ahmad. The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations.
New York, 2011, p. 4; see also Hashmi Sohail. ‘Saving and Taking Life in War:
Three Modern Muslim Views’. In: Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Eu‐
thanasia, Jonathan E. Brockopp (Ed.) Columbia SC, 2003, pp. 129-154, here p. 129.
Originally in: The Muslim World, April 1999, LXXXIX, 2, pp. 158-180.
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scholarship. Ahmad Al-Dawoody holds that a kind of Islamic jus ad bel‐
lum emerged in the 13th century with Ibn Taymayyah, ‘In fact, it took
classical Muslim jurists about seven centuries until a manuscript devoted
to the treatment of the justifications for war was written by the encyclope‐
dic Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328)’.6 Sohail Hashmi, pro‐
fessor of international relations at Mount Holyoke College, US, and author
of several works on the Islamic ethics of peace and war, dates this change
to the modern era and believes that modern Muslim scholars wrote, in
contrast to classical Muslim scholars, mostly on jus ad bellum. He starts
his article ‘Saving and Taking Life in War: Three Modern Muslim Views’
as follows:
A curious invention of foci is evident in modern Islamic discussions of war
when compared with the medieval literature. The majority of medieval writ‐
ers began with a consensus on the grounds for war (jus ad bellum), which
held jihad to be both a war of defense as well as for the expansion of a pax
Islamica. They focused in their writings much more on concerns of legitimate
means in warfare (jus in bello). Modern writers, on the other hand, concen‐
trate heavily on jus ad bellum while devoting very little attention to jus in bel‐
lo.’7
Questions such as why Islamic tradition and Islamic law (fiqh) focused in
the pre-modern era on jus in bello and why and how the shift to jus ad bel‐
lum happened in the 13th century or the modern era can be answered in
different ways, and deserve an investigation at later stages of the research
project, but it is not the concern of this text.8 The main point here is that
Islamic tradition has reflected more, according to the secondary literature,
6 Al-Dawoody, Ahmad. The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations, p.
78.
7 Hashmi, Sohail. Saving and Taking Life in War: Three Modern Muslim Views. In:
Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia. Jonathan E. Brockopp (Ed.).
Columbia, SC 2003, pp. 129-154. Originally in: The Muslim World. LXXXIX,
2. April 1999, pp. 158-180
8 One may relate this shift to Islamic theology, as God has in Islam both merciful and
aggressive attributes and similarly Mohammad was both peace initiator and war
commander. Hashmi holds that due to this theological - ontological difference
Thomas Aquinas's question about war was not proposed in Islamic tradition. He
writes, ‘The use of force by the Muslim community is, therefore, sanctioned by
God as a necessary response to the existence of evil in the world.’ (Hashmi, 2002,
p. 198) Similar to Hashmi, but in a different articulation, Jackson concludes that ‘a
prevailing “state of war”, rather than difference of religion, was the raison d'être of
jihad and that this “state of war” has given way in modern times to a global “state
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on the law and rules of war ‘fiqh in jihad/ jus in bello’ (in the classical
period) and ‘fiqh of jihad/ jus ad bellum’ (in the modern era) and not on
Islamic peace ethics. Talking about Islamic peace ethics is indeed, one
may hold, an unjustifiable translation from the Catholic tradition to the Is‐
lamic tradition. Using the term peace ethics for Islamic jus in bello can be
interpreted, as it lacks the necessary theoretical foundation, suggesting an
‘artificial’ peace ethics that is unlikely to serve a real and sustainable
peace building process. In addition, producing such peace ethics may hin‐
der the development of a native and authentic peace ethics. The literature
on ‘imported’ Islamic peace ethics risk causing a kind of fake sufficiency.
Yet, the search for a possible Islamic peace ethics may still be justifiable
as an intercultural study, even though the contextual differences should be
taken into account in order to prevent misunderstanding.
What does ‘ethics’ mean in Islamic peace ethics? An over-
juridification of Islamic normative system?
The claim that classical Islamic jurists focused on jus in bello, but modern
Muslim scholars focused on jus ad bellum, may be correct. However, it
seems that the almost exclusive focus of secondary literature on the nor‐
mative discussion of peace/war in Islam is directed towards fiqh/law. It is
said in Islamic studies that Islamic culture is a law-based tradition.9 This
opinion has been criticized in recent years as a colonialist-orientalist ap‐
proach that concentrated on a part of Islamic tradition that was reformed
for colonial purposes.10 In addition, is it still legitimate to ask if Muslim
3.
of peace” that rejects the unwarranted violation of the territorial sovereignty of all
nations.’ Jackson, Sherman. Jihad and the Modern World. In: Journal of Islamic
Law and Culture. 2002, 7 /1, p. 25.
9 Joseph Schacht, famous German orientalist, writes in this regard, ‘Islamic law is
the epitome of Islamic thought, the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way
of life, the core and kernel of Islam itself.’ Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Is‐
lamic Law. Oxford, 1964, p.1.
10 Wael Halalq writes in this regard: “Without a full, or even adequate, understanding
of theology, mysticism or Arabic philosophy, the colonialist enterprise could have
still been carried on, but without intimate familiarity with the law of Islam, this
enterprise, or at least its ultimate success, might have been called into question’.
Hallaq, Wael B. ‘The Quest for Origins or Doctrine-Islamic Legal Studies as Colo‐
nialist Discourse.” In: UCLA J. Islamic & Near EL 2. 2002, pp. 1-31, here pp. 1-2.
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philosophers, theologians, mystics, and politicians discussed war, peace
and violence from a normative perspective? Is there any non-legal norma‐
tive field in the Islamic tradition and knowledge culture that has discussed
war and peace? Sohail Hashmi's text implies a negative answer to this
question. Referring to this challenge in his article ‘Interpreting the Islamic
Ethics of War and Peace,’ he writes:
Much of the controversy surrounding the concept of jihad among Muslims to‐
day emerges from the tension between its legal and ethical dimensions. This
tension arises because it is the juristic, and not the philosophical or ethical,
literature that has historically defined Muslim discourse on war and peace.
With the rise of the legalistic tradition, ethical inquiry became a narrow and
secondary concern in Islamic scholarship. What we find from the medieval
period are legal treatises propounding the rules of jihad and discussing related
issues, but few ethical works outlining a framework of principles derived
from the Qur’an and sunna upon which these rules could be based.11
Hashmi's answer, however, needs further investigation. One of the main
points of conflict between the two theological schools in classical Islam,
Ash‘ari and Mu‘tazila, was the normative and ethical approach. They dis‐
cussed the nature and ontology of values: whether a value, for example
justice, is good in itself and by nature, or because of the intention and will
of God. In addition, Hashmi talks about the situation following ‘the rise of
the legalistic tradition’. One might ask what the situation was before the
emergence of a legalistic tradition? What has been the less dominant non-
legal normative tradition beside the dominant legalistic tradition? Can we
reconstruct a non-legalistic normative approach to war in the Islamic tradi‐
tion?12 Therefore, the question of violence in Islamic tradition should first
elaborate on the general normative system in Islam. Is fiqh equal to law in
the Western tradition? Focusing on fiqh/law, when it comes to normative
questions in Islam, does not seem a very convincing position, and might
be called an ‘over-juridification’ of the Islamic normative system. As
mentioned above, there were intensive theological debates about the na‐
ture and ontology of values and norms among Ash‘arite and Mu‘tazilite
schools in the classical Islamic tradition. It should be asked what the cur‐
rent theological-normative discourses are, and what the interaction be‐
11 Hashmi, Sohail H. “Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace”. In: Sohail
H. Hashmi, Jack Miles (Eds.). Islamic Political Ethics Civil Society, Pluralism,
and Conflict. Princeton, 2002, p. 195.
12 See for a non-legal approach to peace and Islam. Kalin, Ibrahim. Islam and Peace.
Amman, 2012.
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tween contemporary Islamic jurisprudence and theological ethics is? In
addition to theological ethics (the Ash‘arite-Mu‘tazilite debate) there has
been a philosophical ethics tradition in Islamic knowledge culture that was
mainly drawn from ancient Greek ethics. Was there any peace/war related
debate in these philosophical ethics? How did they interact with Islamic
jurisprudence and other normative fields? Does this ethical tradition still
have authority in Islamic societies?13
So, one methodological question this research project needs to address
is the nature of the general normative system in the Islamic tradition. What
are the normative disciplines in Islamic knowledge culture? What are their
internal interactions? Are there any non-law normative fields such as
philosophical ethics, theological ethics, mystical ethics, political practical
ethics (Fürstenspiegel) and scripturalist ethics, etc.?
This quest for alternative normative and intellectual resources in Islam‐
ic tradition is important because one might argue that the Islamic law tra‐
dition (fiqh) has methodological shortcomings to overcome the modern so‐
cio-political challenges, including religiously motivated violence. This is
what several contemporary Muslim thinkers have reflected and written
about. Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1936, Muslim India), Fazlur Rahman
(1919-1988, Pakistan), Muhammad Arkoun (1928-2010, Algeria),
Muhammad ‘Abed al-Jabri (1936-2010, Morocco), Hamid Abu Zayd
(1943-2010, Egypt), and Abdolkarim Soroush (1945- Iran), are some of
the representatives of this critical approach.14 A Malaysian academic
makes this point explicitly in his comment on the open letter of Muslim
13 Currently there is a related research project in Göttingen University under the title
of ‘The Islamic moral philosopher and historian Miskawayh (d. 1030) inbetween
reception and transformation’. This research project analyses how Miskawayh, the
Muslim ethicist from 10th century “received, modified and reconstructed the ethi‐
cal and educational ideas of ancient pagans as well as later Jewish, Christian, and
Muslim authorities in the light of his own images of God, human, and the world”.
http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/521153.html (access: 10.02.2017).
14 See for primary literature:
Iqbal, Mohammad. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. London, 1934;
Rahman, Fazlur. Revival and Reform in Islam. Oxford, 1999; Abed al-Jabri,
Muhammed. Kritik der arabischen Vernunft. Die Einführung.Berlin, 2009; Abu
Zayd, Nasr Hamid. Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Analysis. Amster‐
dam, 2006; Arkoun, Mohammed. The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic
Thought. London, 2002; Soroush, Abdolkarim. The Expansion of Prophetic Expe‐
rience: Essays on Historicity: Contingency and Plurality in Religion. Nilou
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scholars to Abubakr al-Baghdadi,15 the leader of IS, in which 128 Muslim
scholars argued using classical Islamic methodology against the IS inter‐
pretation of Islam. He argues that traditional Sunnism has, despite many
differences, also many commonalities with IS when it comes to methodol‐
ogy. Therefore, he believes that Muslim intellectuals should consider
whether they can deal with such problems in addition to traditional Sun‐
nism. He writes:
While IS is outside traditional Sunnism when it comes to the treatment of
non-Muslims (although even here the lines are blurred at times - e.g. the issue
of the fate of captives of war, offensive jihad in Shafi‘i madhahb) it is undeni‐
able that the IS approach to religious texts shares many crucial assumptions
with traditional Sunnism (and sh'ism for that matter) - most faithfully the ahl-
hadith manhaj - such as on gender issues or literal application of the hudud
laws including death for apostasy. This is what the learned author [of the let‐
ter to IS] failed to mention. [...] To my mind, if anything, the rise of IS has
highlighted the many problematic elements of traditional Islam (based on
their outdated worldview and outdated interpretational approaches) that have
never been resolved. And I think that this is the time for us, Muslims, take a
hard, critical and constructive look at our tradition, and ONCE AND FOR
ALL confront these issues with intellectual honesty and develop an alterna‐
tive worldview and more adequate hermeneutics which would reflect more
faithfully the spirit of the islamic message as captured by contemporary hu‐
man rights based ethics which do not discriminate on the basis of faith, gen‐
der or social class.16
This methodological remark demands a reappraisal of a dominant law-ori‐
ented approach in Islam-peace scholarship and pleads for the inclusion of
the alternative normative resources within Islamic tradition to deal with
Mobasser (Ed., Trans.). Analytical Introduction by Forough Jahanbakhsh. Leiden,
2009.
For secondary literature:
Kurzman, Charles (Ed.). Liberal Islam: a Sourcebook. New York, 1998; von
Kügelgen, Anke. Averroes und die arabische Moderne: Ansätze zu einer Neube‐
gründung des Rationalismus im Islam. Leiden, 1994; Dahlén, Ashk. Islamic Law,
Epistemology, and Modernity: Legal Philosophy in Contemporary Iran. New York,
2003; Hildebrandt, Thomas. Neo-Mutazilismus? Intention und Kontext im moder‐
nen arabischen Umgang mit dem rationalistischen Erbe des Islam. Leiden, 2007;
Troll, Christian. Progressives Denken im zeitgenössischen Islam, Vortrag bei der
Tagung der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung und der Bun‐
deszentrale für Politische Bildung. 2005, 09, pp 22-24.
15 The text is available in different languages including English and German in the
following link: http://lettertobaghdadi.com (access: 12.01.2017) 
16 The email of the scholar to the ‘Sociology of Islam’ mailing group. 08.11.2014.
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the question of violence. Accordingly, there should always be a clear men‐
tion in any study on Islam and peace regarding the specific type of the
normative field of study. Talking or writing about Islam and war in gener‐
al, and then merely referring to the law tradition, can imply a factual limi‐
tation and lead to misunderstanding. There are some scholars that have ad‐
dressed this methodological problematic and called for going beyond
sharia in Islamic war-peace ethics discourse. Prof. Abdul Aziz Said and
his team at Chair for Islamic Peace at American University is one of rare,
if not unique, research centers in this regard. However, their main goal
seems to be promoting peace in Islamic discourse through focusing on Su‐
fi tradition.17 Dr. Qamar al-Huda in the United States Institute of Peace
who has published Crescent and dove: peace and conflict resolution in Is‐
lam18 expresses also explicitly this methodological problem. Qamar al-
Huda points to this methodological problem in his interview about the
purpose of their research project on Islamic peace at USIP and the book:
“[The purpose was to ask] How to reframe the current debate on violence
and Islam, and nonviolence? How to move beyond jihad conversation?
Most scholars started with legal rules of engagement to put limitations to
the violence. Others contested that the legal interpretation [of the subject]
is overemphasized in Islam. Many perspectives outside the legal world:
philosophy, theology, sociology etc.”19
What does ‘Islam’ mean in Islamic peace ethics? Islamic/ Islamicate.
An over-Islamization of Muslims?
The question of the ontology of Islam is one of the main concepts under
consideration in this research. In the ontology of Islam the singularity-plu‐
4.
17 See: Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk, and Ayse S. Kadayifci (eds.). Peace and
Conflict Resolution in Islam: Precept and Practice. Lanham, Md: University Press
of America, 2001; Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Is‐
lam: Theory and Practice. Gainesville, Fl.: University of Florida Press, 2003;
Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said. Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East.
Boulder, Colo.: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2008.
18 Qamar al-Huda, (ed.). Crescent and dove: peace and conflict resolution in Islam,
United States Institute of Peace, 2010.
19 Qamar al-Huda, Interview with Dr. Ayse Kadayifci at Rumi Forum: https://www.y




rality, fluidity-solidity, sacrality-secularity of Islam, its ontological borders
with culture, civilization and other religions etc., should be discussed.
What do we mean by Islam when we ask about ‘Islamic peace ethics’? Is
it Islamic dogma and theology or is it Islamic culture and civilization?
What distinguishes the sacral and secular in an Islamic society?
Islam is now often associated in the West with war and violence. This
is, however, not a new phenomenon. ‘For the West, Islam has been for
centuries a source of fear and suspicion.’20 The long conflict history be‐
tween pre-modern Islamic and Christian political powers, the so-called
crusades, can be interpreted as a prototype of these conflicts. Orientalists,
as well as pre-modern polemic theological scholarship on Islam in the
West, have depicted the religion and culture of Islam as an inferior Other
to the religion and culture of the West.21 However, what is not clear in this
scholarship, is Islam itself. One aspect of this ambiguity is the singularity
and plurality of Islam. Which Islam do we mean when we ask about Is‐
lamic peace ethics? In addition to the traditional confessional (Sunni-) the‐
ological (Mu‘tazila, Ash‘ari) and jurisprudential (Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi‘i,
Hanafi, Ja‘fari), there are the cultural/ethnic (Arabic, Iranian, Turkish, In‐
dian, Indonesian, etc.) and ideological/intellectual (traditionalist, liberal,
fundamentalist, etc.) diverse categories in the Islamic cultural sphere.
Therefore, the specific type of Islam should be specified, in order to avoid
generalization.
Another aspect of this ambiguity is using the term Islam as a religion
and at the same time as a culture-civilization. Do we mean by Islam in
contemporary Islamic peace ethics, what contemporary Muslim scholars
think about war? Or do we mean what the ‘religious’ contemporary Mus‐
lim scholars argue, regarding peace/war issues based on Islamic sources?22
A problem searching for Islamic peace ethics is the over-theologization of
Muslim societies, or the over-Islamization of Muslims. It limits the Mus‐
lim society to its religious resources alone, and deprives it of its other nor‐
mative-cultural resources. This impoverishment can get in the way of de‐
20 Al-Dawoody, Ahmad. The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations, p.
2.
21 Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions.
Philadelphia, 1997, p. 21.
22 This question has many dimensions. One may ask further about the very religious-
secular binary. What are the sacred and secular elements in the normative system
in an Islamic society? How is their relationship and how they interact?
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veloping a comprehensive and functional normative attitude in these soci‐
eties towards any one topic, for example war.
Marshal Hodgson, an American historian, introduced the concept of Is‐
lamicate in his book The Venture of Islam, in order to distinguish Islam as
religion (Islamic), from Islam as a culture and civilization (Islamicate).23
This distinction can be helpful in avoiding this reductionist approach. Tak‐
ing this distinction into account, we can ask, regarding this research
project, if we mean by Islamic in ‘Islamic peace ethics’ either Islamic or
Islamicate? After reviewing Hodgson’s book on its 40th anniversary of
publication, and warning about giving the Muslims the role of ‘the bad
other’ in the West, Bruce B. Lawrence writes, ‘Hodgson is both so neces‐
sary and so perilous as a catalyst for our 21st century engagement with Is‐
lam’.24 It is of course plausible to study the attitude of religious tradition
alone in Islamicate societies, but the distinction needs to be explicitly
made, or there can be limiting and exclusionary implications that lead to
misunderstanding. Talking about the religious discourse of peace in Islam‐
ic societies, and not mentioning this distinction, implicitly reduces Islamic
societies to their religious dimension.
After his critique on the lack of adequate scholarship about Islam and
war in the West, James Johnson remarks in his book The Holy War Idea in
Western and Islamic Traditions that ‘there exist no general histories treat‐
ing the understanding of normative tradition on religion, statecraft, and
war in Islamic societies or in Islamic religious thought. Many significant
subjects remain unexplored for lack of researchers with the necessary
training and language skills.’25 The lack of a comprehensive account of
peace in Islam in the West can be explained partly because of the reduc‐
tionist approach towards Islam in orientalism, in imperialistic scholarship.
The reductionist approach is usually an aspect of the mechanism where the
23 Hodgson, M.G.S. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civi‐
lization. 1–3. Chicago, 1974. See also: Arnason, J.P. Marshall Hodgson’s civiliza‐
tional analysis of Islam: theoretical and comparative perspectives. 2006. In: J.P.
Arnason, A. Salvatore, G. Stauth (Eds.). Sociology of Islam (Yearbook n. 7): Islam
in Process. New Brunswick, 2006.
24 Lawrence, Bruce B. “Genius Denied and Reclaimed: A 40-Year Retrospect on
Marshall G.S. Hodgson’s ‘The Venture of Islam’”. http://marginalia.lareviewofboo
ks.org/retrospect-hodgson-venture-islam/ (access: 11.11. 2016).
25 Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions.
Philadelphia, 1997, p. 23. Cited in Al-Dawoody, Ahmad. The Islamic Law of War:
Justifications and Regulations, p. 2.
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centre deals with the periphery. This reductionism is partly responsible for
the current situation in the Middle East that seems to be ‘incapable to re‐
generate itself’.26 For a regeneration and renaissance, the Islamic world
should redefine itself, its intellectual history - a decolonized self and histo‐
ry. As Asma Afsaruddin reminds us, ‘The diversity of voices and opinions
that continue to characterize Muslim-majority societies, as well as the rich
spiritual and intellectual resources available within the Islamic tradition
(both as a religion and civilization)’27 should be taken into account.
Another limiting consequence of the Islamization of Muslims and cer‐
tain regions is depriving a region of its pre-Islamic cultural heritage. One
might hold that in dealing with topics such as peace and war in Islamic
societies we should regard Islam in its larger cultural context, and study its
exchanges and mutual influences in relation to its historical or contempo‐
rary neighbouring cultures and religions, such as Mesopotamian, Egyp‐
tian, Greek, Iranian, Judaism, Pre-Islamic Arab culture, Christianity etc.
These studies can help to understand the normative patterns in societies
better, as well as hinder one-sided and ahistorical essentialist approaches
to the problem. The comparative investigation of concepts such as vio‐
lence, war, peace, martyrdom, defense, missionary action, expansion etc.
in these different cultures can provide helpful insights. As the Ancient
Greek and Roman sources of the Christian-Western tradition generally,
specifically in peace ethics, show, the study of the sources of Islamic tradi‐
tion and peace ethics, including that of Mesopotamia and ancient manifes‐
tations of the civilization in the region, can help to explain and understand
the normative system of Islamic tradition and societies. The current atti‐
tude toward violence in this cultural sphere may be rooted in the mytho‐
logical and archetypical attitudes of these peoples towards life, death,
body, humanity, the Other etc. The (inter)cultural-historical studies of this
research topic can help firstly to avoid dichotomous and essentialist re‐
sults, as well as gaining deep and analytical knowledge through exploring
the general and specific archetypes, such as individual-collective contrac‐
tion-expansions, security-threat conceptions and the self-other etc.
A helpful approach might be a comparative study of Jewish and Islamic
peace ethics, because there is an obvious similarity in the normative order
26 Afsaruddin, Asma. “Contemporary Muslims and the Challenge of Modernity”.
Oxford, 17.07.2015: https://blog.oup.com/2015/07/contemporary-misconceptions-
islam/ (access: 11.11. 2016).
27 Afsaruddin. Contemporary Muslims. Oxford. 17.07.2015.
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of the knowledge cultures in both religions. Jewish religious scholarship is
divided into two main categories: halakhah and aggadah. Halakhah is the
practical and legal part and aggadah is the belief and dogma part. ‘Ha‐
lakhah is comprehensive and has the sentence of every detailed act of a
Jew. Halakhah means a ‘going’ a ‘change’ and denotes the way prescribed
by the Jewish religion from cradle to grave’.28 This is very similar to the
Islamic case, as the practical part of Islamic scholarship is called Shari‘ah
and it also means ‘path’. Marchal Breger, the Professor of law at the
American Catholic University, writes in his short essay about this similari‐
ty:
Similarities between Judaism and Islam are easy to see. [...] In both, law is
central, and personal and social existence is governed by a divinely ordained
legal system. There are also many obvious parallels between Judaism’s legal
system, known as Halachah, and the Islamic legal order of Shari‘ah. Both
purport to instruct us in how to attend to every aspect of one’s life: one’s get‐
ting up and one’s going out, one’s sexual practice and one’s business
practices. For some adherents of each, religious law also dictates political life,
such as for whom to vote.29
It is indeed no surprise that Islam owes a debt to Judaism for its dogma,
rituals, and historiography. This has been acknowledged in the Qur’an and
other Islamic primary sources. This demands a rethinking of the concept
of Islam in Islamic peace ethics, and pleads for a more inclusive approach
to normative sources of Islamicate societies.
Religion and violence: the over-theologization of socio-political
problems?
Another methodological question about the research project is the relation
between the normative and social-political aspects of violence and peace.
Asking about a normative approach to violence and peace, as this research
project does, can be misleading about the real and false root causes of vio‐
lence and peace. This research question presupposes and implies the reli‐
5.
28 von Stuckrad, Kocku (Ed.). The Brill Dictionary of Religion, “Judaism”. Leiden,
2006, p. 1083.
29 Breger, Marchall. “Why Jews Can’t Criticize Shari‘a Law”. In: Moment: Jewish
Politics, culture, and religion. January-February 2012. http://www.momentmag.co
m/why-jews-cant-criticize-sharia-law/ (access: 11.11. 2016).
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gious or normative nature (at least normative dimension) of current violent
acts by some Muslim groups. This may, however, be problematized as the
over-theologization of socio-political problems.30 Taking into account that
different world religions or ideologies have had both violative and tolera‐
tive phases in their history, it is plausible to ask what the determining fac‐
tor is in such socio-political phenomena? What is the role of religion in the
approach of a given society towards peace and war? What is the relation
between religious and non-religious factors? Is it the holy text and dogma
of these religions and ideologies, or the secular factors that cause violence
or peace? Do some cases of high tolerance in Islamic history, for example
in the 15th-16th century when Sephardi Jews were allowed to emigrate
from Christendom to Islamdom - the so-called Alhambra Decree - mean
an Islamic theological-religious consensus, or were socio-political factors
playing a determining role? Is the current opposite reaction and intoler‐
ance towards the Other in Islamdom because of their violence fostering
theology and poor normative peace tradition, or the result of regional and
global non-theological factors, including becoming marginalized in the
modern world and being subject to poverty and injustice? Does the colo‐
nial history of Islamic countries play any role in Islamic radicalism? Some
Islamic countries were colonized in 19th and 20th centuries. The region
was left with a longstanding legacy: artificial borders and national identi‐
ties causing ongoing conflicts, with local military elites allied to the colo‐
nizers and world powers. Context as well as methodologies can play a sig‐
nificant role in the position of contemporary Muslim scholars towards
peace and war. In this regard, the question of Islamic peace ethics needs to
take into consideration the socio-political context.
It seems that the question of Islamic peace ethics assumes that there is
an operating ethical or theological position. If, as some theories of interna‐
tional relations such as dependency theory holds, the ‘failed moderniza‐
tion’ in peripheral countries, including Islamic countries, is a constitutive
part of the world system but is not due to their local conditions, one must
ask whether the violence in such peripheral countries, including some Is‐
lamic countries, is a result of the world system, or a consequence of their
local culture or social system. There are some scholars, for example
Olivièr Roy, who reject any relation between Islam as religion and the re‐
30 Bayat, Asef. “Islam and Democracy: What is the Real Question?”, Amsterdam
University Press, ISIM Paper 8, 2007.
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cent Islamist-militant movements. Roy explains these movements as the
result of secularism and imperialism and being removed from Islamic tra‐
dition. He says:
I think that the current struggle is a continuation of the old confrontation be‐
tween anti-imperialist movements based in the Third World with the West and
specifically the US. [...] Al-Qaida is obviously a generational movement, it is
made up of young people who have distanced themselves from their families
and their social surroundings and who are not even interested in their country
of origin. Al-Qaida has an astonishing number of converts among its mem‐
bers, a fact which is recognized but has not received sufficient attention. The
converts are rebels without a cause who, thirty years ago, would have joined
the Red Army Faction (RAF) or the Red Brigades, but who now opt for the
most successful movement on the anti-imperialist market. [...] The new move‐
ments are profoundly skeptical about building an ideal society, which ex‐
plains the suicidal dimension also present in the RAF.31
This remark is highly relevant because our interpretation of conflicts af‐
fect also the solutions and strategies we adopt to manage them. If this re‐
search project leads to a misleading account of the root causes of the con‐
flicts, through focusing on religious-normative aspects rather than its so‐
cio-political roots, it could also contribute to a failure of conflict manage‐
ment.
Research on ‘Islamic peace ethics’ as epistemological violence from
the centre?
The sceptical view of the normative approach toward Islam-related violent
phenomena is more complicated if we take the concept of epistemological
violence into account. Epistemological violence is exerting force and re‐
producing hierarchy through research design, data collection, analysis, and
communication of the findings. Any phase of a research process entails
‘violent’ acts, by making exclusions and inclusions. A research project on
Islamic peace ethics can become, due to the research asymmetry, an in‐
strument that the centre in the world system uses, in order to burden the
shoulders of the victim and exculpate itself from any responsibility, for
problems that are the result of the centre’s colonialist-imperialist history,
5.1.
31 “Holy Secularism: Oliviér Roy talked to Eren Gvercin”. In: New Perspectives
Quarterly. 27/3. Summer 2010. http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2010_summer/
21_roy.html (access: 11.11. 2016).
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and the current unjust world system. A research project on Islamic peace
ethics may serve the centre firstly by putting the burden of responsibility
on the shoulders of the victim, secondly by calling the victim’s resistance
‘violent’ and thirdly by ascribing socio-political problems as inherent parts
of their culture and religion, and as irrational characteristics of the victim.
Thus, conducting a theological research into Islamic peace ethics, when
the determining factor of peace and war is socio-political, not only fails to
explain much about the problem and confuses the real socio-political caus‐
es (previously remarked upon) but it also frees the real perpitrator from
blame and gets in the way of the victim resisting. Therefore, this research
project should be wary of the question of epistemological violence and be
cautious in regard to any presuppositions concerning this aspect of the re‐
search.
Philosophical foundations of the question
If the violence we witness today in the name of Islam is a socio-political
phenomenon, and a reaction and resistance to a wider violence practiced
by the global centre and the consequence of an unjust world order, the
question that suggests itself is, can the centre’s violence be overcome or is
the centre-periphery model inherent in the world? One may hold that vio‐
lence is inherent even though type and role-player changes. This question
can be better understood if we take into consideration the fact that today’s
periphery was yesterday’s centre, and it practiced more or less the same
imperialist violence and Othering. Islam’s expansion, for example, in late
antiquity through Islamization and in some cases Arabization of the re‐
gion, was not without violence, either physical or epistemological. This in‐
sight requires investigating the question of violence at a deeper level and
asking further questions about the ontology and anthropology of violence.
Is violence an essential and irremovable component of the Being and hu‐
man, and therefore there was and always will be conflict in the world, or is
it an accidental element in the world that can be overcome? What is the
logic of its existence, if there is any? The importance and necessity of
these philosophical elaborations on peace can be better understood if we
take into account that, in spite of all efforts, there has been violence
throughout human history and there has hardly been any progress. Charles
Webel writes in this regard in his article ‘Toward a philosophy and
metapsychology of peace’:
6.
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If peace [...] is both a normative ideal [...] as well as a psychological need [...]
then why are violence and war (the apparent contraries of social, or outer,
peace), as well as unhappiness and misery (the expressions of a lack of inner
peace), so prevalent, not just in our time but for virtually all of recorded hu‐
man history? Given the facts of history and the ever-progressing understand‐
ing of our genetic and hormonal nature, is peace even conceivable, much less
possible?32
If violence cannot be overcome, but it just shifts deterministically from
one space and geography to another (at an international level), then asking
about its relation to one factor, for example Islamic or Christian tradition,
becomes a question that presupposes a kind of causality, which may be a
false question that confuses correlation as causality, due to a neglect of the
more fundamental (ontological) dimensions of the phenomena.
The philosophical foundations of the question also include, in addition
to the ontological and anthropological, the epistemological aspects of ask‐
ing about the relationship between religion/Islam and peace/violence, how
our perception of knowledge and the limitations of the human cognitive
faculty influences the proposition, formulation and researching of the
questions for this research project. How objective is our evaluation of an
act or an idea as either violent or peaceful? Are such evaluations and inter‐
pretations not historical and contextual? What implications have the his‐
toricity and contextuality of the episteme for Islamic peace studies? How
should we deal with the historicity and contextuality of our episteme in
applied normative fields, such as peace/conflict studies? The social-politi‐
cal conditions of knowledge should be considered here too. How do power
asymmetries influence our perception of the offensive and defensive char‐
acteristics of a violent act? How can we be sure not to confuse the position
of offender and offender, victim and criminal?
32 Webel, Charles. ‘Toward a Philosophy and Metapsychology of Peace.’ In: Charles
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Abstract: Leading representatives of religions involved in conflict frequently em‐
phasize the pacific impact of their particular convictions. However, in studies of
religions as well as in political science it seems to be commonplace that the im‐
pact of religions in conflict is ambiguous. The question arises: does it exclusively
depend on the political, sociological, and economical circumstances that religions
either foster or discourage violence? Is it possible to identify the core message of a
certain religion in reference to violence? Moreover, how might an affirmative an‐
swer to the question escape the allegation of essentialism?
Introduction
At the beginning of the third millennium and throughout the world in mili‐
tary conflicts, on the one hand, political leaders recurrently legitimate their
political claims or even violent measures by referring to religious argu‐
ments. On the other hand and simultaneously, religious representatives
normally emphasize the appeasing and pacific character of the religion
they profess.
Frequently this phenomenon in literature is called ‘ambiguity of reli‐
gion’, or ‘ambivalence of sacred’.1 Ambiguity in this context means that
religious arguments can be used to justify or even foster violence just as
easily as to minimize or abate violence in conflicts, to establish peace and
to promote reconciliation. Some essayists call this the ‘Janus-faced nature’
1 Cf. Appleby, R. Scott. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and
Reconciliation. Lanham MD, 2000.
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of religion – referring to the two-faced Roman deity who looks both to the
future and the past.2
But can we really accept the theory that religions are essentially am‐
bivalent with regard to social, political, and military violence? For then we
would be obliged to say that in the end religious ideas are completely irrel‐
evant with regard to their influence on human behaviour. Religious ideas –
as multifaceted as they might be – wouldn’t have any effect on private, so‐
cial, or political actions. They would be void of any normative or critical
function in society. Religious ideas would have the sole function of legit‐
imizing human behaviour – either before action or in retrospect – that
would be primarily motivated by political, sociological, and economical
reasons. Religions would serve as a maidservant to social or political ac‐
tions.
It is clear that such a consequence is hardly acceptable for any commit‐
ted adherent of a religion. Although it is difficult to present a comprehen‐
sive definition of ‘religion’, it is generally accepted that religions present a
certain understanding of reality and human existence. From this starting
point, religions offer some orientation in social relationships, they help to
deal with suffering and contingency, and they nurture spiritual progress.
Religions claim to establish helpful rules for individual, social, and even
political behaviour. Evidently this self-concept of religion contradicts the
previous theory that religion is of no key significance for human be‐
haviour.
Therefore the question arises whether or not there is any substantial and
normative impact of religions on human behaviour. Do the various reli‐
gious ideas on nature and human beings have any effect on human be‐
haviour, particularly with regard to violence and peace?
2 Cf. Schaefer, Heinrich. ‘The Janus Face of Religion. On the Religious Factor in
New Wars.’ In: Numen. 51. 2004, pp. 407-431; Stewart, Pamela J. / Strathern, An‐
drew. ‘Religion and Violence from an Anthropological Perspective.’ In: Mark Juer‐
gensmeyer, Margo Kitts, Michael Jerryson (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Reli‐
gion and Violence. Oxford, 2015, pp. 375-384, p. 380; Scheffler, Thomas (Ed.). Re‐




Frequently researchers refer to the performance of human sacrifices by
Meso-American Aztecs when they consider the relationship between reli‐
gion and violence.3 In doing so it is important to realize that the Aztecs
had good reasons to perform these sacrifices constantly. According to their
religious convictions the Sun would not have kept moving, had they inter‐
rupted their sacrificial practices.
But these convictions would by no means suffice to allow us at the
present time to sanction the Aztecs’ practice of sacrifice. First of all it is
compassion and advocacy for the victims that encourage commentators on
the beginning of the 3rd millennium to criticize the Aztecs’ belief and
practice. Compassion appears legitimate, even if one is aware of the tem‐
poral gap that yawns between the age of the Aztecs and the present day.
Compassion seems to be legitimate, even if one bears in mind the fact that
moral standards have changed over the course of time. On the basis of
compassion it seems to be legitimate – or even compulsory – to criticize
the link between the Aztecs’ religion and violence.
Furthermore, from a contemporary point of view, it is the normative
standard of human rights that encourages judging the Aztecs’ belief and
practice to be intolerable. Human sacrifice does not respect the basic hu‐
man right to life and physical integrity – not to mention other human
rights that are violated by the practice of human sacrifice.
But bloodshed and human sacrifice are exactly what are demanded by
Aztec mythology, the foundation for the Aztecs’ mode of understanding
reality. This mythology is the conceptual basis of social, ritual, and even
political and military behaviour and action. On the ritual level it demands
human sacrifice in order to maintain the world. Therefore one cannot easi‐
ly deny that the religion of the Aztecs justifies and fosters violence.
Another question deals with the authorization for blaming the Aztecs’
religion for fostering violence. The deep historical and cultural gap be‐
tween the Actecs’ time and the present age makes an affirmative answer
difficult. Furthermore, is ‘blaming’ a legitimate category of historical sur‐
vey?
1.
3 Cf. Carrasco, Davíd. ‘Sacrifice / Human Sacrifice in Religious Traditions.’ In: Juer‐
gensmeyer et al. (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence. Oxford,
2015, p. 209-225, here p. 217.
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In any case, although this frequently quoted example is somewhat ex‐
treme, it does allow a closer scrutiny of some basic aspects of the leading
question, whether it is legitimate or even possible to state that some reli‐
gions foster violence, and some do not. Presupposing contemporaneity of
religions – what precisely is the basis on which a critique of religion refer‐
ring to violence is feasible? Furthermore, does such a critique authorize
the establishment of a sort of ranking of religions with regard to their in‐
herent dynamics of violence and peace? And finally, as a possible caveat –
would this ranking introduce a certain kind of essentialism? But what is
the meaning of the concept ‘essentialism’?
Religion and ‘essentialism’
Apparently, the concept of essentialism is not well received in the scientif‐
ic community. Usually it suggests that for any specific entity there is a set
of attributes that are necessary to its identity and function.4 This implies in
particular to cultures and religions. It is evident that the subject of my in‐
quiry doesn’t aim at ontological or metaphysical essentialism, but at cul‐
tural or religious essentialism.5 ‘Cultural’ or ‘religious essentialism’
means that somebody claims to be able to define what is necessarily – by
nature – linked to a certain culture or religion.
Anne Phillips, Professor for Political and Gender Theory at the London
School of Economics and Political Science, distinguishes four types of so‐
cial essentialism:
The first is the attribution of certain characteristics to everyone subsumed
within a particular category: the ‘(all) women are caring and empathetic’,
‘(all) Africans have rhythm’, ‘(all) Asians are community oriented’ syn‐
drome. The second is the attribution of those characteristics to the category, in
2.
4 Cf. Cartwright, Richard L. ‘Some remarks on essentialism.’ In: The Journal of Phi‐
losophy. 1968, 65, pp. 615–626.
5 Cf. Grillo, Ralph D. ‘Cultural Essentialism and Cultural Anxiety’. In: Anthropolog‐
ical Theory, 2003, p. 158, ‘By “cultural essentialism” I mean a system of belief
grounded in a conception of human beings as “cultural” (and under certain condi‐
tions territorial and national) subjects, i.e. bearers of a culture, located within a
boundaried world, which defines them and differentiates them from others’. Cf.
Grillo, Ralph D. ‘Islam and Transnationalism.’ In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies. 2004, 30. p. 864: ‘It must be accepted that for some people a person's
essence is captured by their religious identity.’
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ways that naturalize or reify what may be socially created or constructed. The
third is the invocation of a collectivity as either the subject or object of politi‐
cal action (‘the working class’, ‘women’, ‘Third World women’), in a move
that seems to presume a homogeneous and unified group. The fourth is the
policing of this collective category, the treatment of its supposedly shared
characteristics as the defining ones that cannot be questioned or modified
without undermining an individual’s claim to belong to that group.6
According to Phillips we can’t avoid generalizations when we try to com‐
prehend something. In biology this is evident: without a clear and well-de‐
fined taxonomy it is impossible to classify different animals or plants.
Therefore, according to Phillips, avoiding essentialism is a matter of cau‐
tion and prudence. What matters is – primarily – the intensity of generaliz‐
ing characteristics.
Intensity of characteristics, in turn, is always a matter of dispute. To
avoid a misguided essentialism – ‘misguided’ in the sense of naturalized
characteristics that are socially created – there must be a distinctive open‐
ness to reassessment and criticism. Critical analysis takes for granted the
capability and the willingness to reflect on one’s own understanding of a
phenomenon.
It is Phillips’s second distinction that seems to be most instructive here:
the attribution of specific characteristics to a certain religion, ‘in ways that
naturalize or reify what may be socially created or constructed’. Phillips
encourages distinguishing between the adherents of a religion and the reli‐
gion itself. ‘Religion itself’ doesn’t exist in reality. Instead it is a mere so‐
cial and conceptual construction that underlies multiple and alterable con‐
ditions. Thereby the expression ‘religion itself’ might be conceived to be
the vanishing point of religious ideas, conceptions, and practices that de‐
fine identity and behaviour of such persons we usually call the adherents
of a certain religion.7
It is unnecessary to say that there are very different manners of adher‐
ence to certain religions. Furthermore, human beings always exist with
multiple identities: they operate in the context of their belonging to a cer‐
tain race, gender, culture, nationality, and social role in society very differ‐
6 Phillips, Anne. ‘What’s wrong with essentialism?’ In: Gender and Culture. Cam‐
bridge, 2010, pp. 57-82, particularly 71 s.
7 In the present paper, I do not address the difficult question of how to discern be‐
tween religion and ideology if one accepts this definition. Nor do I discuss the com‐
plex issue of the concept of ‘violence’ – what it is and what it is not.
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ently. This also applies to the individual’s belonging to a certain religious
tradition.
Therefore the appearance of a ‘religion’ in human society essentially
depends on the manner in which normative texts and traditions are inter‐
preted by ordinary adherents, or by religious authorities. It depends on the
way in which these groups derive theoretical conclusions, spiritual bene‐
fits, and normative orientations from their interpretations of religious texts
and traditions.
Although a clear distinction between religious ideas and believers is
necessary, both dimensions are closely linked with each other. There is a
dynamic and complex process of interaction between texts and traditions,
between interpretation and behaviour.
Normative traditions are written corpora, oral traditions, ritual customs,
and social practices that are transmitted from generation to generation.
Their normative force is never released from interpretation. I only need
make mention of Gadamer’s famous ‘hermeneutical circle’ and his con‐
cept of ‘prejudice’ or ‘mind-set’ (Vorverständnis).8 It requires a certain de‐
gree of self-consciousness, capability to discern, and willingness to
question one’s own convictions in order to reflect on the hermeneutical
circle that guides every interpretation.
This fact applies to religious convictions as well. Normally believers
and religious authorities feel obliged to act in a manner that respects reli‐
gious texts and traditions. They tend to regard them as indisputable and
unalterable commands. To reflect analytically about one’s own under‐
standing of normative texts, traditions, and practices in religious commu‐
nities is not at all a matter of course.
This observation suggests to question the relationship between reli‐
gions, on the one hand, and human reason on the other hand. Human rea‐
son is inevitably involved if religious texts, traditions, and practices are in‐
terpreted. This is even more the case if normative conclusions are drawn.9
But it is precisely this involvement of human reason that furnishes a cri‐
terion for questioning the relationship between a particular religion and vi‐
olence, I would argue.
8 Cf. Gadamer, Hans Georg. Truth and Method. 2nd ed. (1st English ed., 1975). J.
Weinsheimer and D.G.Marshall (Trans.). New York, 1989, pp. 366-369.
9 Fundamentalism essentially means a denial of the critical function of human reason
when religious texts and traditions are interpreted.
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Religion, human rights, and human reason
My thesis that human reason furnishes a criterion for questioning the rela‐
tionship between a particular religion and violence might be clarified by a
very brief reference to the vast complex of human rights.
I already stated that criticizing the Aztec practice of human sacrifices
might by encouraged by present standards of human rights comprising the
basic rights of corporeal integrity and self-determination. In modern times,
mankind reached the position of being able to claim that respect for hu‐
man rights is based solely on the fact that someone is a human being. It
doesn’t matter to which nation or ethnic group he or she belongs.10 Nor
does it matter to what religion or ideology he or she adheres.
From a global perspective today, we have achieved an international
standard of human rights that can’t easily be ignored. Human rights are
universally compelling – at least theoretically. They regulate human be‐
haviour even if conflicts occur between members of different ideologies
and cultures or between adherents of different religions. They should be
respected even in the case of war.
However, both the extent and the authority of human rights are nowa‐
days highly disputed throughout the world. Frequently they are suspected
to be a means of Western colonialism.11 Passionate disputes continue on
women’s rights and gender equality in general, and religious liberty for in‐
stance. Nevertheless, there is hardly any state in the world where politi‐
cians do not justify political measures or claims with reference to human
rights.
Even if human rights are contentious issues, some pivotal rights exist
that are accepted by nearly everybody. First and foremost is that a person’s
right to life and physical integrity should never be violated. In emergen‐
cies or in cases of self-defence there might be exceptions, but normally
this basic human right is to be respected unconditionally.12
3.
10 Cf. Bielefeldt, Heiner. ‘Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Human
Rights.’ In: Martin Scheinin, Catarina Krause (Eds.). International Protection of
Human Rights: A Textbook. Åbo, 2009, pp. 3-18.
11 Cf. Burke, Roland. Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human
Rights. Philadelphia, 2010.
12 Therefore torture according to UN Conventions is forbidden even in cases where it
may serve to save innocent human beings (the ticking-bomb-scenario). Other hu‐
man rights are the right to self-determination, the right to freedom of movement,
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Historically the various declarations of human rights have their origins
in the need for political consensus as a consequence of the violent wars
throughout the 16th and 17th centuries CE in Europe. Some of these wars
have been justified by religious arguments that were advocated by differ‐
ent confessional denominations or churches.
In 1648, after the Thirty Year’s War, a political consensus was estab‐
lished in Europe. The conclusion of peace agreements was rendered possi‐
ble by a preceding exclusion of religion from the political sphere. The so-
called ‘Peace of Westphalia’ was principally based on human reason, not
on religious belief. The various agreements came about through political
pragmatism. Simultaneously the opposed coalitions agreed to ban any reli‐
giously legitimated political claims to represent the only truth as Christian.
The philosophers Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke
(1632-1704) designed their theories of the state on the basis of an analysis
of the human condition and by focussing on human welfare. According to
them it is human reason that offers a common ground to achieve a balance
between conflicting interests, and not religion.13
The original impetus of the Enlightenment entailed a decided shift to‐
wards humanism, secularism, and rationalism in the Western world. Fur‐
thermore it is not revelation or divine will that should direct human be‐
haviour but theoretical and practical reasoning. The last foundation of so‐
ciety is – or at least should be – the dignity of human beings and human
reason. Mutual respect and tolerance should rule daily life. Differences
should be acknowledged and even valued in order to enrich the plurality
of a society. The only limits to be safeguarded in society are the property
the right to freedom of thought and religion, and the right to peacefully assemble –
including the right to live in a family.
13 Cf. Hobbes, Thomas. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic. John Gaskin,
Charles Addison (Eds.). Oxford, 1994 [1640], pp. 1-182; Hobbes, Thomas.
Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall
and Civil. Ian Shapiro (Ed.). Yale, 2010 [1651]. – Cf. Hoekstra, Kinch. ‘Hobbes
on Law, Nature and Reason.’ In: Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2003, 41,
pp. 111–120; Krom, Michael P. The Limits of Reason in Hobbes's Common‐
wealth. New York, 2011; Venezia, Luciano. ‘Hobbes' Two Accounts of Law and
the Structure of Reasons for Political Obedience.’ In: European Journal of Politi‐
cal Theory, 2013, 13, pp. 282-298; Locke, John. Letter Concerning Toleration.
James Tully (Ed.). Indianapolis, 1983 [1689]; Locke, John. Two Treatises of Gov‐
ernment. Peter Laslett (Ed.), Cambridge, 1988 [1689]; Cf. Grant, Ruth. ‘John




of human beings, mental and physical integrity, and religious belief and
practice. A peaceful life in the community seems to be possible if these
principles are respected by every citizen.
After World War II, however, and in the light of political totalitarian‐
ism, mankind realized that the age of Enlightenment was not able to ex‐
clude war and violence from European history. With regard to totalitarian
regimes, the German philosophers Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) and
Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) recognized the ‘The Dialectic of Enlighten‐
ment’ (1947).
According to Horkheimer and Adorno human reason bears a totalitarian
tendency that is ushered in via its limitless claim to dominate nature and
human reality. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the Enlightenment’s
emphasis on reason leads to domination in a triple sense: the domination
of nature by human beings, the domination of nature within human beings,
and the domination of human beings by others.14
Consequently ‘postmodern’ philosophers attempt to justify different
and even conflicting interpretations of the world. They suppose a plurality
of reasons within human mind. They stress the value as well as the limits
of different interpretations of reality.
These interpretations usually are characterized by conceptual coher‐
ence. But they are intentionally restricted with regard to their possible ap‐
plication to human life. Postmodern theories of truth deny that there is
such a thing as an overwhelming reason that allows a comparison between
different and competitive interpretations of the world, particularly with re‐
gard to their practical consequences. Evidently, this assumption also af‐
fects our attitudes to religion.
Indeed, one might doubt if universally compelling reason exists at all.
From a postmodern point of view, one might claim that there are only li‐
mited fields or realms of language, culture, and religious beliefs. Today
exponents of ‘Postcolonial Studies’ encourage questioning the existence
of universal human reason. In their criticism of colonialism, violent ‘oth‐
ering’, Eurocentrism, and exclusionary policies, they deny that one culture
or religion is superior to another. Consequently, it is not possible to blame
14 Cf. Horkheimer, Max / Adorno, Theodor W. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philo‐
sophical Fragments [1947]. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Ed.). Stanford, 2002.
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adherents of a certain religion with regard to their attitude towards vio‐
lence.15
On the other hand, does the postmodern appreciation of conflicts justify
the use of violence in conflicts? As a matter of course it doesn’t. But how
can one argue in favour of social, cultural, and ideological conflicts by si‐
multaneously banning violent conflicts between members of different cul‐
tures or adherents of different religions?
It is communication that thus becomes indispensable in order to over‐
come conflicts and violence. Every attempt at understanding the position
of an adversary is useful in order to ban violence and establish peace.
But how do members of different cultures or adherents of different reli‐
gions communicate – particularly if they use different languages and sym‐
bols? Particularly in the shadow of violent and exclusionary policies we
recognize the need for a human reason that is – at least to some extent –
universally compelling.
Obviously we cannot compare human reason with an archipelago that
consists of a number of solitary islands. Otherwise communication be‐
tween human beings belonging to different languages and cultures would
be completely impossible. Therefore, we cannot escape supposing the ex‐
istence of certain sets of symbols, meanings, and concepts that facilitate
communication across different languages, cultures, and even religions.
But these sets are neither stable nor immutable. Sometimes they are taken
for granted and sometimes they are a matter of dispute and conflict. In any
case they have an essentially historical dimension.
Based on this premise, it seems to be legitimate or even compulsory to
criticize religious beliefs and religious practices, particularly when they
tend to disturb peaceful life.
Corresponding, national constitutions are normally a statement and cod‐
ification of a certain kind of overwhelming consensus on the basic values
of a multifaceted and pluralistic society. For the benefit of human society
characterized by social diversity and religious plurality, it is essential that
the guiding principles of its constitution dominate the statutes of particular
groups – including religious groups. This principle has to be enforced
even if these groups claim that they have to obey some ‘higher’ religious
truth or revelation.




But what if adherents of a religious practice or creed are not committed
to a rational reflection of their own presumptions? Such an attitude might
well be justified by their own prevailing religious convictions. It seems
impossible to oblige religious communities or even compel them by exter‐
nal pressure to elucidate their convictions and traditions using human rea‐
son. In this case, inevitably social conflicts are imminent.
In modern, secular, and pluralistic societies it is human reason alone
that furnishes a basis for mutual understanding and tolerance. Here in‐
evitably the question arises whether it is possible to achieve some coher‐
ence between human reason and religious beliefs? Usually this question
cannot be answered in a general manner, because the variety of religions
implies a variety of attitudes to, and connections with, human reason.
This variety becomes obvious in the light of the religions’ attitude to
human rights. One of the basic disagreements about human rights is the
question of its foundation. Secularists insist on an autonomous foundation
to human rights. Very often they argue explicitly in opposition to religious
claims. They point to the indisputable fact that in the past and in the
present religions frequently justify and even foster violence. They claim
that in spite of its limitations, and its misuses, it is only human reason that
in the long run preserves non-violence and peace. Religious authorities of‐
ten reject this position because they regard it as an attack on the sovereign‐
ty of religion. Therefore they try to root human rights in religious tradi‐
tions. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) is a well-
known example of this approach.16
Therefore a number of questions arise. Can the reference to human
rights be generalized in order to criticize religions? What would justify
such an extension? Can the reference to human rights furnish a basis for
the evaluation and even a ranking of religions concerning their relation‐
ship to violence and peace?
According to Charles Seelengut, professor of the sociology of religion
and expert on the psychology of religious movements, ‘for the faithful, re‐
ligious mandates are self-legitimating: they are true and proper rules not
because they can be proven to be so by philosophers or because they have
16 Cf. the critical approach of Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘“Western” Versus “Islamic” Human
Rights Conceptions? A Critique of Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Hu‐
man Rights.’ In: Political Theory. 28.2000, pp. 90-121.
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social benefits but because they emanate from a divine source’.17 Conse‐
quently, logical reasoning does not play as much of a role as loyalty to
one’s religious creed.
But does it really matter in social or political practice whether human
dignity is based on religious authority or on secular reasoning? To believe
that a human being is created in the image of God – as it is proposed in the
Holy Bible (Genesis 1:27) – or to assert that a human being is a moral sub‐
ject – as it is proposed by humanists and by the philosophers of the En‐
lightenment – leads to the same practical consequence: every individual
human being has to be respected unconditionally.18 Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804) argued that rational human beings should be dealt with not as
a means to something else, but as an ‘end-in-themselves’. This means that
a human being’s value doesn't depend on anything apart from being hu‐
man.
The bottom line is that this philosophical conclusion by no means con‐
tradicts religiously founded valuations of human beings – at least if one
considers the major religious groups today. Frequently in contemporary
religious traditions, one encounters the idea of the “sanctity of human
life”. Although this idea does not directly furnish a basis for the claim of
unconditional human rights, it might be taken as a starting point for a mu‐
tual understanding between adherents of a certain creed and secular
philosophers.
Philosophers sometimes discern between discovery, justification, and
validity of moral norms.19 In our context, it might be useful to set aside
the questions of discovery and justification. What is important is validity:
the acceptance of human rights in principle, even if they are highly disput‐
ed in detail. For the acceptance of individual human rights encourages ac‐
cepting difference and otherness – otherness of religious conviction, sexu‐
al orientation, political alignment etc.
The dispute about particular implications of human rights follows – or
should follow – reasonable arguments primarily in order to clarify differ‐
17 Seelengut, Charles. Sacred Fury. Understanding Religious Violence. 2nd ed. Lan‐
ham, 2008, p. 6.
18 This applies at least in principle. Exceptions are given in war or if there is a con‐
flict between human lifes in case of medical emergency – to give only two exem‐
ples.
19 Cf. Habermas, Juergen. ‘Rightness Versus Truth.’ In: Truth and Justification.
Hoboken NJ, 2014, pp. 237-276, particularly p. 244 f.
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ent standpoints and claims. In public discourse, according to Habermas
every disputant is obliged to ensure that everybody is able to understand
his position and arguments even if he doesn’t share the convictions of the
opposite party. These clarifications will be based nowhere but on the field
of human reason – even if it is limited or fragmented, as postmodern
philosophers claim. And perhaps in the long run religious mind-sets will
benefit from reasonable arguments as well. For reasonable arguments bear
the potential not only to contaminate religious convictions and practices
but also to purify them in the light of their own normative religious tradi‐
tions.20
Thus we might say that human reason and respect for human dignity are
the basis for the criteria that allows us to judge religious claims in general,
and their relationship to violence in particular.
The alternative undoubtedly is even worse. If there were no categories
to judge religious beliefs and practices, we would be obliged to give our
assent to any kind of religion, or to any kind of cultural or social be‐
haviour. Then we would have to accept that the sacrifices of the Aztecs as
well as the crimes of the so-called Islamic State are justified by their par‐
ticular reasons. The Aztecs’ explanation of the cosmos was coherent and
plausible, and consequently their practice of sacrifice was justifiable. The
same argument is valid with regard to the Islamic State.
The conclusion seems compulsory: We can’t abandon external criteria
in order to disapprove forms of religiously motivated or justified violence.
And it is human reason that furnishes these criteria – in spite of its limita‐
tions.
Additionally, I would argue that this lesson of European history and
philosophy is universally valid. In any case, it should not be too hastily
blamed as being a colonial discourse.
20 Cf. Habermas, Juergen. ‘Faith and Knowledge.’ In: The Future of Human Nature.
Cambridge, 2003, pp. 101-115. Cf. Audi, Robert / Wolterstorff, Nicolas (Edd.).
Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political De‐
bate. Maryland 1997; Audi, Robert. Religious Commitment and Secular Reason.
Cambridge, 2000.
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Religion, violence, and peace
Admittedly human reason is fundamentally shaped by culture, history, bi‐
ography, and in no small measure by religious traditions. But if human
reason is conditioned in many cases and multifaceted, can we then derive
from it universal criteria to evaluate the relationship between a certain reli‐
gion and violence?
In recent years, some remarkable theories have been presented that deal
with the relationship between religion and violence, taking a universal ap‐
proach. Mark Juergensmeyer for instance, a world-renowned scholar in re‐
ligious studies and sociology, affirms that while violence is not an exclu‐
sive monopoly of religious individuals or groups, it is apparent that reli‐
gions frequently provide compelling symbols that render violence more
likely.21 Because all religions are, in one way or another, inherently revo‐
lutionary, as Juergensmeyer argues, the motivations or the justifications
for violence are not restricted to any single religious tradition.22
Jan Assmann, a German Egyptologist, took a similar position when he
claimed that monotheism in particular is a compulsory source of religious‐
ly legitimated violence. According to Assmann, the assumption that there
is only one God inevitably leads to religious intolerance. He argued that if
one is convinced that there is only one God, the coercive consequence is
that only one and single truth is prevailing. This truth has to be propagated
all over the world in order to honour the one and only God. Everyone who
continues to adhere to deities other than the one and only God is either de‐
luded or an incorrigible liar. In consequence he has to be eradicated in or‐
der to establish the only legitimate social and political order in the world
referring to the one and single truth.23
4.
21 Cf. Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Reli‐
gious Violence. Berkeley, 2001, p. 105.
22 Cf. Sloterdijk, Peter. God’s Zeal: The Battle of the Three Monotheisms. Cam‐
bridge, 2009.
23 Cf. Assmann, Jan. Of God and Gods: Egypt, Israel, and the Rise of Monotheism.
Madison WI, 2008; Assmann, Jan. The Mosaic Distinction or The Price of
Monotheism. Stanford, 2009; Cf. already Langerak, Edward. ‘Theism and Tolera‐
tion.’ In: Quinn, Philip L. / Taliaferro, Charles (Eds.). A Companion to Philosophy
and Religion. Cambridge MA, 1997, p. 515, ‘The motivation for religious intoler‐
ance and violence intensified when monotheism became not just universalistic but
also exclusivistic and expansionistic, as it did with Christianity and Islam.’
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Christian theologians did not criticize Assmann solely with reference to
peaceful traditions in the Bible.24 More compelling is their objection that
Assmann’s argument is purely formal. By no means does it respect the
conceptual content and normative implications of religious traditions and
beliefs Assmann refers to.
Provided that the truth of the one and only God is summarized in God’s
command to love one another, it would be self–contradicting to propagate
this truth by violent means. And this supposition is not a mere hypothesis.
During World War II, Jehovah’s Witnesses suffered a great deal by refus‐
ing military service, because they insisted on God’s command that thou
shalt not kill (Exodus 20:13). Today, Quakers in particular, and other
churches committed to peace, are recognized primarily for their categori‐
cal rejection of violence as a justifiable form of behaviour.
What insight do we derive from this dispute? It encourages us not only
to scrutinize the formal structure of a religion – if it is monotheistic or not,
for instance – but also to scrutinize its contents. What are the basic ideas
of a religion? What is the manner in which it interprets reality? What nor‐
mative conclusions are derived from this interpretation?
These questions build up a comprehensive idea of a certain religion. It
does not at all deny internal differences in a religious community – differ‐
ences with regard to the interpretation of normative texts and traditions, as
well as differences with regard to ritual or daily-life practice. But it fo‐
cusses on the central beliefs of a religion, which might be considered as
being at the heart of all its possible interpretations and practices. In spite
of inner divergences therefore, it is not impossible to identify the core of a
particular religion.25
24 Cf. Zenger, Erich. ‘Der Mosaische Monotheismus im Spannungsfeld von
Gewalttätigkeit und Gewaltverzicht.’ In: Peter Walter (Ed.). Das Gewaltpotential
des Monotheismus und der dreieine Gott (Quaestiones disputatae 216). Freiburg,
2005, pp. 39-73; Zenger, Erich. ‘Gewalt als Preis der Wahrheit? Alttestamentliche
Beobachtungen zur sogenannten Mosaischen Unterscheidung.’ In: Friedrich
Schweitzer (Ed.). Religion, Politik und Gewalt (Veröffentlichungen der Wis‐
senschaftlichen Gesellschaft für Theologie, 29). Gütersloh, 2006, pp. 37-39, par‐
ticularly pp. 37-39; Cf. Bernstein, Richard. Violence: Thinking without Banisters.
Hoboken New Jersey, 2013, The Mosaic Distinction.
25 For Christians this core probably is the belief in a triune God and his incarnation
in a single human being; for Muslims the belief in the one and only God and his
Prophet Mohammad.
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Inescapably, this core will be a matter of dispute in order to identify its
theoretical and practical implications. These implications will change in
different circumstances and at different times in history. But I would argue
that in the course of these disputes there will appear a certain vanishing-
point that directs all reflections and practices in the overwhelming frame‐
work of a certain religion – even if this point itself is unattainable.
I would like to make the case that there are essential ideas in a particu‐
lar religion that cannot be negated without abandoning this religion. Oth‐
erwise it would be impossible to distinguish one religion from another. It
does make a difference whether you believe in a triune God, or if you sup‐
pose a non-personal deity, for instance.
Does this mean ‘essentialism’? The problem will be increased if we
claim that believing has certain practical consequences that follow from
the core of a certain religion.
In the early 20th century the German theologian Erik Peterson wrote his
landmark essay on ancient political theology entitled ‘Monotheism as a
Political Problem’.26 In this essay Peterson claimed that the belief in a tri‐
une God entails the acceptance of difference and plurality. This acceptance
has immediate consequences for the interpretation of a political system.
Peterson’s idea is that strict monotheism fosters monarchianism, whereas
the belief in a triune God fosters pluralism. Here indeed we face an ap‐
proach we are more likely to call essentialism. Christian emperors, in
Byzance as well as in Western Europe, continued to reign without any
commitment to pluralism or even democracy. Obviously, one has to dis‐
cern between theory and practice, between belief and behaviour.
Many researchers maintain that all religions foster violence because of
their claim for supremacy.27 In contradiction, I would argue that the adher‐
ents of a certain religion are less likely to justify and foster violence if the
normative content of religious texts, traditions, and practices they refer to
permits, or even encourages them to acknowledge religious and social plu‐
rality. Admittedly, history shows a large number of contradictory political
26 Cf. Peterson, Erik. ‘Monotheism as a Political Problem’ [1935]. In: Theological
Tractates. Michael J. Hollerich (Ed.). Stanford, 2011, pp. 68-105.
27 Cf. Gort, Jerald D. / Vroom, M. Hendrick (Eds.). Religion, Conflict, and Reconcil‐
iation. Amsterdam, 2002, p. 3: ‘The presence of many religions in the world and
the claim for supremacy by all religions have led to conflict, dissentions, and ve‐
hement reactions to religion instead of uniting mankind.’
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practices. But it will hardly be possible to completely deny the influence
of normative texts and traditions on human behaviour.
My thesis is that the texts, traditions, and practices bear their own force.
Therefore they are not without any influence on social or political be‐
haviour. In the long run they can animate the adherents of a certain reli‐
gion to acknowledge difference, to question themselves, to accept ambigu‐
ity, and to be prepared for empathy and compassion, and in a word, pro‐
mote peace.
Nevertheless, all these capacities are ruled and limited by historical
conditions. Therefore their effects by no means are compulsory. Neverthe‐
less, I would argue that this statement is sufficient to establish an at least
provisional ranking of religions with regard to their capacity to overcome
violence, to encourage peace, and to promote reconciliation.
This ranking depends on the manner in which normative texts and tradi‐
tions are interpreted. It may change in time, and it may be passionately
disputed amongst the adherents of a certain religion at a particular time.
Therefore, the ranking is always subject to modification. However, this
undeniable fact does not contradict the fundamental possibility of ranking.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the likely answer to the initial question whether it is essen‐
tialism to claim that some religions foster violence and some do not, de‐
pends on the manner in which one defines essentialism. According to
Anne Phillips we can’t avoid essentialism when we try to understand any‐
thing. Therefore essentialism is a matter of degree: to what extent are we
willing to question our judgement on something we wish to comprehend?
Our willingness to reach a dialogue between divergent positions might be
an indicator as to whether we are really open to modify our judgement.
Evidently my question entails another dimension: is it legitimate to
claim that some religions foster violence – and others do not? I dare to
say: yes, it is – at least for a particular moment in history. Even if we take
into account that we never get in contact with a religion itself – because it
is always mediated by human interpretation and practice – we can distin‐
guish between normative texts and traditions that foster violence, and dif‐
ferent normative texts and traditions that do not. The case is clear if we
compare the religion of the Aztecs with that of the Jehovah’s Witnesses or
5.
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the Quakers. Admittedly these examples are extremes, with a wide range
of possibilities in between.
The claim that a certain religion fosters violence will inevitably pro‐
voke objections and disputes. These disputes are necessary in order to
avoid misleading essentialism. Moreover they are necessary in order to
preserve the ability of religiously committed people to revise their attitude
towards violence.
Any statement about the relationship of a certain religion to violence is
based on a complex analysis: one has to analyse the manner in which its
adherents interpret reality, and what practical conclusions they derive from
their interpretation. And one has to analyse to what extent social or politi‐
cal behaviour is oriented by a more or less considered interpretation of
normative texts, traditions, and preceding practices.
In order to fulfil this task researchers are referred to the interplay be‐
tween normative texts and traditions with contemporary religious figures.
They are referred to the actual practice of the members of a religious com‐
munity who bind themselves to religious texts, traditions, and authorities.
Notably, they have to scrutinize the manner in which normative texts and
traditions, religious authorities, and the ‘ordinary’ adherents of a religion
interact. Who interprets normative texts and traditions? How is the inter‐
pretation executed, and how binding is its character? To what extend are
the texts and their interpretations normative with regard to ritual commit‐
ment, and to daily life?
All these questions will have to be answered in detail in order to decide
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Abstract: This chapter is conceptual and raises significant issues framing and un‐
derlying the discussion of Islamic peace ethics. The workshop title, ‘Islamic Peace
Ethics: Legitimate and Illegitimate Violence in Contemporary Islamic Thought’
implies the question whether or not Islam and/or Islamic thought embodies inher‐
ently violent forms. While any religion can be used for violence, parts of current
political and public discourse portray Islam – and thereby also Muslims – as
somehow violent, which is a highly problematic view. Biases are a natural part of
any society. A bias is also illustrated, for example, when academics ask certain
questions rather than others. In political terms, the inquiry into Islamic peace
ethics can also be seen as an application of power. Thus, Islam and Muslims may
be delimited while the West and Western self are safeguarded. This perspective
leads us to two conceptual themes, which also have empirical implications. The
first theme directly relates to the normative, in particular normative plurality ver‐
sus universality. Should we take the world’s cultural and socio-political diversity
as a principle to guide us? Can we accept the plurality and hybridity of norms, and
refrain from imposing our Western-democratic norms on others? Or, following
those who are against relativizing culture and norms, should we maintain the dom‐
inant position by imposing our norms? The second and linked theme is the one of
self-other constructions and processes of othering. As the self’s identity is formed
in differences to an ‘other’, self-other constructions are a normal part of human
existence. Yet, hierarchical and dichotomous self-other constructions that lead to
processes of othering, and even dehumanization of the ‘other’, enable violence
and are highly destructive. Western thinking about Islam often illustrates a univer‐
sal, Western approach and the hierarchical, dichotomous self-other constructions
* The author is grateful to the workshop organizer Dr. des Heydar Shadi and for help‐
ful comments from workshop participants, in particular Prof. Oliver Leaman and
Dr. Bianka Speidl.
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and othering processes linked to it. When we inquire into Islamic peace ethics, we
need to remain self-reflective, and consider unknowns and alternatives in order to
enable an understanding that does not reproduce Western biases. Insights generat‐
ed in such a manner can aid a renewed dialogue with the ‘other’, and help to deal
with self-other difference non-violently.
Introduction
The chapter raises significant conceptual issues that frame and underlie
the inquiry into Islamic peace ethics. It is clear that any religion can be
used for violence, and many have been in the past. But regarding Islam,
we find an implicit and at times explicit link to violence in parts of con‐
temporary political and public discourse. This is in itself problematic, and
it is furthermore Muslims who are then implicitly or explicitly portrayed
as violent. Such a link has significant political dimensions and constitutive
effects. The West, or non-Muslims, can utilize such a discourse to exert
power and dominance over Muslim populations or states, while safeguard‐
ing and strengthening Western identity and the Western self.
The aim here is to shed light on two core and interwoven themes. Both
are conceptual in nature but have empirical implications. The first theme
relates to the normative and the question of plurality versus the universali‐
ty of norms. This then leads us to ask if we should accept the world’s cul‐
tural and socio-political diversity as principle to guide us. Should and can
we actually accept normative plurality and hybridity, where norms conflict
with one another too? Answering yes to this question has significant con‐
sequences, for it would lead us to the need to refrain from asserting our
Western-democratic norms onto other cultures and societies. Answering
no to this question, in line with those who warn against relativizing cul‐
ture, would lead us to further imposing our norms onto others, which in
turn has practical consequences.
The second theme is the one of self-other constructions and processes
of othering. To engage in othering is to engage in a process of constructing
discursive and social boundaries to an ‘other’, so that the ‘other’ becomes
the self’s opposed other.1 This chapter makes a clear distinction between
1.
1 Neumann, Iver B. (Ed.). Uses of the Other. ‘The East’ in European Identity Forma‐
tion. Manchester, 1999.
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self-other constructions and processes of othering. Whereas self-other con‐
structions are a normal part of human existence, as identity is formed in
difference to an ‘other’, othering is here considered as negatively oriented.
While some argue that the ‘other’ can also be portrayed as different but
neutral,2 such processes clearly involve hierarchy-building.3 Thus, those
self-other constructions that up-value the self and devalue the ‘other’ build
hierarchies and dichotomies, and enable marginalization and exclusion in
destructive processes of othering. Western thinking about Islam often il‐
lustrates negative constructions of the ‘other’ and othering. Thus, this
chapter argues to approach the topic of Islamic peace ethics in a self-re‐
flective manner, so that gained insights do not simply reproduce Western
biases about Islam but move beyond such biases. Insights that are generat‐
ed in a self-reflective manner can form the basis for thinking about how to
renew the dialogue within the West on Islam, between the West and Mus‐
lims, and within Islam. Such insights may aid us in addressing existing
self-other difference in a non-violent manner.
At this point, it should be said that, while this chapter raises important
issues to consider when speaking about Islamic peace ethics, it will pose
more questions than give answers. It is thus intended as a starting point for
discussion, and it hopes to stimulate debate on conceptual dimensions of
inquiry into Islamic peace ethics that are often sidelined, but that make
their way into both methodology and empirical results. The chapter pro‐
ceeds by discussing the issue of normative universality versus plurality. It
then delves into the impact of a discourse of dominance and of threat by
elaborating the effects of applying normative universality to self-other re‐
lations and Western-Muslim relations. It closes by raising the implications
of such a discourse and by pointing to further questions regarding a possi‐
ble balance between normative universality and cultural plurality.
2 Diez, Thomas. ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering “Nor‐
mative Power Europe”’. In: Millennium. Journal of International Studies. 2005,
33/3, pp. 613-636, here pp. 628-629.
3 Houtum, Henk van. ‘Human Blacklisting: The Global Apartheid of the EU's Exter‐
nal Border Regime.’ In: Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. 2010, 28,
pp. 957-976, here p. 960; Hansen, Lene. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis
and the Bosnian War. Oxford, 2006, pp. 38-41.
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Universality versus Plurality of Norms
Our world shows a great variety of norms, values and ideas to guide hu‐
man life, collective behaviour and political processes. Dealing with this
normative variety has long been a subject of debate. Yet, there is no com‐
mon – and no commonly accepted – definition of which norms should
guide all, and there remain contradictions between some norms and their
practice. For example, not all states accept or practice the norms that are
stated in international declarations, and some provisions collide. Article 1
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights4 states that, ‘All human be‐
ings are born free and equal in dignity and rights... endowed with reason
and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brother‐
hood.’ Many freedoms are officially protected, among them the freedom
of movement, of thought and expression, of religion, and social and cul‐
tural rights. That many governments and regimes do not live up in full or
in part to these declared rights – not even democracies – is one concern.
Another concern is that the rights laid down in the declaration easily illus‐
trate potential conflict with one another. For example, how can one indi‐
vidual’s or collective’s right to free expression truly fit with that of another
individual or collective? How can individual rights fit with those of collec‐
tives? What if a particular collective’s cultural practices conflict with other
rights set forth in the Universal Declaration? Thus, different rights and
norms, as well as cultural practices and rights can collide. Of course,
judgements and views on a given right or norm also differ. Which in‐
stances should or can decide in such normative conflicts? Is it not typical‐
ly the dominant Western states that have the greatest judgement powers,
and that often unilaterally or via international organizations set the stan‐
dard? How truly universal then is the Universal Declaration? In fact, the
drafting committee of the Declaration was made up of representatives
from Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Lebanon, France, UK, US and
USSR, with one from each of the listed countries. Most of these countries
are considered Western, and the few non-Western drafters hardly represent
the world’s diversity. According to a UNESCO report, ‘Values such as col‐
lective human survival, the primacy and protection of human life, the
preservation of nature and the dignity of mankind, justice, freedom and
2.
4 UN. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948, http://www.un.org/en/docu
ments/udhr/ [18.07.2015].
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equity, already form the nucleus of universally accepted values’, and they
should also include a respect for diversity in culture and heritage. A num‐
ber of years ago, this report noticed a ‘growing antagonism’ within many
societies between new and old values.5 The problem, however, lies in how
these principles are defined in detail, how they are implemented and what
it actually means to respect existing diversity.
The Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation, particularly concerned with liberal
values in politics and society, asks how we can achieve conditions to co-
exist peacefully and in freedom, despite the diversity of cultural and reli‐
gious differences. The foundation sees the answer in solving conflicts
based on the principle of freedom being universal. Freedom is seen as pos‐
sible when no one is allowed to act violently towards another being. Toler‐
ance is thereby seen as important but limited when the rights of others are
infringed and when a particular culture, religion or lifestyle is forced upon
others.6 This seems to be the crux of the matter: how to avoid acting vio‐
lently toward the ‘other’ when considering our own values as universal.
Violence is not only violence against life or property, but also psychologi‐
cal. Do we not force upon the ‘other’ our values, even though we claim
not to do so? In many ways, the West seems simply unwilling to respect
diversity elsewhere, particularly when it concerns value diversity. Fears
seem to motivate this position, both rational and emotional in nature –
fears that other, non-Western values could enter our society and dilute our
values. Such fears then enable policies to protect the self and own values.
In practice, human rights are not universally applied. Furthermore, hu‐
man rights are ‘not universal as a cultural artefact, a kind of cultural in‐
variant’ and ‘the question of universality is a particularly Western cultural
question’, with human rights as a concept resting on Western assump‐
tions.7 In efforts to universalize human rights, for example, some scholars
argue that we must ‘transfer these [human rights] into known cultural pat‐
5 UNESCO. In Search of a Wisdom for the World. The Role of Ethical Values in Ed‐
ucation. A collective investigation of the Club of Rome (February – October 1986).
1987, p. 15, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0007/000767/076756eb.pdf
[18.07.2015].
6 Bökenkamp, Gerárd/Reinartz, Armin. ‘Universelle Werte? Universelle Prinzipien
für eine pluralistische Welt.’ In: global + liberal. 2014, 2, pp. 3-4, here p. 3.
7 Sousa Santos, Boaventura de. ‘Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human
Rights.’ In: Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol (Ed.). Moral Imperialism. A Criti‐
cal Anthology, New York and London, 2002, pp. 53-60, here p. 44.
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terns of a region without a loss of their substance’.8 The Sudanese-Ameri‐
can law professor and human rights activist Abdullah An-Na’im is cited as
stating that ‘only those that belong to a culture can affect a change from
the inside’. It is also noteworthy that human rights cannot be forced upon
others, so as not to spread the view of a value-imperialism, but that they
can only be achieved by convincing others.9 The approach advised here is
generally constructive, but still leaves questions to answer. For example,
does not a transfer of human rights into other cultures necessarily mean a
change in the particulars of human rights, if not a dilution of their sub‐
stance? When we follow the law professor’s advice, should not the West
then refrain from trying to bring its view of human rights to other con‐
texts? How can the West help those inside a culture to foster human rights
without some sort of force? Sousa Santos maintains that human rights pol‐
icies since the end of the Second World War have mostly been used to
serve ‘economic and geopolitical interests of the hegemonic capitalist
states.’ In fact, ‘The generous and seductive discourse on human rights has
allowed for unspeakable atrocities that have been evaluated and dealt with
according to revolting double standards.’10 Alternative and non-Western
human rights discourses that are counterhegemonic are ignored by the
West,11 which suggests a harsh critique of Western thinking and behaviour.
A stronger case for Western normative intervention may exist when
there is a need to end outright physical violence in other countries. This is
nothing new, and today it comes under the label of the responsibility to
protect. R2P is a political-moral principle, not a legal norm. According to
Rudolf,12 justifications on the basis of R2P should also include a consider‐
ation of the concept of just war. The jus ad bellum (right to war) illustrates
justifications for war, and the jus in bello (justice in war) illustrates what is
legitimate in war. Justification for war can be the defense of others in the
face of grave human rights violations, in practice today a legitimation of
R2P. Conditions for applying just military force then relate to proportion‐
ality, a reasonable chance of success, as a means of last resort, of right in‐
8 Kunze, Dirk/Abarbanell, Julius. ‘Revolutionsrausch und “Wertimperialismus”.’
In: global + liberal. 2014, 2, pp. 5-9, here p. 9.
9 Kunze/Abarbanell. Revolutionsrausch, p. 9.
10 Sousa Santos. Toward, p. 45.
11 Ibid. p. 46.
12 Rudolf, Peter. ‘Zur Ethik militärischer Gewalt.’ SWP-Study 6. SWP – German In‐
stitute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, March 2014.
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tention, and possibly legitimate authority. Rudolf recommends, also based
on former high-ranking British Ministerial official David Fisher, a debate
on the use of military force from an ethical angle, and that a government
should present reasons for a military intervention based on just war criteria
before and during an intervention. In the case of Germany, Rudolf further‐
more points to the reluctance of accepting any limits to action by any test‐
ing criteria,13 a position that should possibly be revised.
In trying to deal with ‘the difficulty of finding firm foundations for hu‐
man rights’, there are efforts to move beyond the view that human rights
are somehow natural rights predating political society; human rights result
from the rights of citizens based on standards of behaviour having become
more civilized.14 Seeing human rights not as natural rights may create
space and flexibility to build a truly common and shared understanding of
those values we all want to live by. For this, we also have to be prepared
to relinquish some of our power over others and to accept alternative
views.
What does seem universal is the idea of peace.15 All cultures refer to
peace and its desirability in society or even the world, which are refer‐
ences we may build upon without enforcing any cultural superiority. For
this, non-Western ideas of peace should be considered. Studies of peace
should include the multiple ways of and towards peace, in order to arrive
at a more inclusive understanding of our world and the various communi‐
ties within.16 Scholars argue that a culture’s indigenous modes for conflict
solution must be respected and should be seen as a rich resource to tran‐
scend conflict.17 For example, the differentiation between individualism
13 Rudolf. Zur Ethik. pp. 21-27, 36-37.
14 Boucher, David. The Limits of Ethics in International Relations. Natural Law, Nat‐
ural Rights, and Human Rights in Transition. Oxford and New York, 2009, p. 287.
15 Demenchonok, Edward (Ed.). ‘Philosophy After Hiroshima. From Power Politics
to the Ethics of Nonviolence and Co-Responsibility.’ In: Between Global Violence
and the Ethics of Peace: Philosophical Perspectives. Malden, MA and Oxford,
2009, pp. 9-49, here p. 37.
16 Said, Abdul Aziz/ Funk, Nathan C./ Kadayifci, Ayse. Peace and Conflict Resolu‐
tion in Islam: Precept and Practice. Lanham MD, 2001.
17 Osman, Abdulahi A. ‘Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reali‐
ty?’ In: African Journal on Conflict Resolution 2007, 7/2, pp. 93-133, pp. 125-129.
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and collectivism in different cultures should be considered.18 Whereas
Buddhist thinking, for example, emphasizes the collective and limitless‐
ness of the social and of time, Christianity emphasizes the individual.
Buddhist thinking thus sees responsibility as something collective, where
conflicts are collectivized and placed in infinite time with connections be‐
tween all. Only in the collective can something be made right again and
peace be built.19 Also other scholars point to the collective and the indi‐
vidual receiving different emphases. Córdova contrasts the Western model
of elected or selected authorities speaking for all with the model of indige‐
nous communities in the Andes and their bottom-up, ‘open and participa‐
tory’ mechanism of decision making.20 The achieved ‘high community
buy-in’, due to open and transparent consultations and decision making,
results in fewer conflicts.21 The Jirga in Afghanistan and Pakistan is an‐
other collective institution for decision making and peace building. As ‘a
strategic exchange between two or more people to address an issue
through verbal communication [it enables the involved parties] to maintain
a certain level of formal communication, thus ensuring peace’.22 In con‐
trast to a Western system, the Jirga tries to resolve enmity between parties,
address root causes and build preventive measures. In another example,
Navajo peacemaking, we find a type of restorative justice that aims at
treating members of a group as equals, maintaining relationships and har‐
mony.23 The Navajo justice system is seen as a circle, with all being equal
and connected to one another and all participating (and able to do so
equally). This is said to enable justice and healing, restoration and recon‐
18 Galtung, Johan. ‘Frieden mit friedlichen Mitteln: Friede und Konflikt, Entwick‐
lung und Kultur. Aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Hajo Schmidt.’ Münster, 2007,
p. 222.
19 Ibid. p. 153, 156.
20 Córdova, Fabiola. ‘Weaving Indigenous and Western Methods of Conflict Resolu‐
tion in the Andes.’ In: Akanmu G. Adebayo, Jesse J. Benjamin, Brandon D.
Lundy. Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies: Global Perspectives. Lanham
MD, 2014, pp. 15-31, here p. 20.
21 Ibid. p. 22.
22 Gohar, ‘Ali. Jirga. ‘An Indigenous Institution for Peacebuilding in the Pukhtoon
Belt of Pakistan and Afghanistan.’ In: Adebayo/ Benjamin/ Lundy. Indigenous
Conflict Management Strategies: Global Perspectives. Lanham, MD, 2014, pp.
183-194, here p. 185.
23 Nielsen, Marianne O./ Zion, James W. (Eds.). ‘Introduction to Peacemaking.’ In:
Navajo Nation Peacemaking: Living Traditional Justice. Tucson, 2005, pp. 3-19,
here p. 3, 9.
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ciliation of the individual with his or her surroundings (including nature
and cosmos), as well as group solidarity and integration into the group.
Rather than finding out who is guilty, the well-being of the entire commu‐
nity is the goal. The Navajo Peacemaker Court, established by the Navajo
Nation in 1982, exemplifies this approach.24 Islamic thinking also centres
on the concept of peace (al-Salam), which is linked to ideas of justice, hu‐
man dignity and human welfare, development, harmony and ecological
balance. Religious values, reconciliation rituals and practices of commu‐
nal and inter-communal coexistence emphasize the connections between
personal and group identity.25
To not simply reproduce Western thinking in considering non-Western
concepts of peace and stability, one should be aware of the difficulties in
comparing cultures critically. In many ways, and regarding many ele‐
ments, different cultural contexts may not be comparable. A further diffi‐
culty, as argued by scholars, is that also researchers are ethnocentric and
that their views are shaped by their cultural background.26 One possibility
for overcoming such biases may be more frequent cooperation with re‐
searchers from the cultural context studied. Additional problems relate to
some indigenous elements in concepts of peace and stability that are not
necessarily worthwhile to pursue. For example, if a particular tradition is
illiberal, it may not be worth investing in it. Córdova illustrates this with
the examples of a tradition affecting the exclusion of minority opinion or
disenfranchising woman and older children, or when a mob forms and be‐
gins to rule against minority opinions.27 In such circumstances, one may
have to decide to take a position (of dominance) after all, but hopefully
without excluding others.
The above illustrates that peace can be understood and practiced in dif‐
ferent ways. Why should any one way be better than another? This
question must be allowed, since otherwise we risk exerting violence upon
24 Yazzie, Robert. ‘Life Comes from It: Navajo Justice Concepts.’ In: Marianne O.
Nielsen/ James W. Zion (Eds.). Navajo Nation Peacemaking. pp. 42-58, here pp.
46-51.
25 Said, Abdul Aziz et al. ‘Islamic and Western approaches to conflict resolution.’ In:
The Frontier Post. 9 October, 2013, p. 4.
26 Boulding, Kenneth E. ‘National Images and International Systems.’ In: Gary R.
Weaver (Ed.). Culture, Communication and Conflict: Readings in Intercultural Re‐
lations, Needham Heights, 1996, pp. 459-470; Jervis, Robert. Perception and Mis‐
perception in International Politics. Princeton NJ, 1976.
27 Córdova, Weaving, pp. 23-24.
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the ‘other’. Or can we all agree on some norms that are worthwhile to be
pursued, perhaps because they bring the greatest good for all, or for as
many as possible? But even this question is problematic, because who can
define what is good for all, and which kind of majority is large enough to
justify exerting a particular normative understanding onto people holding
a different view? When only a minority – the West – discusses which
norms are to be followed, other voices are marginalized. Furthermore, in
inquiring into Islamic peace ethics and speaking about Islam, it means that
those who are being studied take on a passive role, as if they had nothing
to say and nothing to contribute. They are given an inferior position and
are seen as peripheral, delimited and devalued. To counteract such divisive
and exclusionary dynamics, we need the inclusion of diverse voices.
Thereby, all can have a voice in what is relevant to them and their lives,
and this may be a way forward to (more) peace.
The Impact of Discursive Constructions
When applying a Western normative approach with a universal ambition,
we may engage in or facilitate various forms of violence, even if not in‐
tended. Violence should be seen in its multi-faceted forms, not only as
something physical. According to Keane, a clear definition of violence is
difficult, because the use of violence has been broadened and its meaning
has become heavily context-dependent.28 Ramsey sees violence as not on‐
ly physical, but also psychological, for example.29 We may then differenti‐
ate between physical and psychological violence, and add further differen‐
tiations of direct-indirect or noninstitutionalized-institutionalized violence.
Even actions of a democratic government can be violent, even though a
democracy is considered to exclude violence.30 Since also liberal democ‐
racies must maintain the state’s monopoly of violence to protect the demo‐
cratic system and the liberal order from external and internal threats, as
well as citizen rights, there is an intimate relationship between democracy
3.
28 Keane, John. Violence and Democracy. Cambridge, 2004, pp. 30-32.
29 Ramsey, Maureen. ‘Liberal Democratic Politics as a Form of Violence.’ In: De‐
mocratization, 2010, 17/2, pp. 235-250, here p. 236.
30 Keane, Violence. p. 8-14.
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and violence.31 Examples of violence by democracies include going to war
with another nation in own defense, and applying violent policies to
spread democracy and Western liberal values. Also democracies practice
exclusion, either intentionally or via the unintended effects of democratic
practices.
Moreover, discourse can exert violence, and violence can be discursive.
An example of this is discourse by the core about the periphery, by the
leading and self-claimed superior West about others, such as the Muslim
world and Muslims. That this discourse constitutively shapes meaning, as
well as policy and power relations, has been amply shown.32 Thus, the ar‐
ticulation of someone or something as threatening affects interpretation
and then creates boundaries.33 The concepts of self and other, the need for
identity maintenance in relations with the ‘other’, and the creation of oth‐
erness and exclusion thus deserve our attention. They have epistemologi‐
cal consequence as well as practical effects, by enabling forms of violence
towards those seen as different and thought to be in need of our Western
norms.
Violence-enabling discourse and practices towards the ‘other’,34 such as
towards Muslims, can be eased by the skewed Western perception and rep‐
resentation of Islam and, implicitly, Muslims. The partially existing West‐
ern view of Islam as inherently violent facilitates a discourse of threat vis-
à-vis Islam and Muslims and shapes interaction. When, according to Flood
et al., media reporting on terrorism often includes references to Islamist
31 Ramsey. Liberal; Diamond, Larry. ‘Defining and Developing Democracy.’ In:
Robert A. Dahl/ Ian Shapiro/ José A. Cheibub (Eds.). The Democracy Source
Book. Cambridge MA, 2003, pp. 29-39, here p. 30.
32 See for example Herschinger, Eva/ Renner, Judith (Eds.). ‘Einleitung: Diskurs‐
forschung in den Internationalen Beziehungen.’ In: Diskursforschung in den Inter‐
nationalen Beziehungen. Baden-Baden, 2014, pp. 9-35, here pp. 14-15; Diez,
Thomas/ Bode, Ingvild/ Fernandes da Costa, Aleksandra. Key Concepts in Inter‐
national Relations. Los Angeles and London, 2011, p. 168; Foucault, Michel (Ed.).
‘Gespräch mit Ducio Trombadori.’ In: Der Mensch ist ein Erfahrungstier:
Gespräch mit Ducio Trombadori. Frankfurt, 1996, pp. 23-122.
33 Campbell, David. Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics
of Identity. Revised ed. Minneapolis, 1998, pp. 3-4, 170-171.
34 Dalby, Simon. ‘Geopolitics and Global Security: Culture, Identity, and the “Pogo
Syndrome”.’ In: Gearóid Ó Tuathail/ Simon Dalby (Eds.). Rethinking Geopolitics.
London and New York, 1998, pp. 295-313, here p. 309.
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violence,35 which is supported by findings of a recent study of Western
media discourse,36 violent practices to counter the articulated threat are
enabled. When some point to an existing equation of terror and Islam in
parts of public discourse,37 violent practices are even more likely. Scholars
also point to the problematic Western representation of Islam as a potential
problem for peace, and argue that, in contrast, Muslim writers see Islam as
a possible contribution to international peace, justice and human dignity.38
In light of such associations, but also due to Islamist radicals wanting to
legitimize their violent acts with distorted Islamic teachings, the initiative
by Islamic scholars for an ‘Islamic Curriculum on Peace & Counter Ter‐
rorism’ and similar efforts may be useful. Such curricula, directly drawn
from Islamic teaching, can offer Muslim theologians helpful arguments
against the misuse of theology by Islamist radicals and terrorists.
Difference between self and other is not only easily created but also
constitutive for identity – on the individual, the group and the national lev‐
el. National identity, due to being culture-specific and ethno-centric,
colours the self positively, and this biased view informs how a state acts
towards other states.39 Whereas the belief in a shared identity with another
state aids dialogue and cooperation,40 a lack of such sharing, or the belief
of a diverging identity, may promote conflict. When differentiating from
others, often motivated by different normative orders, otherness can be
created and a destructive process of othering initiated.41 The lens of criti‐
cal geopolitics is also of use here, for it points to the link between identity,
35 Flood, C. et al. Islam, Security and Television News. Basingstoke and New York,
2012, pp. 189-191.
36 Reinke de Buitrago, Sybille. ‘Jihadist Terrorism in Europe: What Role for Media?’
In: Daniela Pisoiu (Ed.). Arguing Counterterrorism. London, 2014, pp. 160-180;
Reinke de Buitrago, Sybille. ‘Media Discourse on Jihadist Terrorism in Europe.’
In: Journal of Terrorism Research. 2013, 4/2, p. 3-13.
37 Weidner, Stefan. ‘Mit der Religion gegen den Terror.’ In: Quantara.de
(29.06.2015). http://de.qantara.de/print/20431 [02.07.2015].
38 Said/ Funk/ Kadayifci. Peace.
39 Holland, Jack. Selling the War on Terror: Foreign Policy Discourses after 9/11.
London, 2013, pp. 10-11, 24; Boulding. National. pp. 461-464.
40 Rousseau, David L./ Miodownik, Dan/ Lux Petrone, Deborah. ‘Identity and Threat
Perception: An Experimental Analysis.’ Paper prepared for presentation at the AP‐
SA-meeting, 2001, p. 5, 15.
41 Houtum, Henk van/ Naerssen, Ton van. ‘Bordering, Ordering and Othering.’ In:
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 2002, 93/2, pp. 125-36, here p.
129.
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space, discourse, power and order. Thus, spatial constructions by political
actors illustrate the building of hierarchical self-other relations, which lead
to acts of inclusion or exclusion of the ‘other’.42 We should then critically
consider Western spatial constructions of regions with varying levels of
danger, in need of Western normative influence. When the Muslim world,
and thereby Muslims, is represented as a region of danger, which the West
must fortify against, how can balanced, non-divisive relations be possible?
What if we rather focused resources on building bridges towards and
strengthening dialogue with the ‘other’? While this requires sufficient po‐
litical will, it is a worthwhile aim with long-term stabilizing effects.
Any hope of avoiding seemingly automatic processes of othering may
lie in the following notion: if identity is not only forms by differentiating
us from others, but also by moving closer to them, as Lebow states, we
may find ways to maintain identity without building harmful divisions.43
In efforts to build bridges to the ‘other’, we should utilize changes on the
side of self and other. Narratives of othering can also collapse, for exam‐
ple when dramatic events or new developments shake the underlying ideas
and allow alternative views of self and other. We thus should pay close at‐
tention to any and even small changes to build constructive self-other rela‐
tions. That this is possible is illustrated by the recent rapprochement be‐
tween Iran and the US.
Conclusion
As othering in a discourse of threat has enormous effects on behaviour and
policy towards the ‘other’, by setting the agenda and affecting organiza‐
tional and political processes in many policy fields,44 Western othering of
Islam and Muslims sets relations on a downward path and enables vio‐
lence. To change such a discourse, and its impact, we would need to
change our views of the ‘other’ and our understanding of our relations
4.
42 Agnew, John/ Muscarà, Luca. Making Political Geography. 2nd ed. Lanham MD,
2012; Albert, Mathias/ Reuber, Paul/ Wolkersdorfer, Günter. ‘Kritische Geopoli‐
tik.’ In: Siegfried Schieder and Manuela Spindler (Eds.). Theorien der Interna‐
tionalen Beziehungen. 2nd ed. 2006, pp. 527-551, here pp. 531, 540-541.
43 Lebow, Richard Ned. The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves.
Cambridge and New York, 2012, pp. 270-271.
44 Including development and aid policy, cultural policy, international cooperation,
trade relations, and military activities.
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with the ‘other’. We may ask ourselves how we can recognize the com‐
plexity of the ‘other’, including the diversity within Islam, and begin to
accept that we all have both positives and negatives. To not reproduce
Western bias when considering non-Western or Islamic concepts of peace
we should attempt to reflect our own ethnocentric biases. In academia, for
example, we may seek to pursue more joint research with researchers from
the cultural context studied. While biases do not necessarily mean that out
ideas and views are wrong, we should be aware of our biases, and their
motivations. Can we then re-define our relations with Muslims, and if so,
how? In efforts to build and strengthen dialogue with our constructed ‘oth‐
ers’, we should seek ways of defining what values we share. There is a
dilemma about relativizing and universalizing, and it may be constructive
to find a balance between the two. There is further benefit in recognizing
when others employ either a relativizing or universalizing approach for
their political agenda, and in working towards a balance. Agreeing on ap‐
proaches to these questions may enable us to overcome the simplified rep‐
resentations that often facilitate violence. With that goal in mind, we
should also focus on a better balance between normative universality and
cultural plurality. Sousa Santos offers a way forward to change the West‐
ern hegemonic, universalist human rights conception, into something cos‐
mopolitan.45 Accordingly, we should, first, move beyond the limiting and
divisive universalism-cultural relativism debate. Second, we should look
at meanings of human dignity in all cultures to achieve a basis of common
understanding. This should, third, be done by paying attention to the in‐
completeness of each culture’s human dignity conception and, fourth, by
paying attention to the different degree of openness of one culture to an‐
other. Lastly, we need to consider that existing and constructed equalities
and differences contain nuances in themselves, so that equalities show
difference within and differences show commonalities within. To con‐
clude, the acceptance of at least a degree of normative plurality could be
more effective in building dialogue and peaceful relations with the ‘other’
than insisting on only Western norms being universal. Perhaps peace is
more possible by letting go of our insistence on own norms, and by seek‐
ing common ground on Islam in a dialogue with Muslims.
45 Sousa Santos. Toward. pp. 46-47, 53-57.
Sybille Reinke de Buitrago
68
Peace and Violence in Islam: Philosophical Issues
Oliver Leaman
University of Kentucky, Lexington, USA
Abstract: Although there is a good deal of discussion of issues to do with peace
and war in Islam, very little of that discussion looks at it from the general point of
view of the philosophy of ethics. Yet using this perspective can be useful in seek‐
ing to establish greater clarity on the nature of the major issues in the Islamic de‐
bate on these issues.
There are roughly two perspectives here, one being absolutist and one consequen‐
tialist. The absolutists tend to concentrate on particular ayat in the Qur’an and
their accompanying hadith and use them to defend wide ethical principles that for‐
bid, or permit, certain kinds of peaceful or violent behavior. This approach tends
to defend the status quo, since it often rules out violence in the ways it is often
used to bring about regime or radical change. The ethical principle involved here
is that whatever the consequences there are certain things that must never be done,
and that obviously restricts the aggressive actions from a moral point of view.
On the other side are the consequentialists, who are argue that Islam justifies radi‐
cal steps in order to bring about the correct sort of objectives, those which are of
course themselves justified by religion.
Those ayat which the absolutists appeal to are of course respected by the conse‐
quentialists, but they are put within a context which restricts their scope and does
not interfere with a consequentialist ethics.
Both ethical positions are based on longstanding differences in moral philosophy,
but trying to ground them in the Qur'an raises some intriguing issues of how to
link a philosophical with a religious argument. It will be argued that looking at the
internal Islamic debates in terms of moral philosophy does bring out usefully
some of the logical parameters of the controversy.
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Justifying violence and Islam
There is a very well developed legal discussion about the nature of peace
and conflict in Islam, and it will be touched on here. But the main focus
will be trying to create a framework for such discussions that take account
of the basic philosophical issues that arise. There tends to be a basic div‐
ision among writers on the topics of war and peace between those who see
the Qur’an as advocating basic and irrevocable standards of behaviour,
and those who understand the rules as being more malleable. This reflect a
basic ethical contrast between philosophers who are in favour of assessing
action in terms of its consequences, often called consequentialists, and
those who insist on absolute principles that are never to be violated. Most
people think that peace is a desirable state of affairs, but clearly there are
situations where it needs to be put aside and conflict permitted. This could
be when the community is attacked and needs to defend itself, but then of
course what counts as attack is quite variable. It could be that violence is
justified when some group of people are prevented from finding out about
the divine message in the Qur’an by their leaders, and those rulers and
their supporters need to be defeated in order that the truth is more widely
broadcast. It might be that a group is dangerous and could represent a fu‐
ture threat, and need to be challenged now when it is in the interests of the
Muslim forces to strike early and without waiting for an initial act of di‐
rect physical aggression. What is interesting about these sorts of cases is
not only the differing views on their legality, but how they work ethically.
Often in political life rulers have to deceive, lie, make agreements they
have no intention of keeping, dissimulate and so on, and these are all in
themselves immoral actions. One of the characteristics of warfare is that
whatever the intentions of the parties, innocent people are often killed or
injured, and this is also in itself immoral. Yet war is impossible without
such risk, especially modern warfare, but there is nothing modern about
this debate. If two people are fighting each other and one throws a spear at
the other, who knows where that spear will land? These sorts of issues
arise all the time in conflict, and it is no justification of harming an inno‐
cent person to say truthfully that one did not intend to do so. It is a rele‐
vant excuse and may legally result in a lesser penalty, but morally speak‐
ing we know that violence often leads to consequences for innocent peo‐
ple, and we need to find some justification for such behavior if we wish to




Another way in which the contrast between these two positions arises is
by treating violence as a category of punishment, and here again we have
two general theories of how we are entitled to act. One position suggests
that only the guilty may be punished, and innocent people should not ever
be punished. On the other hand, some argue that punishment as a deterrent
is more effective if the target of punishment is broadened to include more
than just the guilty. After all, innocent people are inevitably harmed as a
side-effect of punishment, and if people are likely to be deterred from im‐
moral behavior by contemplating the punishment of those held to be
guilty, this is to the general good. To take an example, in warfare armies
tend to target those who are threatening them, but if it will dissuade the
enemy from acting by punishing innocent civilians, and all civilians count
as innocent in warfare, then that may result in fewer death overall than
otherwise. Similarly, if an army can induce the enemy to destroy a civilian
group of people and buildings, that is often helpful from the point of view
of publicity, and so may hasten the end of the conflict, as a result minimiz‐
ing loss of life and damage to property. In these examples it is the conse‐
quences that are important, and they may result in our doing something
that otherwise would not be acceptable, but given the consequences they
are. To take an example from recent history, in 1979 the most important
mosque in the world, the masjid al-haram in Mecca, was captured by a vi‐
olent group who were led by someone claiming to be the mahdi. Could vi‐
olence be used to defeat and expel them? The judicial authorities first of
all suggested that unarmed troops be sent in to retrieve the building, and
the result was that they were promptly killed by the insurgents. Then,
quoting 2: 191, the authorities permitted violence to defeat the interlopers
and this obviously caused a lot of damage to the building as well no doubt
as killing many innocent bystanders who had been caught up in the en‐
counter. The consequences justified it as the verse from the Qur'an sug‐
gests, so does this mean that in matters of violence it is the consequences
that are the crucial factor?
The rules of war
In many ways this seems generally to be the position of radical move‐
ments seeking to challenge the status quo. They argue that the Qur’an it‐
2.
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self points to the importance of frightening the enemy1 and the sira of the
Prophet refers to many instances of violence that were apparently sanc‐
tioned by him and his followers, such as beheading and making fun of the
dead body of an enemy. What is often called terrorism by its opponents is
action that kills innocent people but for a purpose that is religiously valid.
So for example the recent attack in Tunisia on foreign tourists is designed
to retaliate against those fighting radical forces in other parts of the Mid‐
dle East by hurting and killing their civilians. It may help motivate those
countries to change their policies. Normally it would not be thought to be
right to attack innocent civilians, but if the consequences suggest it might
be effective in bringing about a greater good, then it is on the table as a
legitimate action. The Shi‘ite thinker Mutahhari in his account of accept‐
able uses of violence argues that 2: 251: ‘and if God had not repelled some
men by others, the earth would have been corrupted’, can be taken with
22: 40: ‘for had it not been for God's repelling some men by means of oth‐
ers, cloisters and churches and oratories would have been pulled down’.
Mainly concerned with the rules of initiating jihad, discussion of the rules
of war tend to point to the major moral motives as helping the oppressed,
whether or not such intervention is requested. According to Mutahhari this
was the nature of most of the early Islamic wars, and another legitimate
cause is the removal of political obstacles to the propagation and spread of
Islam or in other words, fighting in favour of the people that are otherwise
condemned to isolation from the call of truth and against regimes that sup‐
press freedom of speech. Defensive wars like the defence of life, wealth,
property, and land, of independence and of principles are all legitimate.
However, the defence of human rights Mutahhari places above the defense
of individuals. The last of Mutahhari’s legitimate causes of war goes be‐
yond any notion of defense; he supports a policy of moral expansionism.
That is, when dealing with corrupt societies, whether democratic or other‐
wise, the Islamic state should seek to challenge the false ideas that persist
there and it may be necessary to invade them or at the very least confront
them militarily in order to convey the proper principles as to how they are
to live 2.
The response of the status quo is often that this policy contravenes such
verses as those which compare killing someone to killing everyone. That
1 Choudary, Anjem. Evening Standard. 15.08.2014.
2 Mutahhari, Murtaza. ‘Jihad’. Holy War of Islam and its legitimacy in the Qur’an.
M. Tawhidi (Trans.). Tehran 1989.
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means that there are absolute principles such as the proscribing of murder
that can never be contravened, whatever the consequences. Shaykh Allam
recently produced this verse as an argument against ISIS and its support‐
ers 3. He starts by using 49:13 to suggest that God created different com‐
munities, and so it is pointless to try to make everyone believe in the same
things. The Grand mufti of Egypt, Shawki Allam, uses this passage to crit‐
icize those radical groups that kill others of a different religious back‐
ground, quoting also 5: 32: ‘If anyone kills a person it is as if he kills all
humanity, and if anyone saves a life it is as if he saves the life of all hu‐
manity’. Yet he surely did not mean that Islam condemns all killing or
even all saving of life, since there are many other passages which certainly
seem to go in a very different direction. Surely he also would not think it a
bad thing if everyone became a Muslim. Certainly there is nothing in the
Qur’an which suggests killing people just because they are not Muslims.
On the other hand, that is not what radical groups tend to do, they find
some reason for killing people and try to legitimate that reason in religious
terms by finding appropriate and different authoritative sources. They may
well be wrong and certainly casuistic in their approach to texts, but refut‐
ing them requires more than just referring to the way in which God created
different communities in the world. Many Muslims believe that the diver‐
sity of faith should be seen as a temporary stage of humanity, until every‐
one comes to accept Islam. Whatever the verse suggesting that killing one
person is like destroying all of humanity means, it cannot mean that killing
is completely ruled out. It would be very difficult to give the Qur’an a
pacifist interpretation. When we look at more sources of authority in Islam
like the hadith and the sira of the Prophet, and for the Shi‘a the sayings of
the imams, we get yet more material advocating killing, in certain circum‐
stances. Surely that is in principle right, there are always circumstances
which look like exceptions to the rule and it then looks overly rigid to
stick to the rule.
3 Allam, Shawki. Terrorists and their Qur’anic Delusions, In: Wall Street Journal,
2015.
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The importance of considering the consequences
This suggests that really we have to consider the consequences as the cru‐
cial determining factor in morality. There is much to support this position
in Islamic thought. In a recent and very interesting article Joseph Alagha
shows how two very different groups of Muslims, Hezbollah in Lebanon
and the Muslim Brothers in Egypt use the principle of considering the
consequences to countenance dancing if it is directed to the appropriate
political ends 4. They recognize that while in itself dancing might be re‐
garded as objectionable on religious grounds, specifically because of its
implications for modesty, it can be provided with a positive role in pro‐
moting the message of resistance and encouraging solidarity among those
in the movements concerned. Similarly, when it comes to violence the
principle of darura or necessity is often regarded as significant, the idea
being that in particular circumstances necessity demands that things are
done which normally would not be acceptable, which again is in line with
the principle that what is important morally are the consequences. How
this works is quite clear. In a violent confrontation one has the ultimate
aim of overcoming the enemy, and there are things one is allowed to do to
achieve this end. It may be, though, that in the particular circumstances it
is necessary to put aside these principles if victory is to be likely, and in
that case such a suspension of the principles is permitted. This could mean
treating the civilian population in a particularly harsh way, or it could even
affect how one behaves oneself. There is evidence, for example, that those
engaging on surreptitious violent missions are instructed to blend in by
shaving off their beards, drinking alcohol, going to clubs and so on, all ac‐
tivities which they would avoid otherwise, but in the circumstances might
find effective in realizing their goals. Observers would assume they were
‘normal’ and so not dangerous, and this could provide effective cover for
the mission.
In support of this view, which looks like being in support of the ethical
stance of those often called Islamists or extremists, is what we know of the
political flexibility of the Prophet Muhammad and also the phenomenon
of abrogation. The idea that later verses can overrule and replace earlier
ones is also evidence of a commitment in the religion to consider the role
3.
4 Joseph Alagha, G. Banna, and A. Fadlallah’s Views on Dancing. In: Sociology of
Islam, 2014, 2, pp. 60-85
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that changing circumstances have for what is required of Muslims. The
whole process of asbab al-nuzul, of considering the context of revelation,
is clearly important here, since it helps us know which verses precede
which others, and in any case once we know the situation that led to a
verse we are often in a position to understand it better. Also, the whole
process of using the hadith to help work out what Muslims are to do is an
exercise in flexibility, since there are so many hadith, and different opin‐
ions on their strengths and weaknesses as genuine reports of what was said
in the past, that coming to a judgment necessarily involves a fine adjudica‐
tion between a range of sources, as is the case in all major religions that
are based on documents. So it looks very much as though in decisions
about how to act in conflict and peace, it is not sufficient to rest on certain
principles that remain inviolable throughout. One has to employ a variety
of material, take account of the particular circumstances of the case and be
very aware of the nature of the consequences of acting in particular ways.
Different kinds of jihad
A significant problem with this approach is that it seems to conflate divine
with secular law. The latter certainly varies from context to context, and
also varies over time. But the Qur’an is taken to be the last message of
God to His creatures, and it does not vary at all. God knew throughout the
various revelations to prophets and messengers how we are supposed to
act, and this could not vary over time. Our understanding of what God
wants us to do could vary, but it should not, since the Qur’an is in its own
view a straightforward and clear text. Saying that we do not understand it
is an implicit criticism of its clarity. There is a passage which refers to the
ambiguity of some verses (3:7) but it does not seem to be implied that
many verses are ambiguous, and there are many references to jihad where
it is equated with qital that are very clear in how people ought to behave.
One of the things worth noting here is that earlier we suggested that sup‐
porters of absolute principles that could not be altered were likely to be
members of the status quo, since they want no change to take place in how
things are done. Yet we have presented evidence that these are often pre‐
cisely the same people who ask for exceptions to be made in those abso‐
lute principles in order to modernize Islam or to better reflect the original
intentions of God in His revelation and how it was interpreted by His
Prophet.
4.
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A good example of this is the popularity nowadays for distinguishing
between the greater and the lesser jihad, where the former is the spiritual
struggle over the negative aspects of the self, while the latter is physical
struggle. This serves to emphasize the defensive nature of jihad and tries
to dissociate Islam from those aspects of the account of jihad in the
Qur’an which really go in a different and rather more aggressive direction.
A significant problem of representing this hadith as a crucial aspect of un‐
derstanding jihad and peace is that it is often used in a very vague manner,
as a corrective to the negative image of Islam as a violent religion. The
hadith certainly does not do justice to the practice of Muslims at war, or
even their disinclination to go to war, and this is not to criticize it, but it is
to question how widely it was accepted and used as a basis to behaviour.
In any case, to say war is the lesser jihad does not mean it is not important
nor that the rules for pursuing it are not important. It suggests that there is
more to conflict than just physical struggle and that is worth emphasizing.
There is an English saying that sticks and stones may hurt my bones but
words can never harm me, but the reverse is often the case. The damage
due to sticks and stones may only be temporary, yet the hurt that words
can cause may last a lifetime, and even lead to death. This is certainly true
of cultures that are based on tribalism and shame, which according to al-
Jabri is most Arab societies since the Ummayads. He refers to the phrase:
Those who listen to their Lord, in Qur’an 42:38. He used this verse to de‐
fine a political period in early Islam of shura or consultation, since it goes
on to mention ‘consult each other in their affairs’. In the time of the
Prophet the state was based on the Islamic creed or ‘aqida. Muhammad’s
Medinese community was a real political community and can be defined
as an ‘Islamic state’. This was not to last long, the Ummayads distinguish‐
ing in the person of their ruler the function of religious scholar (‘alim) and
leader of the state. Mu‘awiya’s mulk or kingdom was continued by his
successors, replacing ‘aqida with qabila or tribalism, and an authoritarian
government resulted, since one tribe had to dominate the rest if stability
was to be preserved5. The subsequent domineering regimes were based on
tribalism, and its noxious heritage, in his view, continues to this day. It
also encourages the growth of a form of authoritarianism in the family, a
patriarchy based on the analogy with the ruler and the ruled, and levels of
physical and psychological violence to maintain those levels of authority.
5 al-Jabri, Mohammad. al-‘Aql al-siyasi al-‘arabi. 1990.
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In 2: 190 we read: ‘And with those who fight to kill you, fight in the
way of God.’ Many early Sufi thinkers adopted esoteric interpretations of
the Qur'anic verses treating conflict. The real challenge and test comes
from within. The reasons why the Prophet stressed that the greater jihad
must be against the carnal soul (nafs) is that physical wars against infidels
are occasional but the battle against the self is frequent, indeed constant.
There are ways to avoid the visible weapons of the military foe, but less
chance to escape the invisible weapons of the temptations of the soul; and
although we can achieve martyrdom in war with the enemy, there are no
rewards if one is defeated by our inner enemy6. On the contrary, that de‐
feat is the normal condition of human beings. But before we come to the
conclusion that physical warfare is not that important we need to see the
next verse, 2:191: ‘And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel
them from wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah is worse than
killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al-Haram until they fight you
there. But if they fight you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the
disbelievers.’ This is a robust account of how Muslims ought to act in con‐
flict, even in Mecca itself. 9: 14 suggests: ‘Fight them, God will torment
them with your hands, humiliate them, empower you over them, and heal
the hearts of the believers.’ The Qur’an advises believers to deal harshly
with the enemies of Islam.
To understand the significance of this verse, as with the rest of the vers‐
es in the Book, it is very helpful to look at the sira and hadith of the
Prophet. As with a variety of religions, there are plenty of bloodthirsty ac‐
counts of the past that can be used to legitimate acting in similarly direct
ways in the present and future. For example, there is the death of ʿAmr bin
Hisham, a pagan Arab chieftain originally known as ‘Abu Hakim’ (Father
of Wisdom) until Muhammad renamed him ‘Abu Jahl’ (Father of Stupidi‐
ty) for his determined opposition to Islam. After ʿAmr was mortally
wounded by a new convert to Islam during the Battle of Badr, it is report‐
ed that ʿAbdullah ibn Masʿud, a close companion of Muhammad, saw the
chieftain collapsed on the ground. So he went to him and started abusing
him. Among other things, ʿAbdullah grabbed and pulled ʿAmr's beard and
stood gloating on the dying man's chest. This has led to a good deal of
similar actions among some groups of Muslims when dealing with their
enemies by cutting off their heads and humiliating their bodies, perhaps as
6 Leaman, Oliver. Islamic Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford, 2009, pp. 133-7.
Peace and Violence in Islam: Philosophical Issues
77
a means to healing the hearts of the victors. Although this may be distaste‐
ful to some, if this is the most efficient way of bringing about an end
worth achieving, are there really any significant ethical objections to it? At
8: 16 we are told: ‘And whoever turns his back on them, except as a strate‐
gy or to join another group, will certainly attract the wrath of God, his
abode will be fire, And what a wretched destination that is.’ The previous
verse refers to fighting the unbelievers. This quotation from a London
newspaper is a response to the practice of cutting heads off in Syria by
ISIS: ‘Look, I'm not into holding people's heads and things like that, but in
the battlefield people kill each other and things are done to terrify the ene‐
my. So it may be used as a war ploy or a tactic - as it is said in the Qur’an,
chapter eight, verse 16, to terrorize your enemies so that the war can be
finished quickly and your enemies run away’ 7. He is right in thinking that
there are plenty of verses which talk of the advantages of violence, but of
course there are just as many and perhaps more that talk of the signifi‐
cance of peace and the importance of not prolonging conflict any longer
than strictly necessary.
Back to absolute principles
It looks as though it is very difficult to perceive the overriding absolute
principles that ultimately govern action, since all sorts of otherwise objec‐
tionable actions are apparently contemplated in the right circumstances.
We have to be very careful in how we deal with those principles. Pious
books defending Islam on this topic see no problem at all, Islam is based
on peace, even the name of the religion can be taken to refer to peace, and
the rules of war are fair, largely defensive and appropriate 8. Those hostile
to Islam represent the references to peace and war to be based on some
generally aggressive principles 9, and it is not difficult to find verses that
can be expanded into universal principles which accord with such a view.
History brings out the ruthlessness and brutality of people who do not
seem to have reflected on how their religion might have expected them to
behave. Not of course that there is anything specifically Islamic about this,
5.
7 Choudary. 2014.
8 bin Muhammad, Ghazi/ Kalin, I./ Kamali, M. (Eds.). War and Peace in Islam: The
uses and abuses of jihad. London, 2013.
9 Holland, Tom. In the Shadow of the Sword. London, 2013.
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the phrase ‘the rules of war’ is generally oxymoronic, but it does serve to
remind us that the rhetoric we often hear of how comparatively gentle, or
vicious, the forces of Islam tend to have been in the past miss the point.
They were just like anyone else. Does that not suggest that the idea that
there are absolute principles that have to be obeyed in all circumstances is
merely rhetorical. This is not a point about practice but about theory as
well. The principles do not seem to enter into the process of ethical deci‐
sion-making. We know that the Prophet is supposed to have been very
flexible in his political management of the nascent umma, but surely this
pragmatism was based on principles, principles embodied in the Qur’an
and derived from God. That is why one of his wives, ‘A’isha, referred to
his character as based on the Qur’an and his practice is taken as exemplary
by Muslims.
We need to make some remarks on the connection between principles in
ethics and the ways in which we actually work out how to Islam, as in oth‐
er religions and ethical systems, there are not just general principles that
help one decide how to act. There are additional and diverse sources of au‐
thority, ranging in Islam from the hadith, the sira of the Prophet, the
judgements of whatever school of law one adheres to, the sayings of the
Imams for the Shi‘a, the use of reason at some level, and so on. Some of
these consist of stories, stories which talk about what happened, what it
meant, how people reacted and so on, and these are very helpful in teach‐
ing people how to apply theory to practice. Good teachers do not just in‐
struct their students in the subject they are teaching but give examples,
show them how to apply the theory and in this way it becomes more con‐
crete and applicable to their everyday lives, and this is how religions work
also. Such examples not only help us apply theory but they also enable us
to stand back from the immediacy of the situation in which we find our‐
selves, so pressing in the case of conflict, and calmly consider how to act.
This is a point that Kant made when outlining the concepts we use both
epistemologically and morally, suggesting we need some way of actually
applying them to the world we experience. He argued this involved what
he calls schematism, which is a way in which the concepts are translated
into a more concrete form so that they can be used to deal with the world
of space and time, and human behaviour. He does not actually think that
we can find a clear schema of the moral law, but something rather similar
to it will have to serve. We do not have to enter into the detail of the criti‐
cal philosophy here, but we should take up his main point, which is that
the way in which the schematism works involves the imagination.
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It is the imagination that uses and manipulates the stories that are so im‐
portant to us in operating in the everyday world, and the stories that fea‐
ture in the hadith are precisely that. they help us work out a variety of
ways of adapting the principles of religion to the practice of everyday life.
In Islamic philosophy imagination has traditionally been seen as the inter‐
mediary between heaven and earth, between the realm of the celestial and
entirely abstract and the world of generation and corruption which we in‐
habit. As a source of knowledge it is suspect, but as a way of allowing us
to discover how to combine experience with general ideas it is essential.
This Kantian point has a long history in Islamic thought, and it comes very
much into the ethical discussion here, since it helps us understand how it
is possible for us to use moral principles in a way that makes sense both
practically and yet also in a way that acknowledges the significance of
those principles. Imagination is clearly involved here. The sorts of people
who just follow principles without thinking about their implications or
putting themselves in the shoes of the participants surely fail to act appro‐
priately, however close their actions are to some verses in the Qur’an.
They go awry since there are of course other verses as well, plus a wide
range of interpretative material that obliges the believer to consider care‐
fully how he should behave in a situation of conflict and not just follow a
formula that represents a partial understanding of the divine will.
Principles and how to apply them
The idea of balance in religion is worth mentioning here also. It is linked
with the concept of justice, as in 2:143 where the followers of the Prophet
are described as wasat. Sometimes the term is identified with being the
best (68: 28; 1: 6-7), in the last verse contrasting sharply with the ap‐
proach to religion taken by the Jews and the Christians. Indeed, Islam of‐
ten sees itself as standing between those who believe in anything at all and
those who deny everything they cannot personally vouch for. It is a middle
point between those who see the universe as the only important place and
those who regard it as an illusion. In Islamic law we find a system which
seeks to balance crimes and penalties, and rules such as those of inheri‐
tance are designed to preserve equity. Now, when we get to the detail of
such laws we may find much in them which is difficult to accept, but the
principle here is entirely acceptable, that an attempt is made to be fair to




ance. The identification of virtue with moderation is not difficult to under‐
stand since the universe itself was created in a balanced and presumably
good way: ‘And the earth We have spread out, and set on it mountains
firm and immovable; and created in it all kinds of things in appropriate
balance’ (15: 19).
Applying a rule always calls for discretion, and the virtue of moderation
is that the rule is applied sensitively to a particular situation or within a
certain context. That is where Iblis went wrong, when he applied the rule,
one of his rules, that fire is superior to earth, in a way that failed to take
into account God's purpose in elevating humanity over jinn. Iblis was not
prepared to consider whether there was a point to what was happening, he
could not moderate his sense of superiority over this creature that God was
elevating over others, and the result is well known (17:61-62). As Rein‐
hold Niebuhr points out, virtues taken to an extreme easily become
vices10. But why do they? Surely we do not run into the danger of being
too good, or too accurate in our judgements? If Iblis is correct in what he
says about fire and earth, what is wrong with his insisting on it? Perhaps it
is his disregard for suras such as ‘O you who believe! Do not make un‐
lawful the good things which God has made lawful for you, but do no ex‐
cess, for God does not love those given to excess’ (5: 87). In criticizing
the status of humanity Iblis acted excessively, rather than waiting patiently
to see how this new creation would work out. This straight path is men‐
tioned in all the daily prayers, and it is not difficult to argue that the
straight path is equivalent to acquiring a moderate disposition to our be‐
haviour. The whole structure of Islam can be seen as contributing to this
aim.
God knows what sorts of creatures we are, since he created us, and so
he knows how we ought to live. He provides us with this information
through his messengers and prophets, through the Qur'an and other author‐
itative works, through the hadith and the sunnah of the Prophet, and for
some Muslims through the imams or other significant figures. A contrast
was made earlier between two approaches to moderation, one based on
strict adherence to the law where moderation is damaging to the point of
the divine legislation, and where it is something we are advised to pursue
throughout our lives with respect to our personal and communal be‐
haviour. This contrast may itself be moderated, and we might say that the
10 Niebuhr, Reinhold. The Irony of American History. New York, 1985.
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strict view of the law represents one side of it, the fact that it comes from
God and cannot be altered. Yet however divine the law may be, it has to
be used and interpreted in everyday life, and it is here that moderation is
significant. Moderation can be linked with the idea of considering the con‐
sequences of what might happen since it involves considering a wide
range of examples that might be relevant in deciding what to do in a par‐
ticular case. It is opposed to the idea of just sticking to a formula and fol‐
lowing it.
We started by contrasting two ways of decision making in ethics, one
which relied on absolute principles and one which is dependent on the
consequences of action. It was argued that both are involved and that Is‐
lam suggests this by its emphasis on moderation and through the whole
hermeneutic process of considering a wide range of sources of authority.
Nowhere is this more important than in issues to do with conflict, since
here the passions of the participants are often raised to such a level that
their capacity for calmly and properly assessing the situation before them
is diminished. Religions are very good at helping participants think in a
sophisticated manner about the issues and coming to a conclusion based
on a rounded view of both the facts and the ethical possibilities of action.
To grasp this we need to understand more clearly what scope there is for
moral reasoning in religion. This essay has been an attempt at starting on
this task and applying it to the debate over violence and Islam. The argu‐
ment has been rather like those in Islamic philosophy advocating describ‐
ing God in terms of what He is not like, as opposed to His positive at‐
tributes. It has been argued here that whatever the rules of war in Islam
might be, and how violence should be used, they are not going to be re‐
solved by either consideration of the consequences or through relying on
some general principles that can never be contradicted. It is going to be by
some combination of these ethical sources of information. There is noth‐
ing novel in this suggestion. On the contrary, it represents the practice of
those involved in the debate over many centuries. It is designed to serve as
a corrective to those today who seek to resolve these complicated ethical
issues by relying on a simple formula to work out how to behave.
Further Reading
Leaman, Oliver. Controversies in Contemporary Islam, London, 2014.
----. The Qur’an: Philosophical Perspectives. London, 2016.
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Violence in Contemporary Indonesian Islamist Scholarship:
Habib Rizieq Syihab and ‘enjoining good and forbidding evil’
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Abstract: Violence can be construed as ‘action that inflicts, threatens, or causes
injury’, and it is worth asserting that ‘injury may be corporal, written, or verbal’
(Hall 2013: 364). In line with this, Stewart and Strathern (2013: 376) understand
violence as ‘harmful acts whose legitimacy is contested or ambivalent’. For Stew‐
art and Strathern, the contested legitimacy is an essential element in categorizing
hurtful action as violence.
The underlying idea of the founding of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is the
notion of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’ (al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy
‘an al-munkar). The founding fathers of FPI (most notably Habib Rizieq Syihab)
thought that the government of Indonesia remained silent about evil events which
occurred throughout the country, and accordingly felt the necessity of ‘command‐
ing good and forbidding evil’, by organizing some necessary actions to stop evil in
Indonesian society.
Syihab is considered as one of the authorities who define the canon of Islamist
scholarship in contemporary Indonesia. This authority includes his lineage that
can be traced back to the Prophet Muhammad, as well as his mastering of classical
Arabic and Islamic texts. This study will focus on Syihab’s book entitled Han‐
curkan Liberalisme, Tegakkan Syariat Islam (Destroy Liberalism, Enforce Islamic
Law, 2011), and will address the following problems: (a) How does Syihab justify
the violence in the corpus of Islamic doctrines and national constitution? (b) What
agency does Syihab use to transmit his idea of ‘commanding good and forbidding
evil’? and (c) What are the socio-political factors which surround Habib Rizieq
Syihab’s ideas on violence?
Introduction
This paper is devoted to investigating the notion of violence in contempo‐
rary Indonesian Islamist scholarship, as it is presented in Habib Rizieq
1.
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Syihab’s elaboration of al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar
(commanding good and forbidding evil). The accounts of ‘religion and vi‐
olence’, ‘the notion of authority’, ‘Islamism and Indonesian Islam’ and
‘commanding good and forbidding evil in Islamic scholarship’ are consid‐
ered in the first part of this paper, to give a general context for the topic
under discussion. The next part of this paper deals with the Islamic De‐
fenders Front. The main parts of the paper comprise a discussion on Habib
Rizieq Syihab and religious authority, the notion of ma‘ruf and munkar,
the conditions of performing ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’, vio‐
lence and freedom of conscience, the anthropological and constitutional
logic of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’, the constitutional and
cultural circumstances of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’, and the
axiological basis of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’.
The intricate interplay between religion and violence
Violence can be construed as ‘action that inflicts, threaten, or cause in‐
jury’, and it is worth asserting that ‘injury may be corporal, written, or
verbal’.1 In line with this, Stewart and Strathern2 understand violence as
‘harmful acts whose legitimacy is contested or ambivalent’. For Stewart
and Strathern, the contested legitimacy is an essential element in catego‐
rizing hurtful action as violence.
Pertaining to the relationship between religion and violence, we may
observe at least two contrasting opinions among scholars. Some specialists
do not ascribe the potential for violence to particular religious structures,
whilst others do. The French scholars Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and
René Girard (b. 1923) belong to this latter group. Durkheim argues that in
religious tradition, sacred and profane are clearly distinguished, and ‘it is
well within religious possibility that violence can become a sacred duty’.
It is worth remarking that Durkheim reveals instances of violence driven
by religion, namely extreme asceticism, martyrdom and holy war.3
2.
1 Hall, John R. ‘Religion and Violence from a Sociological Perspective.’ In: Mark
Juergensmeyer/ Margo Kitts/ Michael Jerryson (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of
Religion and Violence. Oxford, 2013, p. 364.
2 Stewart, Pamela J./ Strathern, Andrew. ‘Religion and Violence from Anthropologi‐
cal Perspective.’ In: Juergensmeyer et al (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook. p. 376.
3 Hall, p. 364.
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In line with Durkheim, Girard points out that ‘scapegoating - killing of
a ‘surrogate victim’ standing in for wider evils - is a primordial religious
act to sustain the sacred in the face of pollution’.4 Sacrifice is accordingly
a ritual in which the community offers up a replacement of itself for the
sake of protecting the community from its own violence. This allows us to
comprehend that for Girard ‘violence is always implicit, and indeed, lies at
the heart of ritual’.5
In response to these contrasting positions, Hall6 suggests his own thesis,
namely, ‘that manifestations of violence in relation to religion are diverse’.
He goes on to stress that these manifestations ‘hinge on alternative cir‐
cumstances wrought by different historical moments, institutional forma‐
tions, and cultural meanings. In other words violence is situational’. Hall7
concludes that it is religious formations and their contextual situations, not
religious traditions per se, which mould their potential embodiments with
violence. For Hall,8 ‘the complex array of possible developments will be
conditioned - and, in turn, shape - specific kinds of religious organizations
involved. In unfolding events of violence, both of a religious group and of
a social order, may be very much in play, and historical circumstances
and, thus, trajectories of group and their collective actions may shift’.
Hall9 highlights four categories of violence that occur within a religious
domain. First, scapegoating and other forms of boundary maintenance are
performed in order to affirm the sacred. Second, strict and detailed bound‐
aries, most particularly in sectarian religious organizations, may contribute
in the emergence of ‘conflicts over identities and allegiances of individu‐
als’. Third, religions are concerned with the possibilities of salvation, and
accordingly wield a strong influence to its members, ‘in part by offering or
withdrawing the blessings of the group’. Fourth, charismatic figures and
religious functionaries may attain a high degree of trust or ‘command a
degree of hero worship’ from their respective religious communities.
4 Ibid. p. 364.
5 Bowie, Fiona, The Anthropology of Religion: An Introduction. Oxford, 2010, pp.
178-179.
6 Hall. p. 366.
7 Ibid. p. 373.
8 Ibid. p. 366.
9 Ibid. pp. 367-368.
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The notion of authority
For the purpose of my analysis, I adopt Zambrano’s10 definition of author‐
ity as ‘a relation that exists between individuals’ in which ‘one individual,
prompted by his or her circumstances, does as indicated by another indi‐
vidual what he or she would not do in the absence of such indication’.
Zambrano goes on to assert that ‘the legitimacy of an authority relation is
what keeps the relationship from breaking down’, and is the response to
the question: why does the subject of authority do as prescribed by the
holder of authority?11 This authority relation is deemed to be a part of ‘a
wider web of practices and beliefs’ that renders meaning to all relations in
a given community.12
The question of legitimacy involves the perspectives of both the holder
of authority and the subject of authority. The former perspective is con‐
cerned with the authority claims that are asserted by the holder of authori‐
ty. Max Weber13 indicates three types of authority and their respective
grounds for asserting obedience: (a) traditional authority, ‘obey me be‐
cause it is what our people have always done’, (b) charismatic authority,
‘obey me because I can transform your live’, (c) legal-rational authority,
‘obey me because I am your lawfully appointed superior’. The latter per‐
spective, i.e. the subject of authority, deals with the question of what justi‐
fies the command in the eyes of the subject.
Drawing inspiration from game theory, Zambrano14 assesses the legiti‐
macy of an authority relation, and considers the perspectives of both the
holder and the subject of authority. He points out that ‘an individual can
be in a position of authority with respect to another individual to the extent
that there are equilibrium beliefs that support choices that an analyst of the
relation’ designates as ‘commanding’ or ‘ruling’ for the superior and ‘fol‐
lowing’ or ‘obeying’ for the subordinate.
3.
10 Zambrano, Eduardo. ‘Authority, social theories of.’ In: Neil J. Smelser/ Paul B.
Baltes (Eds.). International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.
Amsterdam, 2001.
11 Zambrano. Authority.
12 Ibid. p. 209.
13 Jones, Liz Bradbury and Shaun Le Boutillier. Introducing Social Theory. Cam‐




Zambrano15 further develops his argument by identifying ‘equilibrium
beliefs’ as: (a) ‘at the interpreted level of the social interaction’, (b) func‐
tioning ‘as the common ground that sustains an authority relation’, (c) as‐
certained with respect to both the holder’s and the subject’s situation, and
(d) ‘part of the web of practices and beliefs’ that yield meaning to all rela‐
tions in a given community.
Friedman’s16 distinction of ‘being in authority’ and ‘being an authority’
is worth remarking. Friedman indicates that the claim to authority of a per‐
son ‘in authority’ is merely based on the fact that he/she has been ‘put “in
authority” according to established procedure, rather than his decisions
are, on independent grounds, sound, meritorious, or superior decisions’.
What is generated by someone ‘in authority’ is ‘a decision to be followed,
not a statement to be believed’. The legitimacy of an individual who is an
authority is grounded on the belief that he/she possesses ‘special knowl‐
edge, wisdom, or insight or to be recipient of a revelation or unique expe‐
rience not available to other men’. What is represented by the person who
is an authority is ‘not merely a decision to be followed, but a statement to
be believed’.
Further, Friedman17 classifies being an authority into two sub-clusters:
(a) ‘authority over beliefs’ and (b) ‘authority over conduct’. Religious
scholars, experts and parents are instances of those possessing ‘authority
over beliefs’, while judges, generals and legislators possess ‘authority over
conduct’.
Islamism and ‘Indonesian Islam’
‘Indonesian Islam’ is believed by many specialists to have distinct fea‐
tures, of which the most striking is the compatibility between Islam and
democracy. This distinct characteristic is considered to be able to explain
why the process of democratization in Indonesia persists and is likely to
succeed, differing from the experience of Muslim countries in the Middle
East and North Africa, which encountered the ‘Arabic spring’ of democra‐
cy, but found it to be short lived.
4.
15 Ibid.
16 Friedman, R.B. ‘On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy.’ In: Joseph
Raz (Ed.). Authority. New York, 1990.
17 Friedman. On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy. p. 57.
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Indonesian Islamic Civil Society Organizations are distinct to those in
some Muslim countries (most notably the Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan and
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), in the sense that Indonesian civil soci‐
ety organizations (most notably the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muham‐
madiyah) demonstrate their commitment to Indonesian nationalism and
constitutional governance.18
Azra19 explores the notion of ‘Indonesian Islam’ and comes to conclu‐
sion that Indonesian Islam possesses distinct characteristics. These fea‐
tures include: (a) the peaceful spread of Islam, (b) Islam is culturally em‐
bedded, in the sense of undergoing cultural enrichment without losing its
own cultural traditions, (c) the rich heritage, (d) it is a Pancasila state, (e)
women enjoy a greater role in public life, (f) the existence of mainstream
organizations, most notably the Nadlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah,
(g) the radical groups are small in number, but relatively outspoken, (h)
the empowerment of moderates, as a balance to outspoken radicals.
The existence of radical groups in Indonesia is worth drawing attention
to. Radical Islamic groups are also found in other Muslim countries. In In‐
donesia, radical Islamic groups are found during the Old Order, New Or‐
der and Reformation Era, but it is most particularly during the Reforma‐
tion Era that radical Islamic groups became more visible. What is specific
to Indonesia is that the number of these radicals is relatively small, and
that there are counter-discourses and praxis made by the moderate Muslim
personages and groups. These discourses and praxis play a significant role
in shaping the nature and future of Indonesian Islam.
It is hoped that this paper will contribute to making ‘Indonesian Islam’
better known in international academia. As some specialists argue, In‐
donesian Islam is in some ways distinct from Islamic religiosity which de‐
veloped in the Middle East, in the sense that Indonesian Islam can easily
connect with and conform to the ideas of democracy, human rights, and
pluralism. Although we are aware of the existence of radical groups within
Islam, we notice that their number is relatively small, and that there are
counter-discourses and actions made by moderate Muslim individuals and
18 Hefner, Robert W. ‘Indonesia in the Global Scheme of Things: Sustaining the Vir‐
tuous Circle of Education.’ In: Jajat Burhanudin, Kees van Dijk (Eds.). Islam in
Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations. Amsterdam, 2013, p. 58.
19 Azra, Azyumardi. ‘Distinguishing Indonesian Islam: Some Lessons to Learn.’ In:
Jajat Burhanuddin, Kees van Dijk. (Eds.). Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images
and Interpretations. Amsterdam, 2013.
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groups which play a strong role in moulding the nature and future of In‐
donesian Islam.
‘Commanding good and forbidding evil’ in Islamic scholarship
The notion of violence in Islamic scholarship is found, for instance, in the
discourse on al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (commanding
good and forbidding evil). The Persian scholar Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (d.
1111), for instance, reveals the levels (darajat) in conducting al-amr bi al-
ma‘ruf. Al-Ghazzali puts these levels in the following order: (a) ‘seeking
information’, (b) ‘informing’, (c) ‘exhortation’, (d) ‘harsh language’, (e)
‘physical action’, (f) ‘the threat of action’, (g) ‘actual violence’, and (h)
‘armed helpers’. In addition to this, al-Ghazzali highlights three qualities
that the performer of al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf should have, namely: (a) knowl‐
edge (‘ilm), (b) scrupulousness (wara’), and (c) an even temperament
(husn al-khuluq).20
Some Muslim scholars are of the opinion that the performance of al-
amr bi al-ma'ruf with the tongue is most particularly the responsibility of
scholars - though many other scholars disagree with this point of view.
Above all, we should perceive this standpoint from an alternative angle.
This particular standpoint implies that the performance of al-amr bi al-
ma‘ruf by the scholars is due to their social role, and serves to exercise a
moral authority21. Moral authority refers to:
‘the relative credibility and weight of a source's moral judgments, beliefs,
principles, rules, intuitions, and value-commitments. For millennia, moral au‐
thority was thought to belong to religious texts and leaders. In theocratic na‐
tions, and in some social circles elsewhere, this is still assumed. From such a
perspective, for example, a judgment has moral authority only if found in the
Bible as interpreted by the Vatican. In mystical traditions, moral authority
may be given to those who claim to possess supernatural insight into the uni‐
verse or who, as with prophets, are believed to commune directly with
gods’.22
5.
20 Cook, Michael. Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought.
Cambridge, 2000, pp. 438-442.
21 Ibid. pp. 488-489.
22 Potter, Michael K. ‘Moral Authority’. In: Deen K. Chaterjee (Ed.). Encyclopedia
of Global Justice. London 2001, p. 2011.
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Michael Cook highlights the political aspect of forbidding evil. He argues
that, ‘while forbidding wrong can express the claims of rebels to political
authority, it can also provide an alibi or those who do not wish to chal‐
lenge an incumbent state too openly or directly’.23
The Islamic Defenders Front
The Islamic Defenders Front and its theological tendency
The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) was founded by twenty Muslim fig‐
ures, most notably Habib Rizieq Syihab, Cecep Bustomi and Habib Idrus
Jamalulllail. These individuals are known as hard line preachers. Cecep
Bustomi, for instance, was jailed in the 1980 s due to his sermons, which
criticized the evil of the authoritarian Soeharto governance. On 17 August
1998, these preachers gathered at the Pesantren al-Umm, Ciputat, South
Jakarta, to declare the existence of the ‘Anti-Evil National Movement’ and
an organization called ‘The Islamic Defenders Front’. The Islamic De‐
fenders Front, which was established three months after the fall of Soehar‐
to in May 1998, advocates ‘moral reformation’. 24
The FPI maintains that it is a movement based on Islamic teachings ac‐
cording to Ahl al-Sunnah Wa al-Jama‘ah. It is worth mentioning that the
FPI’s understanding of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama‘ah is closely related
to that of Indonesian Salafism, as it is represented by the Forum Komu‐
nikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah (Communication Forum of Ahl al-Sunnah
Wa al-Jama‘ah) under the leadership of Ja‘far ‘Umar Talib. Salafism re‐
jects the assumption that the Ahl al-Sunnah Wa al-Jama‘ah originated
from the teachings of Abu Hasan al-Ash‘ari and Abu Mansur al-Maturidi.
They would rather maintain that the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama‘ah origi‐
nated from the Companions (sahabah) of the Prophet, and accordingly
they strive to follow the examples of the Companions pertaining to their
6.
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24 Hasani, Ismail/ Naipospos, Bonar Tigor. Wajah Para ‘Pembela’ Islam (Faces of
Defenders of Islam). Jakarta, 2011, p. 148.
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understanding and implementation of religion. This includes sticking to
the symbolic aspects of religion 25(Ngatawi 2006: 96-98).
Although in many respects the FPI share their teachings with Indone‐
sian Salafism, they also differ from Salafism in some other respects. This
can be seen for instance in the fact that Indonesian Salafism (as they repre‐
sent their position) is strict in terms of understanding and implementation
of Islamic teachings as well as symbolic aspects of Islam, and accordingly
they are intolerant towards diversity. Such an attitude often triggers con‐
flict within local communities. This is to some extents distinct from that of
the FPI, which is slightly more liberal in implementing Islamic teachings,
most particularly in terms of the symbolic aspects of Islam. The FPI toler‐
ate members who do not dress as laid down by the Prophet, most particu‐
larly during Islamic gatherings (pengajian). The FPI applies strict regu‐
lation pertaining to dress code only during demonstrations or sweeping ac‐
tions, when it is for a practical reason, namely in order to exclude non-
members from an action.
Interestingly, the American Foreign Policy Council 26 includes the FPI
as an Islamist group, most particularly due to the fact that this organization
aspires to bring Islamic law into the national constitution. This can be ob‐
served, for instance, at FPI’s assemblies that demand the espousal of the
Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta), which would render constitutional status
to Islamic law. Moreover, the FPI calls for the abolishment of the govern‐
ment policy of ‘sole foundation’, which imposes the acceptance of the
state ideology (Pancasila) on all political and social organizations in the
country.
It seems to me that the American Foreign Policy Council’s standpoint,
which includes the FPI in the category of Islamist groups, is also to some
extent motivated by the fact that the FPI is one of the bodies behind the
campaigns against the US in the Indonesian public sphere. This is appar‐
ent, for instance, in Syihab’s book,27 which makes the point that the FPI
25 Ngatawi, Al-Zastrouw. Gerakan Islam Simbolik: Politik Kepentingan FPI (The
Movement of Symbolic Islam: the Political Interest of Islamic Defenders Front).
Yogyakarta, 2006, pp. 100-101.
26 American Foreign Policy Council, The World Almanac of Islamism. Philadelphia,
2014, p. 88.
27 Syihab, Habib Rizieq. Dialog FPI Amar Ma‘ruf Nahi Munkar: Menjawab
Tuduhan terhadap Gerakan Nasional Anti Ma’siat di Indonesia (Dialogue with Is‐
lamic Defenders Front on Commanding Good and Forbidding Evil: Answering the
Accusations on Anti-Evil National Movement in Indonesia). Jakarta, 2008, p. 8.
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ran a major campaign against the US after the US’s invasion of
Afghanistan, 7 October 2001.
One publication highlights two types of Islamism in post-Suharto In‐
donesia. The first is embodied in struggless to win power through electoral
competition. The Crescent Star Party (PBB) and the Prosperous Justice
Party (PKS) belong to this first category. The second type is manifested in
cultural and social activism. This second category includes the FPI, the
Council of Indonesian Muslim Holy Warriors (MMI) and the like.28
Islamism, according to Olivièr Roy, is ‘a new movement of thought that
endeavoured to define Islam primarily as a political system’, more specifi‐
cally ‘in keeping with the two major ideologies of the twentieth century.
This movement, which is mainly initiated by the Egyptian scholar Hassan
al-Banna and the Indo-Pakistani scholar Abu ’l-A’la Mawdudi, justifies
this new vision by the notion of a ‘return’, namely ‘a return to the texts
and to the original inspiration of the first community of believers’ (al-
salaf). Roy goes on to explain that nowadays Islamism has undergone a
change in its outlook. It has been transformed into a type of ‘neo-funda‐
mentalism’, which aims primarily at re-establishing the Shari‘ah (Islamic
law), ‘without inventing new political forms’.29 In this regard, the FPI
falls into the category of neo-fundamentalism.
The Islamic Defenders Front and the mission of ‘commanding good
and forbidding evil’
The FPI has been inspired by a popular prophetic saying (hadith), ‘If any
of you sees evil, he/she has to change it with his/her hands. If he/she is not
able to do so, he/she has to change it with his/her tongue. If he/she is not
able to do so, he/she has to change it with his heart; and this is the weakest
faith’. The FPI’s activism in suppressing evil using physical force can be
understood in this context, since they do not want to be considered as
those of the weakest faith. 30
6.2
28 Hilmy, Masdar. Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism.
Singapore, 2010, pp. 101-102.
29 Oliviér Roy. The Failure of Political Islam. Carol Volk (Trans.). Cambridge, 1994,
pp. viii-ix.
30 Hasani and Naipospos. Wajah Para ‘Pembela’ Islam, p.149.
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The FPI’s programmes to suppress evil are not entities in themselves,
but rather serve as strategies to achieve a higher goal, namely the enforce‐
ment of Islamic law. The FPI was founded because in 1998 there was no
Islamic mass organization deeply concerned and involved with suppress‐
ing evil (Hasani and Naipospos 2011: 149).
The FPI’s mission in prohibiting evil is mainly performed by its off‐
shoot organization, the Paramilitary Force for Defending Islam (Laskar
Pembela Islam). This force is responsible for exerting physical pressure in
order to eradicate evil. Candidates for this force normally have to undergo
training for about three days. In the last day of training they undergo an
initiation, the text of which reads that they must be, ‘ready to abandon
evil, ready to defend the oppressed Muslims and ready to become a martyr
in the cause of God’ (Hasani and Naipospos 2011: 151).
In addition to the Paramilitary Force for Defending Islam, the FPI has
other wing organizations which have respective strategies for conducting
al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar. These offshoot organiza‐
tions include the Female Strugglers for Defending Islam (Mujahidah Pem‐
bela Islam) and the Islamic Student Front (Front Mahasiswa Islam). The
Female Strugglers for Defending Islam was established to facilitate the as‐
pirations of Muslim women regarding the performance of al-amr bi al-
ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar. This offshoot organization has many
opportunities to defend women’s rights in accordance with the rulings of
Shari‘ahh. The Islamic Student Front aims to conduct itself using its intel‐
lectual capacity.31
It seems to me that the FPI’s offshoot organizations (with their respec‐
tive strategies for dealing with al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-
munkar) are established in response to the hadith that necessitates that
Muslims perform al-nahy ‘an al-munkar with physical force and power
(bi al-yadd), their capacity to be articulate (bi al-lisan), and their disap‐
proval of evil (bi al-qalb). The establishment of these subgroups also
serve as a response to the Qur’an (Al-Nahl: 125) implying the stages of
the performance of da‘wah and al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf, namely wisdom
(hikmah), good advice (maw’izah hasanah) and dialogue (mujadalah).
The FPI has been involved with mobs urging for the dissolution of the
Ahmadiyyah. In February 2008, at the ‘big gathering’ in Banjar, Shobri
Lubis, one of the FPI’s national board declared war against the Ah‐
31 Syihab, Dialog FPI. pp. 200-202.
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madiyyah. He said, ‘we must make war against the Ahmadiyyah, kill the
Ahmadiyyah, in every place we find them we must kill them’. 32
During the years 2003-2004, the FPI stuck to a policy that they would
perform necessary actions if there were requests from the respective local
communities. Accordingly during these years there was a limited number
of sweeping actions performed by the FPI. It is recorded that there were
only two sweeping actions performed by the FPI in Jakarta. Since then the
FPI have been involved in mass demonstrations pertaining to various is‐
sues ranging from defending the Tempo Magazine, which was in conflict
with the conglomerate Tommy Winata in 2003, and objecting to the visit
of the US President George W. Bush in 2004.33
The FPI’s mode of action in forbidding evil have been opposed by some
elements within Indonesian society. The National Alliance for the Free‐
dom of Religion and Conscience (AKBB), for instance, posted an adver‐
tisement in some national newspapers:
Indonesia guarantees the citizens to exercise their respective religions. This is
the human right which is guaranteed by the constitution. This is also the
essence of ‘Unity in Diversity’ (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), which constitutes the
pillar of our Indonesian-ness. But lately there is a group of people which
strives to eliminate this human right and to threat the unity. This group also
spreads hate and fear in the society. They even commit violence, like their vi‐
olence against the Ahmadiyyah, which have lived side by side with other faith
communities since 1925. Let us guard our republic. Let us preserve these hu‐
man rights. Let us maintain our unity. 34
Habib Rizieq Syihab and the ‘enjoining good and forbidding evil’
Habib Rizieq Syihab and religious authority
The underlying idea of the founding of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI)
is the notion of al-amr bi al-ma‘ru wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar. The found‐
ing fathers of FPI (most notably Habib Rizieq Syihab) thought that the
government of Indonesia remains silent about the cases of evil that spread
throughout the country. In response, the FPI felt the necessity of ‘com‐
manding good and forbidding evil’, and accordingly they organized some
7.
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necessary action to stop evil in Indonesian society. FPI’s action in sweep‐
ing the restaurants that remained open at midday during the Ramadan-fast‐
ing month can be seen in this light. In this regard, one may see the FPI as
an anti-evil organization, which strives to take over the authority of the
state apparatus in enforcing the law and stability.
Syihab runs an official website, namely www.habibrizieq.com. This
website carries a tagline ‘Islam is the religion of blessing, which is against
evil’. On the front page of this website, Syihab reveals his three main pos‐
itions, namely, the great imam of Islamic Defenders Front, the grand mufti
of Sultanate Sulu Darul Islam (today part of Indonesia, Malaysia and
Philippine), and the President Director of ‘Markaz Syariah’ (an institution
which promotes and defends the Sunnite theology in Indonesia).
Syihab is considered as one the authorities who define the canon of Is‐
lamist scholarship in contemporary Indonesia. His credentials for this au‐
thority include his mastering of Arabic and classical and contemporary Is‐
lamic texts (which he learned in traditional Islamic institutions in Indone‐
sia, the King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as well as the
Malaya University in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia). His genealogical roots,
which can be traced back to the Prophet Muhammad, also strengthen his
authority among Indonesian Muslims, the people who respect descendants
of the Prophet Muhammad. Syihab’s authority is gained from these three
major positions, held in three institutions: the Islamic Defenders Front, the
Sultanate Sulu Darul Islam and the ‘Markaz Syariah’.
This paper focuses on Syihab’s book entitled Dialog FPI Amar Ma‘ruf
Nahi Munkar: Menjawab Tuduhan terhadap Gerakan Nasional Anti
Ma’siat di Indonesia (Dialogue with the Islamic Defenders Front on Com‐
manding Good and Forbidding Evil: Answering the Accusations against
the Anti-Evil National Movement in Indonesia). This book comprises of
three chapters: the essence of al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-
munkar, the Islamic Defenders Front and al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy
‘an al-munkar, and the Anti-evil National Movement. Syihab wrote this
book during his imprisonment in Salemba, Jakarta, from April - Novem‐
ber 2003. He chose the title of this book Dialog FPI because the contents
resulted from questions that he encountered on various occasions.35
35 See: Syihab, Dialog FPI, pp. 8-10.
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Ma‘ruf, munkar, and the conditions of performing ‘commanding good
and forbidding evil’
According to Syihab, 36 ma‘ruf means what is known, what is good. He
goes on to explain the parameters of ma‘ruf, by asserting, ‘good according
to Shari‘ah, which draws its doer near to God’. Munkar means what is de‐
nied, or evil. As for the parameters of munkar, he says, ‘evil according to
Shari‘ah which makes its committer far away from God’. In the terminolo‐
gy of Islamic jurisprudence, al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-
munkar is known as hisbah.
Syihab proposes a classification of evil. First, ‘individual evil’, namely
the evil which is committed by the individual. To cope with this kind of
evil, a soft approach is preferable. Secondly, ‘structural evil’, namely the
evil which has been embodied in a system, or a syndicate. To cope with
this latter type of evil, firmness is to be preferred. 37
The FPI was initially known as an anti-evil movement. From 1998 -
2002 the FPI performed sweeping actions in several places of entertain‐
ment, which mostly took place during the month of Ramadan. Nowadays
the intensity of these sweeping actions decreases, and as a substitute, the
FPI is now more concerned with activism against religious liberty. This
can be seen from the FPI’s action in attacking the Ahmadiyyah and the
Christianity38. In this regard, one may suppose that the FPI’s definition of
evil (munkar) becomes broadened so as to include religious liberty.
There is an indication that Syihab and the FPI are expanding their defi‐
nition of evil. Evil is not only something to do with alcoholic drink, gam‐
bling and prostitution, but also to do with deviant sects like the Ah‐
madiyyah, and with groups which injure Islam like the Network of Liberal
Islam. In July 2005, the FPI closed the Ahmadiyyah centre in the Mubarok
Campus, Bogor. In August 2005, the members of FPI gathered and
planned to ransack the centre for the Network of Liberal Islam, but it
failed to achieve this.39
When we read through Syihab’s book entitled Dialog FPI we begin to
realize that he seems to consider any practice and system that runs counter
to Shari‘ah as evil. Accordingly, he condemns the Counter Legal Draft of
7.2
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Compilation of Islamic Law, which has been introduced by some Indone‐
sian activists in order to include the idea of ‘gender equality’ and ‘human
rights’ in Indonesia’s Compilation of Islamic Law. Syihab argues that the
idea of gender equality does not conform to the principles of Shari‘ah.40
According to Syihab,41 there are four prerequisites to be met before tak‐
ing up physical action in the course of al-nahy ‘an al-munkar. Firstly, the
existing evil has to be agreed as haram (prohibited). This rules out things
that have been disputed by a Muslim scholar – when, in other words, their
status has been contested. For example, cigarettes are considered as haram
by a number of Muslim scholars, but regarded as makruh by other Muslim
scholars. Secondly, that the evil is clear and provable. This rules out un‐
clear evils, like things that fall into the category of al-munkarat al-ba‐
tiniyya (heart evils) - such as riya’, takabbur and hasad - and things that
fall into the category of al-munkarat al-masturiyya (hidden evils) – such
as evils which have been committed within people’s houses. Thirdly, the
evil cannot be solved by a soft approach. Fourthly, a firm reaction towards
the evil will not trigger any greater harm. In this vein, Syihab bases his
argument on a single principle of Islamic jurisprudence, namely, al-‘amal
bi-akhaff al-dararayn (one should take things which have the smaller
number of harms).
Syihab’s four conditions are in line with al-Ghazzali’s standpoints. Al-
Ghazzali puts forward four conditions of ‘committed evil’ or the object of
al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (al-muhtasab fih). Firstly,
it is embodied in the form of ‘munkar’ (evil) rather than a kind of
‘ma‘siyyah’ (sinful conduct). For al-Ghazzali, when a small child drinks
alcohol, it is a kind of ‘munkar’ although it should not be considered as
‘ma’siyyah’ for that child. Secondly, the evil is ongoing. Thirdly, the evil is
done in public. Fourthly, the status of evil is agreed by Muslim scholars.42
According to Syihab, the FPI is ready to undertake any negotiation per‐
taining to the eradication of evil, except in relation to two things: apostasy
and sorcery, since these two are considered as clear infidelity and shirk.
This negotiation is mostly concerned with the gradual process of eliminat‐
ing outbreaks of evil.43
40 Syihab, Dialog FPI. pp. 449-451.
41 Ibid. pp. 258-271.
42 Ibid. pp. 122-123. See also: al-Ghazzali, Abu Hamid. Ihya’ ‘Ulum al Din. pp.
117-122.
43 Syihab, Dialog FPI, pp. 492-494.
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Syihab is aware of the existence of hadith, which suggests the perfor‐
mance of ‘commanding good’ in a good manner. This hadith reads, ‘man
amara bi al-ma‘ruf fal-yakun amruhu ma‘rufan’ (one who commands
good should perform his command in a good manner). Syihab interprets
the word ma‘rufan (in a good manner) as ‘the good and true way which is
in accordance with Shari‘ah’. He explains further that the performance of
‘commanding good’ should stick to the principle of allowing the halal (al‐
lowed) and prohibiting the haram (prohibited) 44. In other words, the per‐
former of ‘commanding good’ should be aware of the distinction of halal
and haram, and should not do anything to prohibit the halal and allow the
haram.. 45 His opinion is based on the saying of the salaf, namely, ‘unsur
al-haqq bi al-haqq’ (help the truth by way of truth).
Violence and freedom of conscience
For Syihab, violence reflects two things: (a) firmness in principle and atti‐
tude and (b) rudeness and cruelty. He is convinced that firmness in princi‐
ple and attitude falls into the category of ‘praiseworthy violence’. He goes
on to elucidate that rudeness and cruelty fall into the category of ‘dis‐
graceful violence’.46 It seems to me that that Syihab’s classification of
‘praiseworthy and disgraceful violence’ is comparable with the notion of
‘legitimate and illegitimate violence’. In this regard, Syihab’s grounds for
legitimacy has been the rulings of Shari‘ah.
Syihab argues that this ‘praiseworthy violence’ is in line with God’s
commands. QS Al-Tahrim 9 and QS Al-Taubah 73 order the Prophet to
show his firmness of attitude towards the infidels and hypocrites.47 This
kind of violence is a follow up from ‘commanding good and forbidding
evil’, which cannot be solved with a soft approach. He argues that when‐
ever ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’ cannot be achieved except
by firmness of principle and attitude, the principle of Islamic jurispru‐
dence applies, namely, ‘ma la yatimm al-wajib illa bihi fa-huwa wajib’









Syihab49 justifies his violence towards evil doers, ‘Let the people cry
out that “commanding good and forbidding evil” by destroying evil, is a
kind of violent act that harms the property of other persons. But these peo‐
ple forget, or pretend to forget, that evil itself is a kind of violence that
does harm to people’s morality, which is more valuable than property’.
Elsewhere Syihab argues, ‘Let the people cry out that ‘commanding
good and forbidding evil’, by destroying evil is an anarchic act, which
may turn into other greater harmful actions (darar). But these people for‐
get, or pretend to forget, that evil is more than anarchic, since its presence
inflicts harm, and it has the potential to inflict more harm if its existence is
tolerated’ 50. It seems to me that in this case Syihab is striving to apply a
principle of Islamic jurisprudence, namely ‘al-darar yuzal’ (harm is to be
eliminated).
Syihab51 is aware that there are rulings in the Qur’an and the hadith that
recommend violence, but there are also rulings which suggest tolerance
and a gentle approach. In this case, Syihab does not take up one approach
and abandon the other, but rather takes both into consideration. He argues
that both rulings are valid since they come from God and the Prophet. As
for apparent contradictions in the two rulings, he sticks to the opinion that
the contradiction exists only on the surface. For this purpose he is in
agreement with Abd‘ al-Wahhab Khallaf in his book Usul al-Fiqh, that in
the case of a contradiction between two rulings, one has to apply such
principles as: takhsis al-‘amm, taqyid al-mutlaq, tafsil al-mujmal, and
nasikh al-mansukh.
The FPI is aware of the many perspectives on terrorism and evil. This
can be seen from their criticism of US double standards. Syihab52 express‐
es this in the following words:
When the US chased Osama ben Laden with the accusation of terrorism, the
US made use of the United Nations and designated this act as ‘the US’s policy
which deserves respect’. But when this statement was responded to by
Osama, by declaring that they would fight the US for its crimes against hu‐
manity in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US made use of the United Nations and
designated this as ‘Osama’s evil which should be fought’. In another case,
when Israel bombed Palestine and killed many civilians, the US exploited the
United Nations and designated this as ‘Israel’s policy to defend and protect
49 Ibid. p.20.
50 Syihab, Dialog FPI, p. 20.
51 Ibid. pp. 75-76.
52 Ibid. pp. 196-197.
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their citizens’. But when Hamas fought to defend their religion and their
country, the US exploited the United Nations and labelled this as ‘Hamas’s
evil which should be condemned’.
Syihab53 perceives the phenomenon of freedom in Post-Suharto Indonesia
from his particular angle. For him, the negative side of this freedom in‐
cludes the mushrooming of deviant sects and a variety of evils. The posi‐
tive side of this freedom includes the flowering of systems and methods in
disseminating the Islamic faith (da‘wah). For Syihab, this freedom of
da‘wah is undermined and hated by the West, since for them this will nur‐
ture Islamic militancy, and accordingly they suppress this kind of freedom.
Epistemological foundation of the ‘commanding good and forbidding
evil’
Syihab maintains that the rulings of the Qur’an and hadith on al-amr bi al-
ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar employ the ‘imperative form’ (sighat al-
amr) without any limitation (taqyid). He specifically refers to two princi‐
ples of usul al-fiqh, ‘al-asl fi al-amr li al-wujub’ (in principle, command
designates the obligation) and ‘mutlaq al-amr yaqtadi al-wujub’ (com‐
mand without any limitation imposes obligation).
Syihab54 sticks to Wahbah al-Zuhaili’s standpoint in his book Usul al-
Fiqh al-Islami, ‘the majority of Muslim scholars are of the opinion that the
command indicates the obligation to perform what is asked for. The obli‐
gation will not be turned to another form except when there is evidence
that leads to that conclusion’.
Syihab55 explains that the maslahah and madarrah of ‘commanding
good and forbidding evil’ are to be evaluated by the standards of Shari‘ah,
not merely rational consideration. There should also be a balance between
‘commanding good’ and ‘forbidding evil’, so that they will come into
fruition. Syihab compares ‘commanding good’ with planting rice, and
‘forbidding evil with eradicating pests.
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Anthropological and constitutional logic of ‘commanding good and
forbidding evil’
Syihab56 felt the necessity to organize what is required for ‘commanding
good and forbidding evil’, and this is based on a well-known adagio ‘al-
haqq bi-la nizam yaghlibuh al-batil ma’a al-nizam’ (unorganized truth
will be defeated by an organized lie). He points out that in Indonesia evil
has been organized as syndicate since the country’s independence in 1945,
and this syndicate of evil became stronger after the reformation (1998 un‐
til today). He argues further that this syndicate has also exploited the
‘campaign against violence’ to protect their evil practices in the country.
Syihab likens the solution to ‘evil fever’ with the dengue fever, which
can only be treated by not only curing those infected by aedes aegypti
mosquitoes but also by destroying the mosquito nests and by killing the
mosquitoes. A similar act needs to be performed to solve ‘evil fever’. The
problem of evil fever cannot be dealt with merely by curing the patient but
there also needs to be a destruction of the ‘nests’ of evil, as well as the
‘mosquitoes of evil’. Mosquitoes of evil include the sellers of alcoholic
drinking, sex workers, drug sellers, corrupt officials and thugs who back
up the evil, porn VCD sellers, and the like. Nests of evil cover the produc‐
ers of alcoholic drinking, porn VCDs, drugs and the like.57 It seems to me
that evil according to Syihab is a kind of social pathology, which requires
strict treatment.
Syihab refers to the Indonesian constitution pertaining to the necessity
of performing ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’. He argues that the
mosquitoes of evil are those that violate and denigrate both religion and
the constitution. He specifically refers to the first pillar of the Indonesian
constitution, namely belief in one God. These mosquitoes of evil, accord‐
ing to Syihab, violate Indonesian Criminal Law, most specifically the Psy‐
chotropic Act, Narcotics Act, and the like.58 Syihab argues that ‘com‐
manding good and forbidding evil’ serves to protect the human rights of
the Muslim community in terms of ‘aqidah and religiosity. 59
In addition, Syihab justifies the performance of ‘commanding good and
forbidding evil’ with the Presidential Decree of Soekarno, issued on 5 July
7.5
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57 Ibid. p. 11.
58 Ibid. pp. 12-13.
59 Ibid. p. 451.
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1959. This decree states that, ‘the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta), dated
22 June, 1945 is the spirit of the 1945 National Constitution (UUD 1945)
and is an extricable element of that constitution’. It is worth remarking
that the Jakarta Charter also states that ‘the state is based on the belief in
One God, with the obligation of performing the Shari‘ah for Muslims.
Syihab argues that this presidential decree serves as a constitutional basis
for the enforcement of the Shari‘ah as well as the enactment of ‘com‐
manding good and forbidding evil’.60
Constitutional and cultural circumstances of the ‘commanding good
and forbidding wrong’
Syihab61 is conscious of the necessity to comprehend the national consti‐
tution and other national regulations, so that the FPI’s actions in perform‐
ing al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar do not run counter to
the constitution and these other regulations. For that purpose, he sticks to
the following procedures, (a) collecting facts which could serve as proofs
of the existence of evils, which runs in counter with both religious teach‐
ings and national regulations, (b) seeking support from the local communi‐
ty which has been disturbed by that evil, (c) writing reports and making
claims to the state apparatus. Syihab maintains that only after sticking to
these procedures, can the FPI undertake necessary further actions to carry
out al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar.
Syihab goes on elucidate two strategies in the performance of al-amr bi
al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar, most particularly by looking at the
existence of support from the local community. First, there is that which
necessitates al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf. This pertains to an area that is full of evil
and where the existence of this evil is supported by the local community,
or at least the local community are not disturbed by the existing evil. In
this case, the FPI is not allowed to conduct al-nahy ‘an al-munkar, since
such an action will elicit conflict with the local community. As a substi‐
tute, the FPI is to perform al-nahy ‘an al-munkar, to enlighten the society
pertaining to the noble messages of Islam. Second, is what necessitates al-
nahy ‘an al-munkar. The second case relates to the area that is full of evil
7.6
60 Syihab, Dialog FPI, p. 478.
61 Ibid. pp. 242-243.
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and where the existence of this evil is rejected by the local community, or
at least the local community is disturbed by this evil. In this case, the FPI
is obliged to assist the local community to conduct al-nahy ‘an al-munkar,
to eliminate evil that harms the community.
In this regard, we may perceive Syihab’s classification from two angles,
(a) he is aware of socio-cultural condition in performing al-amr bi al-
ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar and (b) he would like to justify the FPI’s
actions in conducting al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar are
showing that they are in accordance with the socio-cultural condition of
the local community in question.
Axiological basis of the ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’
Syihab argues that the FPI cannot be neutral about ‘good’ and ‘evil’, since
neutrality in this respect also falls into the category of evil. He bases his
argument on the existence of two opposing forces, (a) ‘hizb Allah’ (party
of God) and (b) ‘hizb al-shaytan’ (party of Satan). Syihab’s distinction of
hizb Allah and hizb al-shaytan originates from the Qur’an (al-Mujadilah:
19 and 22), and he employs this categorization to portray and simplify so‐
cial groups, and the FPI’s position towards these groups. Syihab goes on
to explain that it is forbidden for the FPI to stay neutral about ‘hizb Allah’
and ‘hizb al-shaytan’, but it is allowed for them to remain neutral between
two groups belonging to hizb Allah.62
At the axiological level, Syihab’s performance of al-nahy ‘an al-
munkar is based on the consideration that evil does harm to the lives of
individuals, society and the nation. For that purpose, he quotes the sayings
of the Salaf, which were written in Isma‘il Muhammad al-‘Ajluni’s Kashf
al-Khafa’. These sayings include, (a) al-ma‘asi barid al-kufr (sinful con‐
ducts are the currier of infidelity) and (b) al-ma’asi tuzil al-ni’am (sinful
conducts will eliminate God’s grace). 63
In addition, Syihab refers to the hadith, which was transmitted via al-
Tirmidhi. This hadith reads, ‘wa-lladhi nafsi bi-yadih, lata’murunna bi al-
ma‘ruf wa tanhawna ‘an al-munkar, aw la-yushikuna Allah an yab’atha
‘alaykum ‘iqaban minhu, thumma tad’unahu fa-la-yustajab lakum’ (With
7.7
62 Ibid. pp. 205-206.
63 Syihab, Dialog FPI, pp. 419-420.
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the Being that my soul in His hand, you are to command good and to for‐
bid wrong, or God will put punishment on you, that that you pray for Him
and he would not hear you). He also quotes the Qur’anic verse: ‘And
whatever strikes you of disaster - it is for what your hands have earned;
but He pardons much (al-Shura: 30). In this regard, we may see that, ac‐
cording to Syihab, the spread of evil will trigger God’s punishment, such
as in the form of disaster.’
Concluding remarks
‘Indonesian Islam’ is in some ways distinct from the Islamic religiosity
that developed in the Middle East, in the sense that Indonesian Islam can
easily connect and conform to the ideas of democracy, human rights, and
pluralism. Although we are aware of the existence of radical groups within
Islam, we notice that their number is relatively small, and that there are
counter-discourses and actions made by moderate Muslim personages and
groups which play a strong role in moulding the nature and future of In‐
donesian Islam’.
The notion of violence in Islamic scholarship can be observed for in‐
stance in the discourse on al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar
(commanding good and forbidding evil). The performance of al-amr bi al-
ma‘ruf by scholars is due to their social role, and serves to exercise a
moral authority.
The Islamic Defenders Front was founded by twenty Muslim figures,
most notably Habib Rizieq Syihab, Cecep Bustomi and Habib Idrus Ja‐
malullail. These figures are known as hard line preachers. The Islamic De‐
fenders Front, which was established three months after the fall of Soehar‐
to in May 1998, advocates ‘moral reformation’. The underlying idea of the
founding of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is the notion of al-amr bi
al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar.
Syihab is considered to be one of the authorities who define the canon
of Islamist scholarship in contemporary Indonesia. His credentials include
his mastering of Arabic as well as classical and contemporary Islamic
texts.
Syihab explains the parameters of ma‘ruf, by asserting, ‘good according
to Shari‘ah, which draws its doer near to God’. As for munkar, he says,
‘evil according to Shari‘ah which makes its perpitrator far away from
God’. We observe that after 2002 there has been an indication that Syihab
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and the FPI have expanded their definition of evil. Evil is not only some‐
thing to do with alcoholic drink, gambling and prostitution, but also to do
with deviant sects like the Ahmadiyyah and with groups that undermine
Islam, like the Network of Liberal Islam.
Syihab’s classification of ‘praiseworthy and disgraceful violence’ is
comparable with the notion of ‘legitimate and illegitimate violence’. In
this regard, Syihab’s source of legitimacy has been the rulings of
Shari‘ahh. Syihab64 is aware that there are rulings of the Qur’an and the
hadith, which recommend violence, but there are also rulings that suggest
tolerance and a softer approach. In this case, Syihab would not take one
and abandon another, but rather take both into consideration.
Syihab argues that al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar is
obligatory for Muslims. His arguments are grounded on the principles of
Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh). Evil according to Syihab is a kind of
social pathology, which is in need of strict treatment.
In addition, Syihab justifies the performance of ‘commanding good and
forbidding evil’ with the Presidential Decree of Soekarno, which was is‐
sued on 5 July, 1959. This decree states, ‘the Jakarta Charter (Piagam
Jakarta) dated 22 June, 1945 is the spirit of the 1945 National Constitu‐
tion (UUD 1945) and is an inextricable element of that constitution’. It is
worth remarking that the Jakarta Charter states that ‘the state is based on
the belief in One God, with the obligation of performing the Shari‘ah for
Muslims’.
Syihab is conscious of the necessity to comprehend the national consti‐
tution and other national regulations, so that the FPI’s actions in perform‐
ing al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar do not run counter to
the constitution and these regulations. At the axiological level, Syihab’s
performance of al-nahy ‘an al-munkar stems from the notion that evil
harms the lives of individuals, society and the nation.
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Citizenship as Inclusion and Exclusion:
Arguments against Religious Violence from Contemporary
Pakistan
Najia Mukhtar
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Abstract: Pakistani society, with its multiple Muslim orientations and small non-
Muslim communities, is seeing high levels of aggression towards religious and
sectarian targets. Competing understandings of Islam tend towards seeking to sup‐
press (variously defined) religious ‘others’. The context is further complicated by
an ongoing Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency, which frequently selects
religiously identified targets (for instance, Christians and Shi‘ahs).
My paper analyses the discursive responses of two contemporary Pakistani actors,
the ‘moderate’ Sunni scholar, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi and the Sufi scholar, Tahir-
ul-Qadri, who, operating in this socio-political context, actively critique religious
violence.. Specifically, I examine their notion of citizenship, constructed from Is‐
lamic source materials such as the Qur’an, hadith, and fiqh, to guarantee religious
freedoms. However, inclusive citizenship that offers protection against violence to
religious difference must also exclude certain types of religious difference, in or‐
der to be practicable. Both Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri argue for eliminating,
through violent or coercive means, ‘terrorists’ and ‘militants’. Terrorists and mili‐
tants are categorized as dissidents and rebels using the same Islamic source mate‐
rials. Citizenship (in their versions of Islam) thus constitutes guarantees of protec‐
tion from illegitimate violence against religious difference necessarily predicated
on the legitimate violent suppression of rebel citizens.
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Introduction: Socio-political context, problem spaces and discursive
actors
The question of how Muslims should approach religious difference within
Islam1 and with other faith-groups has become increasingly charged amid
the recent prominence of violence associated with ‘Islamic’ groups. Evi‐
dently, violent suppression is one way to approach religious ‘others’. For
instance, within Pakistan, there have been numerous attacks on minorities
like the Shi‘ah, Ahmadi2 and Christians, as well as on those associated
with the (majority3) Sunni-Barelwi orientation. The Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pak‐
istan (TTP)4 insurgency in Pakistan, which often selects religiously identi‐
fied targets, has further magnified the scale of religious violence5. Several
1.
1 The term ‘Islam’ here does not refer to a single, static discourse or set of practices.
Instead, it encompasses the ambiguities, heterogeneities and fluidities within Islam
as it is lived, practiced, believed, interpreted and reinterpreted by Muslims on a
continuous basis.
2 The Ahmadiyya movement was founded in 1889 in the Indian province of Punjab
by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908). Ahmadis have faced opposition from other
Muslims, typically over the perceived messianic claims of their founder. In Pak‐
istan, Ahmadis were officially declared a non-Muslim minority (despite their self-
identification as Muslims) in 1974. Further constitutional ordinances were subse‐
quently passed penalising their usage of Muslim symbols and practices.
3 Reliable statistics on the different Sunni orientations in Pakistan are unavailable.
The website of the US public policy organization globalsecurity.org provides esti‐
mates suggesting that Barelwis comprise the significant majority, followed by the
Deobandis and then the Ahl-i-hadith. This is corroborated by anecdotal and popular
accounts in the media.
4 The TTP is a loose network of militant groups with ties to the Afghan Taliban. It
emerged officially in 2007, partially as a form of resistance to the Pakistani state’s
complicity with NATO’s anti-terrorist operations in Pakistan’s Federally Adminis‐
tered Tribal Areas (FATA).
5 Shehzad, Mohammad. ‘Timeline of Attacks on Shi‘a/Hazara Muslims in 2012-13,’
24 March 2013, http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2013/03/timeline-of-attacks-on
-Shi‘ahazara-muslims-in-2012-13/; BBC News, ‘Pakistan Mosque Attacks in La‐
hore Kill Scores,’ 29 May 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10181380 [27 August
2013]; ‘Pakistan Sufi Shrine Suicide Attack Kills 41,’ 3 April 2011, http://www.bbc
.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12951923 [27 August 2013]; Shafiq Butt, ‘Yet An‐
other Shrine Comes under Attack,’ 26 October 2011, http://archives.dawn.com/arch
ives/42249 [25 September 2011]; The Guardian, ‘Pakistan Church Bomb: Chris‐
tians Mourn 85 Killed in Peshawar Suicide Attack,’ 24 September 2013, http://ww
w.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12951923 [28 April 2013]; Dawn News, ‘Blast
Kills Six at Baba Farid’s Shrine in Pakpattan,’ 25 October 2010, http://beta.dawn.co
m/news/575737/blast-kills-six-at-baba-farids-shrine-in-pakpattan [27 August 2013].
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other militant groups operate in Pakistan, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
(Militia of Jhangvi6), which was formed in the 1990 s and particularly tar‐
gets the Shi‘ah community7. All this interplays with a global context pre‐
occupied with the emergence and violent activities of high-profile ‘terror‐
ist’ Muslim groups such as al-Qaida, the Taliban and the Islamic State
(ISIS).
This paper probes the issue of violent responses to religious difference
through the concept of ‘citizenship’, as understood by two self-described
‘tolerant’ religious actors8 in Pakistan – Javed Ahmad Ghamidi and Tahir-
ul-Qadri. Both (ostensibly) argue against religious violence and advocate
more accommodating approaches to religious difference.
Ghamidi became widely known as a ‘moderate’ Sunni scholar during
the 2000 s, when he aligned himself with the policy of ‘Enlightened Mod‐
eration’ advocated by the military government of Pervez Musharraf,
which was supporting the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT)9. Along‐
side state support, a growing demand for religious programming after the
deregulation of the Pakistani media in 2002, created space for ‘moderate’
interpretations on television. Hence, although Ghamidi and other scholars
of his Islamic educational institute, al-Mawrid, did not have a wide access
to traditional institutions (the mosque and madrasa) they became increas‐
ingly present on television. They would frequently be called upon to com‐
ment on ‘true’ Islamic injunctions regarding the use of violence, for in‐
stance in cases of blasphemy or jihad. Concerns about Muslim religious
violence following 9-11 have therefore, directly propelled and shaped the
6 Named after its founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi.
7 For more on the TTP, its relationship with the Afghan Taliban and with militant sec‐
tarian groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, see: Bergen, Peter L. / Tiedemann,
Katherine. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders between Terror, Politics and Reli‐
gion. New York, 2013; Brown, Vahid and Rassler, Don. Fountainhead of Jihad :
The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2010. London, 2013.
For an overview of the broader Taliban movement see: Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban the
Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond, New ed. London, 2010.
For a good discussion on militancy in Pakistan see Hussain, Zahid. ‘Battling Mili‐
tancy’ In: Pakistan : Beyond ‘the Crisis State’. Maleeha Lodhi (Ed.). London, 2011.
8 Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri are referred to as ‘actors’ because they are seen as
proactively producing and speaking alternative ideas for, and about, Muslims.
9 The programme of Enlightened Moderation was premised on US foreign policy to‐
wards regulating relations between religion and state in Muslim majority countries
after 9-11. See Aziz ‘Making a Sovereign State: Javed Ghamidi and “Enlightened
Moderation”’. Modern Asian Studies 45/3. 2011.
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ideas regarding Islam produced and publicly disseminated by Ghamidi and
other al-Mawrid scholars.
Tahir-ul-Qadri, referred to as Shaykh10-ul-Islam by his followers, is the
leader of the transnational organisation, Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International
(MQI, lit. Path of the Qur’an). MQI was established in 1981. Prior to 9-11
when sectarian violence between the Shi‘ah and Sunni first erupted in Pak‐
istan during the 1980 s11, Tahir-ul-Qadri actively campaigned for reconcil‐
iation and dialogue between the two communities. After 9-11 he has spo‐
ken regularly at conferences in Western countries, including the UK and
US and on television, condemning ‘terrorists’ and advocating peace and
interfaith harmony. He became globally renowned for his ‘Fatwa against
Terrorism and Suicide Bombings’12 (‘the Fatwa’) issued in London in
201013. Following this, he ran a series of ‘Anti-Terror Camps’ in the UK
during 2010. Recently he has launched an ‘Islamic Curriculum on Peace
and Counter-Terrorism’14. Hence, Tahir-ul-Qadri’s ideas too are signifi‐
cantly influenced by the preoccupation with Muslim religious violence
and ‘terrorism’ following 9-11.
While religious violence is underpinned by entangled political, social
and economic sub-texts, the targeting of groups and individuals identified
by their religion is a consistent and significant feature. Hence my empha‐
sis above, on the problematic question of how to treat religious difference
in Islam. I address this question, and not the violence per se, in this paper.
I understand both my actors as intervening in the discursive problem-
space of religious difference in Islam. According to Scott, a ‘problem-
space’ demarcates an intelligible aggregate of ideas and meanings that
10 Referring to a Muslim religious leader, particularly the leader of a Sufi community
(silsila or tariqa). The spelling shaykh is as used in MQI’s communications.
11 On the emergence of Shiʿah-Sunni sectarianism in Pakistan see: Abou Zahab,
Mariam. ‘The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan,’ In: Pak‐
istan : Nationalism without a Nation. Christophe Jaffrelot (Ed.). London, 2002;
Nasr, S. V. R. ‘Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan.’
Ibid.




13 Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad. Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings. London,
2010.
14 Wyatt, Caroline. ‘Cleric Launches “Counter-Terrorism" Curriculum,’ 23 June
2015, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33249099 [14 August 2015].
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represent political and ideological stakes. It is thus … ‘very much a con‐
text of dispute, a context of rival views, a context, if you like, of knowl‐
edge and power’... 15. In Pakistan, disputation over how to approach reli‐
gious difference within Pakistan interlaces with a global (especially West‐
ern) narrative pregnant with concern about Muslims seeking to suppress
religious difference.
In order to arrive at Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri’s usage of ‘citizenship’
in the problem space of religious difference, I start with their interpretive
methods. Producing ideas about Islam begins with a particular interpretive
treatment of recognised Islamic source materials, notably the Qur’an and
hadith16. Each actor, influenced by his particular ideological background,
emphasizes particular Islamic source materials and applies a specific inter‐
pretive logic. These interpretive processes underpin actors’ arguments
against the violent suppression of religious difference in Islam.
From here, actors adopt rhetorical strategies to publicly deliver their ar‐
guments. This is where each agent deploys the notion of ‘citizenship’, im‐
buing it with specific and distinct meanings derived out of his particular
interpretive approach. ‘Citizenship’ is thus understood as a rhetorical de‐
vice for putting forward their case against religious violence. Paradoxical‐
ly, protecting religious freedoms, or including a religiously heterogeneous
populace within the folds of citizenship is predicated on excluding certain
religious ‘others’. The ‘terrorist’ is defined as a sort of religious rebel who
must be eliminated from the folds of the polity. This concern with ridding
the polity of terrorists is immediately relevant to the post 9-11 socio-politi‐
cal context, which pervades the problem-space in which my actors are em‐
broiled.
Intellectual backgrounds and interpretive methods
Ghamidi
Javed Ahmad Ghamidi and several other members of his Islamic research
institute, al-Mawrid, were in the early parts of their lives influenced by the
2.
2.1
15 Scott, David. Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment.
Durham NC, 2004, p. 4.
16 A hadith (pl. ahadith) is a report of the exemplary sayings or deeds of the Prophet
Mohammad.
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ideas of Abu’l-’la Mawdudi (d. 1979), founder of the well-known religio-
political organisation Jamaat-i-Islami (JI – Islamic Party). Scholarship on
al-Mawrid has labelled it a ‘post-Islamist’ group, following terminology
used by Bayat and others17. Here, post-Islamism refers specifically to their
rejection of the JI’s electoral Islamism and Mawdudi’s ideological ‘Islam‐
ic’ state. Ghamidi parted ways with the JI in 1977 and cultivated a sepa‐
rate intellectual identity, which he refers to as the ‘School of Shibli’
(Dabistan-e-Shibli)18, named after the 19th century Muslim scholar and
historiographer Muhammad Shibli Nu῾mani (d. 1914)19. Shibli’s student,
Hamid al-Din Farahi (d.1930), and Farahi’s disciple, Amin Ahsan Islahi
(d.1997) are counted as key progenitors20. Ghamidi attributes his move
away from Mawdudi’s ideas, to the influence of Islahi, whom he met in
1973. Islahi had in fact been one of the JI’s founding members, but left the
party following internal disagreements in 1958. In 1980, Islahi published
his seminal exegesis, Tadabbur-i-Qur’an, which builds on Farahi’s think‐
ing regarding internal coherence in the Qur’an21. Ghamidi’s emphasis,
which I will elaborate below, on the Qur’an as the primary Islamic source
material, is significantly premised on this work.
In so far as the process of interpreting Islam begins with selecting from
among the corpus of Islamic source materials, Ghamidi’s ideas have a
modernist bent. He disparages reliance on traditional source materials -
17 Bayat, Asef. Post-Islamism : The Changing Faces of Political Islam. New York,
2013; Iqtidar, Humiera. ‘Post-Islamist Strands in Pakistan: Islamist Spin-Offs and
Their Contradictory Trajectories.’ In: Post-Islamism : The Changing Faces of Po‐
litical Islam. Asef Bayat (Ed.). New York, 2013; Amin, Husnul. From Islamism to
Post-Islamism: A Study of a New Intellectual Discourse on Islam and Modernity
in Pakistan. Rotterdam, 2010.
18 ‘From Islamism to Post-Islamism: A Study of a New Intellectual Discourse on Is‐
lam and Modernity in Pakistan.’
19 Nu῾mani was a founding member of the prestigious Nadvat al‐῾Ulama' school (est.
1894) in Lucknow.
20 Amin. ‘From Islamism to Post-Islamism: A Study of a New Intellectual Discourse
on Islam and Modernity in Pakistan; Iqtidar. ‘Post-Islamist Strands in Pakistan: Is‐
lamist Spin-Offs and Their Contradictory Trajectories’; Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad.
‘About Javed Ahmad Ghamidi: Introduction to Mawlana Mawdudi,’ http://www.ja
vedahmadghamidi.com/about/view/introduction-to-mawlaanaa-mawduudii [17
November 2014].
21 Rauf, Abdul. ‘Life and Works of Mawlana Amin Ahsan Islahi (1904-97).’ In: Pak‐
istan Journal of History and Culture 30/1, Jan-June 2009.
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notably, hadith and fiqh22- in favour of what he deems an intellect and rea‐
son-based evaluation of Islam, premised first and foremost on ‘primary’
sources, the Qur’an (and sunnah)23. The exegetical works (sing. tafsir) of
his intellectual predecessors, Farahi and Islahi, guide Ghamidi’s treatment
of source materials24. Here, it is emphasized that the Qur’an, per the status
it ascribes to itself, is the final authority and decisive standard on matters
of religion (2010: 29). Both Farāhī’s unfinished commentary (in Arabic)
and Islahi ’s 9-volume exegesis (in Urdu) treat the Qur’an as a stand-alone
text25 and extensively examine its coherence or nazm (order, arrange‐
ment), believing this to have been ensured by God26. Through affirming
the Qur’an’s structural schema al-Mawrid’s scholars elucidated (what they
believe to be) the only possible ‘correct’ meaning of Islam.
Applying some form of interpretive logic to preferred source materials
(here, the Qur’an) is an obligatory next step in the process of interpreta‐
tion. On the matter of religious difference, one particular aspect of al-
Mawrid’s Qur’anic hermeneutics is crucial. Based on their understanding
of the Qur’an’s internal structure and coherence, certain parts of the
Qur’anic text are deemed as pertaining only to a period of perfect infor‐
22 Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad ‘al-Mawrid Global Dawah Conference [Video File],’ 24
March 2012, http://www.al-mawrid.org/index.php/videos/ajax_video/al-mawrid-gl
obal-dawah-conference-24th-march-20121 [24 July 2015].
23 In Al-Mawrid’s ontological understanding, only the Qur’an and sunnah (the
Prophet’s exemplary precedent) are sources of Islam. Both are known to Muslims
through unanimity (ijma‘) of recitation and practice and concurrence of transmis‐
sion (tawatur) through time. See: Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. Islam: A Comprehen‐
sive Introduction. Lahore, 2010.
24 Farahi, Hamiduddin. ‘Exordium to Coherence in the Qur’an,’ 2008, Al-Mawrid,
http://www.hamid-uddin-farahi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=catego
ry&layout=blog&id=39&Itemid=67 [4 November 2015].
Islahi, Amin Ahsan. Tadabbur-I Qur’an. Lahore, 1985, http://www.tadabbur-i-Qur
’an.org/text-of-tadabbur-i-Qur’an/.
For an overview of Islahi’s writings see also: Rauf. Life and Works of Mawlana
Amin Ahsan Islahi (1904-97).
25 This treatment of the Qur’an is similar to that of other Indian modernists, such as
Syed Ahmad Khan and Fazlur Rahman.
26 See Farahi. Exordium to Coherence in the Qur’an; Islahi. Tadabbur-I Qur’an; Mir,
Mustansir. Coherence in the Qur’an: A Study of Islahi's Concept of Nazm in Tad‐
abbur-I Qur’an.Indianapolis, 1986). For a summary of Al-Mawrid’s most current
understanding see: Ghamidi. Islam : A Comprehensive Introduction. pp. 53-59.
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mation about the Truth (itmam-e-hujjah27) governed by divine law (qa‐
nun-e-risalat). Notably, sections of the Qur’an referring to violent mea‐
sures against religious difference are understood to fall in this category.
Ghamidi argues that acts of retribution against religious difference oc‐
curred under divine law during the lifetime of prophets (Muhammad in
this case) only after God deemed that those punished were perfectly and
fully informed (about ‘true’ Islam).
The principle is explained also by treating components of the Qur’an
referring to such retribution as pertaining only to the deviant amongst the
immediate addresses28 of the Prophet Muhammad29. In contrast to Tahir-
ul-Qadri, who, as I will show below, takes the onus of identifying the kafir
(unbeliever, denier of Truth) upon himself, Ghamidi concludes that it was
God who identified the kuffar (pl. of kafir) from amongst the immediate
addressees of the Prophet and punished them through divine injunction30.
In post-prophetic times however, nobody is in possession of the Truth.
Truth must be derived from source materials through an infinite process of
critical evaluation. Hence, religious difference is unavoidable. Further it is
impossible for an ordinary person to ascertain if the Truth has been con‐
clusively communicated to others.
Finally, unlike the Qur’an, Ghamidi considers hadith to be a dhanni
(non-definite) source material 31. Most hadith are understood to neither
have been transmitted by several people in each generation (mutawatir),
nor are they authenticated by consensus (ijma‘)32. This is especially perti‐
nent in relation to blasphemy, for which punishment is mentioned in the
27 Explained further as ‘communicating the truth to the extent that no one among its
addresses is left with an excuse to deny it’. Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction.
p. 52, note 6.
28 Those who were directly exposed to Muhammad’s preaching.
29 Saleem, Shehzad. Playing God: Misreading a Divine Practice. Lahore, 2010,
www.al-mawrid.org/pages/dl.php?book_id=87.: p. 42.
30 Common Misconceptions About Islam. Lahore, 2010, www.al-mawrid.org/pages/
dl.php?book_id=85.: pp. 134-135.
31 Ghamidi. Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction. p. 60.
32 At this point the distinction between the sunnah, which is treated as an indepen‐
dent an authoritative source material, and hadith is underscored. Contrary to the
dominant notion in the traditional branches of fiqh (Muslim jurisprudence) as well
as in South-Asian Sunni sub-denominational (Deobandi, Ahl-i-Hadith and Barel‐
wi) doctrine, Ghamidi argues against relying on hadith to know the sunnah. In‐
stead, the sunnah is restricted to very specific practical precepts, such as the rituals
of prayer and pilgrimage, marriage, divorce and dietary practices. It is believed to
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hadith but not in the Qur’an. In the next section I will develop how this
treatment of hadith, coupled with Ghamidi’s Qur’anic hermeneutics, are
directly relevant to his discussion of ‘citizenship’ as a means of accommo‐
dating religious difference.
Tahir-ul-Qadri
Tahir-ul-Qadri is affiliated with the traditional Sunni-orientation, which is
most closely associated with shrine-based religious practices. Barelwis
claim the non-sectarian character of their interpretations by referring to
themselves as Ahl al‐Sunnat wa-al-Jama῾at (people of the Prophet’s way).
Nevertheless, there are doctrinal disagreements with the other Sunni sub-
denominations. For instance in Barelwi prophetology the Prophet Muham‐
mad is afforded an exceptionally elevated, near super-human stature33.
Hence for Tahir-ul-Qadri the Prophet epitomises Islam, and his sayings,
the hadith (in contrast to Ghamidi’s views) capture Islam’s very essence
for posterity. Hence, while Tahir-ul-Qadri does also cite the Qur’an (and
fiqh) in his writings and speeches (such as the Fatwa), the hadith are par‐
ticularly emphasized. In Minhaj-ul-Qur’an’s (MQI) Islamic Library web‐
site, the largest number of works (89), all penned by Tahir-ul-Qadri, sit
under the topic The Hadith. 28 titles pertain to The Prophet’s Life and
Virtues, and 3 relate to the Finality of Prophethood. This is in comparison
to 23 titles listed under The Qur’an. The volumes comprise collections of
relevant hadith, systematised through the use of sub-headings. In some in‐
stances, details pertaining to authentication are provided, such as the chain
of transmitters (sing. isnad). Little or no commentary is offered34. Indeed,
in his public addresses too, Tahir-ul-Qadri relates hadith always as if liter‐
ally and directly.
However, the process of selecting certain hadith to relay (over others)
and insisting that there is only one meaning of Islam to be derived from
2.2
be known in the same way as the Qur’an, through unanimity and concurrence of
transmission.
33 Sanyal, Usha. Devotional Islam and Politics in British India : Ahmed Riza Khan
Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920. Delhi, 1999, pp. 255-267.
34 Melchert finds the same approach amongst the ninth-century ‘traditionist-jurispru‐
dents’ who, ‘simply assembled collections of hadith, or at least, quoted large num‐
bers of hadith reports’. See: Melchert, Christopher. ‘Traditionist-Jurisprudents and
the Framing of Islamic Law’. In: Islamic Law and Society 8/3. 2001, pp. 388-389.
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them - here asserting that Islam categorically disallows coercion in matters
of religious belief - in fact constitutes Tahir-ul-Qadri’s interpretative
method and logic. To illustrate, he repeatedly insists that he has conducted
a comprehensive review of existing hadith material, and only found hadith
supporting his position. Moreover, while Ghamidi critically engages (to
some extent) with the ideas he disputes by arguing that certain parts of the
Qur’anic text are being mistakenly interpreted as guidance for ordinary
Muslim in post-prophetic times, Tahir-ul-Qadri does not seem to examine
the interpretations he opposes at all, even for the purpose of demonstrating
their fallacies.
Ghamidi predicates his case for opposing violence against difference by
stressing human incapacity to (fully) know the Truth or identify those who
knowingly deny the Truth in post-prophetic times. For him, attempting to
understand Islam in a context of uncertainty naturally spawns difference.
In comparison, Tahir-ul-Qadri’s interpretive thinking is premised on cer‐
tainty about Truth. For instance, his Fatwa quite clearly denounces ‘terror‐
ists’ and ‘suicide bombers’ as deniers of Truth (kafir). While for Ghamidi,
uncertainty about Truth (and hence, over identifying unbelievers) is the
basis for accommodating difference, Tahir-ul-Qadri’s proclaimed certainty
in this very matter also serves to critique activists (‘terrorists’ and ‘suicide
bombers’) who violently suppress difference. Prophet Muhammad is re‐
ported to have described a ‘true’ Muslim as somebody from whose ‘hand
and tongue all humanity is safe’. Two further hadith describe the ‘true’
Muslim as one who extends charity to the poor and greets other people
with a salutation of peace. Moreover, the true believer (mumin) is one on
whom people rely for the protection of their lives and property35.
… if someone becomes an extremist and adopts hatred, prejudice, disunity,
chaos and coercion, and kills peaceful citizens as a means to preach and en‐
force … [religion], his claim to be a Muslim cannot be accepted even if he
35 Tahir-ul-Qadri. Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings; ‘Launching Ceremony
of Fatwa against Terrorism & Suicide Bombing’ [Video File], 2 March 2010, http:/
/www.deenislam.com/islam/flvID/3248/Fatwa-on-Suicide-Bombings-and-Terroris
m--by-Shaykh-ul-Islam-Dr-M-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html [9 July 2015]; ‘European






appears outwardly as a devout worshipper – because the basic criterion given
by the Prophet to judge true Islam is peace and security36.
In sum, both Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri conclude, through entirely dif‐
ferent interpretive methods, that religious difference must not be violently
suppressed. Ghamidi de-emphasises traditional source materials such as
hadith, stressing instead the primary and stand-alone nature of the Qur’an.
In contrast, Tahir-ul-Qadri’s traditional Barelwi leanings, lead him to val‐
orise the hadith. Ghamidi’s interpretive logic finds that sections of the
Qur’an mentioning the suppression or persecution of religious difference
are to be interpreted as evidence of divine retribution limited only to a
time of perfect information during the life of the Prophet Muhammad. In
current times, where information about Truth is imperfect, ordinary hu‐
mans do not have the capacity to identify and punish unbelievers. Tahir-ul-
Qadri on the other hand, seeks to accommodate difference by identifying
unbelievers. He amasses numerous hadith (and other source materials) to
corroborate his position that ‘terrorists’ are unbelievers.
Rhetorical Strategies - Citizenship
Recall my argument above that publicly speaking actors engage in a socio-
politically relevant, discursive problem-space. Thus, seeking social change
by articulating and disseminating ideas about (religious difference in) Is‐
lam further involves the rhetorical deployment of interpretive outcomes
discussed in the previous section. This involves making use of specific
contentious concepts in the relevant problem-space. Here, I turn to Ghami‐
di and Tahir-ul-Qadris’ deployment of the concept of ‘citizenship’.
Following Quentin Skinner, ‘rhetorical strategies’ involve the use of
terms that offer ‘a moral evaluation’ of something at the same time as de‐
scribing it37. For instance describing a person or action as ‘religious’ has
normative connotations38. One of the rhetorical strategies proposed by
Skinner for an agent seeking ideational change, is to vary the criteria for
applying an existing set of normatively positive terms. The ‘aim in this
3.
36 ‘Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings’ p. 32.
37 Skinner, Quentin. Visions of Politics: Regarding Method. 1. Cambridge, 2002, p.
156.
38 Whether these are positive or negative depends on the prevailing social norms of
the society in question.
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case is to insist, with as much plausibility as can be mustered, that in spite
of contrary appearances a number of favourable terms can be applied as
apt descriptions’ in this case, to the matter of religious difference39. Both
Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri apply the concept of ‘citizenship’ in this way;
that is, they relate (the favourable term) citizenship with religious differ‐
ence in order to persuade their listeners to view the latter in a more
favourable light.
Citizenship, in Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri’s usage, pertains not so
much to the role of the state (presently, both have no direct involvement in
the Pakistani or any other state) but to how ideas about citizenship influ‐
ence the behaviour of ordinary Muslims towards (perceived) ‘others’ in
Pakistan. Broadly speaking, citizenship implies the inclusion of individu‐
als and groups into a polity and society and the exclusion of certain others.
Narratives about citizenship shape who people imagine belong in their so‐
ciety and on what terms. They influence also the extent of freedom grant‐
ed to members of a polity to express their ideas and beliefs. In Pakistan,
the nation’s liberal-secular founding elite initially framed citizenship as
constituting religious freedom and equal rights for all citizens regardless
of religious belief 40. Subsequent governments, partly driven by an in‐
creasingly potent lobby of Muslim religious groups and parties41, propa‐
gated more majoritarian notions of citizenship, for instance in the treat‐
ment of Ahmadi citizens,42 and in the passing of laws against blasphemy
in 1982 and 1986. The influential Muslim scholar-activist Mawdudi (from
whose thought Ghamidi ultimately defected), also professed antipathy to
the presence of deviant Muslims (who were threatened with the capital
39 Skinner. pp. 153.
40 Ali Jinnah, Muhammad. ‘First Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly
of Pakistan,’ 11 August 1947, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00isla
mlinks/txt_jinnah_assembly_1947.html [31 July 2013].
41 See for instance the anti-Aḥmadi campaigns of the JI and others in Vali Reza Nasr,
Seyyed. The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-I Islami of Pakistan.
London, 1994.
42 For an analysis of the increasingly discriminatory treatment of Aḥmadis by the ju‐
diciary see Mahmud, Tayyab. ‘Freedom of Religion & Religious Minorities in




charge of apostasy, seen as akin to treason) as well as non-Muslims, in his
ideological Islamic state43.
The citizenship of those deemed as religious ‘others’ (whether Muslim
or non-Muslim) is thus an important concern in the problem-space of reli‐
gious difference. Drawing on their interpretations of Islamic source mate‐
rials, Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri assert that religiously different others
should be included in society as (somewhat) equal citizens. This is one
way in which they seek to dislodge the negative majoritarian norms (part‐
ly) underpinning violence against religiously identified targets. Moreover,
by excluding from citizenship, ‘terrorists’ and other militant groups that
take up arms against civilians, both actors further seek to de-legitimise re‐
ligious violence. Yet, there are limits; notably, blasphemers sit on the
fringes of citizenship for both actors.
Citizenship as inclusion of religious difference … with exceptions
In Ghamidi’s schema, non-Muslim citizens have complete freedom to
practice their faith and build and maintain places of worship without risk
of violent suppression or persecution44. Any political agreement may be
made with non-Muslim citizens in a Muslim majority state; the best exam‐
ple would be the agreement that the Prophet Muhammad made with the
Jewish tribes of Medina when he first migrated from Meccah to Medina in
622 CE. Importantly, this is defined as a time before the conclusive com‐
munication of Truth.
As far as the rights of non-Muslims are concerned, any agreement can be
made with them regarding their rights, keeping in view the circumstances and
the various international accords one is bound with. In this regard, perhaps the
best example before Muslims is the pact made by the Prophet (sws) before
itmam al-hujjah with the Jews of Madinah … one can see that one of its
statutes clearly says that … the Jews and the Muslims are equal citizens of
this state of Madinah and therefore, the Jews will have the same rights as the
Muslims have here (sic)45.
3.1
43 Hartung, Jan-Peter. A System of Life: Mawdudi and the Ideologisation of Is‐
lam.London, 2013.
44 Saleem. Playing God: Misreading a Divine Practice.
45 Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. Citizenship and the Rights of a Citizen. 2010, http://www
.javedahmadghamidi.com/meezan/view/citizenship_and_the_rights_of_a_citizen
[13 July 2015].: emphasis added.
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Here, Ghamidi is not drawing on his preferred source material, the
Qur’an. However, he still applies his particular interpretive logic, arguing
that this prophetic example can be used as basis of understanding citizen‐
ship today, since it occurred at a time of imperfect information.
Tahir-ul-Qadri extols the same prophetic example, premised upon his
interpretive emphasis on the exemplary deeds and actions of the Prophet
Muhammad. The so-called ‘Constitution of Medina’46 negotiated by
Muhammad shortly after his migration, with the Jewish tribes of Medina
as well as the Christians of Najran (Syria), is frequently hailed by him as
categorical evidence of the equality of rights of non-Muslim citizens under
Islam. On this precedent, Tahir-ul-Qadri posits that in Islam ‘“citizen”
means all Muslims and non-Muslims, because this’ (the Constitution of
Medina) ‘included the Jewish and Christian tribes’47. Moreover, ‘the
Prophet … stated that whoever hurts a non-Muslim citizen who is a civil‐
ian, I shall be the opponent of that Muslim … on the Day of Judgement I
will plead in favour of the non-Muslim … who has been wronged’48.
In so far as they both advocate the same prophetic precedent, Ghamidi
and Tahir-ul-Qadri are alike. However, the latter entirely neglects to
broach the matter of the inferior dhimma legal category that was subse‐
quently established for non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) inhabiting the
expanding Muslim empire49. In contrast, Ghamidi’s interpretive logic al‐
lows him a proper rationale for dismissing the validity of discriminatory
46 The ‘Constitution of Medina’ refers to agreements mediated by Mohammad be‐
tween the muhajirun (emigrants, i.e. Muslims from Mecca) and the ansar (helpers:
i.e. residents of Yathrib). These were negotiated after the hijrah (migration) of
Mohammad and his followers to Yathrib (later renamed Medina) in 622. Moham‐
mad was invited to Yathrib as an arbiter in the prolonged civil war that had started
in the late 6th century between the Arab and Jewish tribes inhabiting the oasis.
Scholars consider these agreements among the early efforts to mitigate the conflict
in the area by establishing an accord that covered all inhabitants of the oasis into a
single polity (Halabi, Awad. ‘Constitution of Medina,’ Oxford, http://www.oxfordi
slamicstudies.com/opr/t236/e1003 [17 July 2015].).
47 Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad. ‘Peace for Humanity & Mawlid-Un-Nabi (Pbuh)
Conference [Video File].’ 3 June 2012, http://www.deenislam.com/islam/flvID/34
58/Peace-for-Humanity-Mawlid-un-Nabi-pbuh-Conference-by-Shaykh-ul-Islam-D
r-M-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html [13 July 2015].: mins 21:28-21:42
48 ‘European Launch of Fatwa on Terrorism & Suicide Bombings [Video File]’.:
mins 45:15-45:36.
49 The second caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (d. 644 C.E.) is noted for establishing the
formal contract of protection that offered a recognised legal status for protected
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dhimma arrangement in current times. By treating the initial agreement
made by the Prophet Muhammad with Jews and Christians in Medina, as
occurring before the condition of perfect information, Ghamidi can argue
that subsequent conflicts with non-Muslims and their eventual relegation
to an inferior status, occurred only later under divine injunction, after the
establishment of perfect information. In any case, since perfect informa‐
tion does not exist in post-prophetic times, treating non-Muslim citizens as
dhimmi is no longer a valid practice50.
Following the same interpretive approach, al-Mawrid’s scholars are
also explicit in their denial of any sectarian basis of differentiation be‐
tween Muslim citizens. Firstly, under imperfect information it is not possi‐
ble for any Muslim to conclusively identify other Muslims as ‘false’ in
their understanding of Islam. Moreover, they argue that the Qur’anic chap‐
ter (surah) called Tawbah (Repentance) offers clear guidance on how to
approach intra-Muslim difference. The surah required the polytheists of
Arabia to repent from disbelief, be diligent in prayer and give the manda‐
tory charity (zakat)51. Al-Mawrid’s argument - premised on their interpre‐
tive logic - is that if polytheists during a prophetic period of perfect infor‐
mation were to be killed only if they did not repent, and were asked only
to pray and pay zakat as evidence of their belief. Hence, there can be no
further obligations on Muslim citizens to demonstrate their Muslim faith.
In other words, sectarian bases of differentiation cannot be valid identi‐
fiers of ‘true’ and ‘false’ Muslims.
…after fulfilling these conditions …They are like brothers and, therefore,
possess the same legal rights. There is no question of any discrimination be‐
tween them whatsoever in Islam. The Qur’an has used the words … ‘then
[they are] your brethren in religion’. The word ‘the religion’ obviously means
Islam and the words ‘then [they are] your brethren’ are directed at the Com‐
panions … of the Prophet …, who are told that if these people fulfil these
minorities under Muslim rule (dhimmi). However, this covenant established also
certain restrictions on their religious practices and required non-Muslims to pay a
protection tax (jizya) and differentiate themselves from their Muslim superiors.
50 Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, ‘Islami Rayasat May Aqliyat Ka Tasawor [Approaching
Minorities in an Islamic State] [Video File],’ 20 September 2011, https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=gwQYcjVwWfo [15 July 2015].: mins 2:00-4:30.
51 Zakat constitutes one of Islam’s five pillars, and constitutes a religious obligation
for Muslims with the financial means to give a certain percentage of their wealth
annually towards charity.
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three conditions, they will be equal in citizenship status to the Companions
…. No distinction will exist between the two in the eyes of the law 52.
Tahir-ul-Qadri distinguishes his own Barelwi sub-denomination on the ba‐
sis of their love for the Prophet Muhammad. As I will show below with
respect to the issues of blasphemy and apostasy, any violation of this love
is cause for suspending the citizenship protections of offenders. This pos‐
ition is in contrast to that of Ghamidi. Nevertheless, leaving blasphemers
and apostates aside, Tahir-ul-Qadri does not say that Barelwis must have a
higher citizenship status than other Muslims. His argument for peaceful
co-existence between Muslims rests mostly on the aforementioned
Prophetic example. He treats this as equivalent to the modern day notion
of nation, stressing that after migrating to Medina, Muhammad brought to‐
gether all the Muslim migrants from Meccah and Muslim inhabitants of
Medina under a common bond of ‘Brotherhood’ that superseded ethnic
and tribal (and by extension, sectarian) affiliations 53.
On apostasy however, Tahir-ul-Qadri says very little; in my interview
with him he largely avoids answering the question of how apostasy should
be penalized54. Elsewhere, he tends to conflate apostasy and blasphemy55.
The latter, for Tahir-ul-Qadri pushes one out of the folds of citizenship.
Following his Barelwi orientation, love and respect for Prophet Muham‐
mad defines faith; blasphemy (particularly, disrespect to Muhammad) is
thus defiance against the core of faith. The Ahmadis are a case in point;
even as citizens, they have foregone their rights to practice their faith
freely because their perceived tenets regarding the prophetic status of their
founder, lead them towards committing blasphemy (and apostasy)56. In‐
52 ‘Citizenship and the Rights of a Citizen’.
53 Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad. 'Islam a Blend of Moderation and Modernism - Tahir-
Ul-Qadri [Video File],' 16 June 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SOzk8
JvAK0 [13 July 2015].
54 Interview with Najia Mukhtar, 25 October 2013..
55 In a lecture about his role in the creation of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, he ex‐
plains that Hanafi jurisprudence tends to treat blasphemy and apostasy in the same
category of crime. See: ‘Gustakh-E-Rasool Ki Saza (Blasphemy Law) Ki Histori‐
cal Background by Dr Tahir Ul Qadri (the Historical Background to the Blasphe‐
my Law by Dr Tahir-Ul-Qadri) [Video File],’ 17 October 2011, https://www.youtu
be.com/watch?t=1203&v=ycy-44Rc98 k [13 July 2015].
56 In several public addresses Tahir-ul-Qadri strongly criticizes the founder of the re‐
ligion for claiming prophetic status. In his view, this erroneously undermines the
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deed, Tahir-ul-Qadri even concedes that, in the final analysis, the blasphe‐
mer (and apostate) should suffer the death penalty57.
This is not the case for Ghamidi. By treating hadith as a source material
whose interpretation (and validity) needs to be verified with reference to
the Qur’an, Ghamidi can criticize the use of coercion or violence against
(alleged) blasphemers. He stresses that while the Qur’an mentions inci‐
dents of blasphemy against the Prophet, it does not state that offenders
were punished58. Nonetheless, according to several hadith, the Prophet
Muhammad did order capital punishment against blasphemers. This
proves problematic for Tahir-ul-Qadri who in his privileging of the hadith
cannot refute the injunctions contained therein. For Ghamidi however, if a
hadith is at disjoints with the Qur’an, the latter takes precedence. More‐
over, he can argue that the punishments against blasphemy mentioned in
such hadith occurred by divine command under prophetic law; this was
not punishment for blasphemy per se, but for denying the Prophet
Muhammad’s message after its conclusive communication.
Still, blasphemy and citizenship are not fully reconciled in Ghamidi’s
understanding. Given that Truth is indeterminate in post-prophetic times,
Ghamidi tends to argue broadly for freedom of speech, including citizens’
freedom for different faiths to proselytize different faiths in a Muslim
state. However he recognises that no satisfactory way has been established
to reconcile the right to freedom of religious expression with the religious
sensitivities of other citizens59. So he also suggests that citizens should
avoid disrespecting the revered personalities of any faith. Furthermore,
Ahmadis present an anomaly. Most of al-Mawrid’s scholars are critical of
fundamental Muslim belief that there will be no more prophets after Mohammad
See: 'Hidayah (Guidance) Camp, Toronto - Questions by Qadiani Ahmadi and An‐
swers by Dr Tahir-Ul-Qadri [Video File],' 2005, https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=AznTyFBrZLo [13 July 2015]; ‘Truth About Ahmadiyya / Qadianism and
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad: Dr Tahir-Ul-Qadri Part 1 [Video File],’ 3 March 2010,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S7usnxzIYOk [13 July 2015].
57 Note that Tahir-ul-Qadri is hesitant to express his agreement with the use of the
death penalty for blasphemy, particularly in front of Western audiences. This was
evidenced a public lecture in Copenhagen when he was directly questioned on
whether he agreed with the use of capital punishment against blasphemers. See:
‘European Launch of Fatwa on Terrorism & Suicide Bombings [Video File]’.
58 Ghamidi. ‘Founder of al-Mawrid.’
59 'Z', interview by Najia Mukhtar, 11 September 2012, Skype interview; 'M', inter‐
view by Najia Mukhtar, 17 October 2012, Personal interview.
Citizenship as Inclusion and Exclusion
129
the (perceived) blatancy of their rejection of the finality of Muhammad’s
prophethood and their self-segregation from the rest of the Muslim com‐
munity60. It seems then, that Ghamidi is inflexible about who may self-
identify as a Muslim; the religious freedom of the Ahmadis is curtailed to
this extent. Still, unlike for Tahir-ul-Qadri, the Ahmadis, as far as Ghamidi
is concerned, are not apostates or blasphemers. They would enjoy the
rights of any other non-Muslim citizen.
Citizenship as exclusion – the rebel citizen
Blasphemers, apostates and Ahmadis may sit at the outer fringes of the re‐
ligious freedoms afforded to equal citizens. Yet even Tahir-ul-Qadri who
does not dispute the use of capital punishment against such deviation from
‘true’ Islam, is muted in publicly stating this. Not so for one particular cat‐
egory of religious other, whose exclusion is loudly advocated: the (non-
state) individual or group that takes up arms, notably against civilians.
Both Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri consider this to be a form of rebellion.
The exclusion (from citizenship) of the rebel makes citizenship possible on
the terms described above, since if rebels are not eliminated from the poli‐
ty, they seek to physically eliminate ‘other’ citizens at their discretion. In
the Fatwa for instance, an extensive discussion on rebellion (chapters
8-17) follows immediately after the discussion on citizenship rights (chap‐
ters 3-7), implying that the existence of the latter is underpinned by the
elimination of the former.
The contemporary context of political violence in Muslim societies has
revived classical debates about what constitutes rebellion versus legitimate
armed action (armed jihad) or even legitimate protest. For instance, the
use of violence against civilians is critical to both my actors’ understand‐
ings of rebellion. However, in 2013 and 2014 Tahir-ul-Qadri himself led a
mass protest against the alleged corruption and tyranny of the Pakistani
state. He passionately (and always with reference to myriad hadith), de‐
3.2
60 'Z', interview by Najia Mukhtar, 24 September 2012, Skype interview; 'M', ‘al-
Mawrid Scholar.’ 'U', interview by Najia Mukhtar, 18 October 2012, Personal in‐




scribes this form of dissidence as a religious duty for all Muslims61. It falls
outside the fold of the rebellion he so harshly denounces, because it adopts
legal and constitutional means62. Ghamidi, on the other hand, stresses that
it is not a religious requirement to rise up in any form, even against a
despotic government63. This position is in keeping with his own intellectu‐
al evolution away from the political activism espoused by the JI. Never‐
theless, Ghamidi agrees with Tahir-ul-Qadri that if a group chooses consti‐
tutional and non-violent means of protest, then this is not a rebellion.
Of course, the problem-space in which Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri are
currently intervening is one where Muslim religious violence perpetrated
by various so-called ‘terrorist’ groups is central. Responding to this socio-
political context, both actors seek to designate ‘terrorists’ and militants as
rebels in the Islamic sense. Both mention Al-Qaida, the Taliban (and more
recently) ISIS, as falling under the rebel category. For instance there is ex‐
tensive discussion of rebellion in the Fatwa wherein Tahir-ul-Qadri simply
conflates ‘terrorists’ and ‘suicide bombers’ with all other rebels. He identi‐
fies contemporary perpetrators of terrorist acts with the extreme version of
rebellion associated with the Kharijites (Ar: Khawarij, sing. Khariji). This
was a Muslim opposition group that emerged during, and fought against,
the government of the fourth Muslim caliph, ʿAli ibn Abi Talib (d. 661
CE)64. Tahir-ul-Qadri does not offer a rigorous account of the factors that
led to the emergence of the Kharijite rebellion; rather, he uses these events
in Muslim history to symbolise and reinforce his assertion that the con‐
temporary terrorists are in fact a continuation of the Kharijites65:
61 Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad. ‘Dr Tahir Ul Qadri Addresses Juma-Tul-Wida: Pro‐
moting Peace, Interfaith Dialogue & Human Welfare - Itikaf City 2013 [Video
File],’ 2 August 2013, http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/23318/MQI-promoting-p
eace-interfaith-dialogue-amp-agenda-of-human-welfare-Dr-Tahir-ul-Qadri-addres
ses-Juma-tul-Wida.html [17 July 2015].
62 Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings. p. 212.
63 Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. ‘Muslim Revivalist Movements (6) Present Situation of
the Muslim Ummah [Video File],’ January 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=bq8gjwB2r04 [17 July 2015].
64 In Arabic, al-Khawarij (pl. of Khariji) means those who secede or exit the commu‐
nity.
65 It should be noted that Tahir-ul-Qadri is not alone in linking the Kharijites with
contemporary Muslim movements, particularly those considered to be ‘radical’ or
‘extremist’. For instance see: Kenney. Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics
of Extremism in Egypt. Oxford, 2006.; Salem. Political Theory and Institutions of
the Khawarij.Baltimore, 1956.
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It would be interesting to know that there are more than 100 ahadith on the
subject … The Holy Prophet said that … at least more than twenty times, they
(the Kharijites) will emerge. He said that the last group of Kharijite terrorists
will be a part of the army of the anti-Christ … [sic]66.
For his part, Ghamidi’s public discussion of rebellion also mainly occurs
with reference to ‘terrorism’, notably the current Tehrik-e-taliban-Pakistan
(TTP), insurgency in Pakistan. Often he distinguishes the conditions of le‐
gitimacy for armed jihad (war) from those of rebellion. Armed jihad by
non-state actors such as the TTP, unless following stringent conditions of
legitimacy, is seen as an act that warrants the elimination of the perpetrator
from citizenship. For instance he argues that, following the injunctions of
the Qur’anic chapter entitled Shura, armed rebellion against a democrati‐
cally elected government is entirely unacceptable in Islam, for it repre‐
sents rebellion against the directives of the Qur’an and against the people
who have elected the government67. Rebellion can only be fathomed as
permissible against an entirely despotic (istibdadi) form of government
that has established itself on the force of coercive capacity alone. Further
conditions of permissibility include that the rebels should form an organ‐
ised group that have control over some territory (however small) from
where they launch operations. They should also be representing a majority
of people in undertaking armed rebellion against a despotic government.
Hence, the TTP’s call for jihad against the Pakistani state and people can‐
not be justified since they do not represent the people of Pakistan68.
Ghamidi argues that if these conditions are not met the rebels are under‐
stood as act simply as a mob69. He argues that the Qur’an considers this to
be fasad, defined (by him) as threatening the lives, property and honour of
civilians by violent means. Fasad disturbs social order and weakens the
condition under which the rights and protections of citizenship can be af‐
forded to Muslim and non-Muslim citizens70. Essentially, such a rebellion,
if it persists and cannot be resolved through political means, must be
66 Tahir-ul-Qadri. ‘Launching Ceremony of Fatwa against Terrorism & Suicide
Bombing’ [Video File]’.: mins 6:06-1:03, videos 6-7
67 Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. ‘Armed Revolt against the Government [Video File],’ 27
September 2013, [17 July 2015].
68 'Z', interview by Najia Mukhtar, 3 September 2012, Skype interview.
69 Ghamidi, ‘Armed Revolt. [Video File]’ Shehzad Saleem, ‘Armed Rebellion -
Some Misconceptions About Islam,’ 21 September 2012, https://www.youtube.co
m/watch?v=Idg1PIT8Weg [17 July 2015].
70 Ghamidi, ‘Armed Revolt. [Video File]’.
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crushed by the authority of the state and its perpetrators eliminated from
citizenship as per the injunctions of the Qur’an stated in the chapter enti‐
tled Al-Ma’idah (The Table Spread; 5:33-34)71.
Tahir-ul-Qadri makes a similar distinction. ‘Terrorism’ is not the same
as war, which can only be declared by the state, and as a defensive mea‐
sure. Moreover, war should not comprise acts of violence against civilians
and outside the context of a battlefield 72. Hence ‘terrorists’ are not wag‐
ing a just or legitimate resistance. They must be eliminated from citizen‐
ship in order to ensure the continuing citizenship of others. Further there is
little room for diplomacy. Prophetic sayings and juristic opinions on the
matter show that terrorist-rebels ultimately have to be weeded out and en‐
tirely eliminated from the polity (by putting to death)73.
Conclusion
All in all, both agents, acting in a socio-political context of increased Mus‐
lim religious violence, actively participate in the contentious problem
space of religious difference in Islam. In speaking their ideas, they deploy
rhetorical strategies that entail the use of evaluative-descriptive terms such
as ‘citizenship’ to shift negative social norms and perceptions of religious
difference in society. Both Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri infuse citizenship
with meanings that include religious difference within its folds. The spe‐
cific meanings that each agent gives to citizenship are premised on his
particular interpretive methodologies and findings. Tahir-ul-Qadri follows
his Barelwi leanings in wishing to model citizenship on (his interpretation
of) the example of the Prophet, notably of the political accords that the
Prophet Muhammad devised between Muslims, Christians and Jews after
his migration to Medina. Ghamidi privileges the Qur’an over other tradi‐
tionally emphasized source materials (notably hadith). His interpretive
logic designates parts of the Qur’anic text that refer to penalties against re‐
ligious difference (blasphemers, apostates, non-Muslims) to pertain only
4.
71 ‘Punishment for Rebellion [Video File],’ 11 December 2013, http://www.javedah
madghamidi.com/videos/view/punishment-for-rebellion [17 July 2015].
72 Tahir-ul-Qadri, ‘European Launch of Fatwa on Terrorism & Suicide Bombings
[Video File]’., mins:19:20-22:14
73 ‘Launching Ceremony of Fatwa against Terrorism & Suicide Bombing [Video
File]’.
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to a prophetic period of perfect information about Truth. In post-prophetic
times of imperfect information, he thus condemns the violent suppression,
or inferior treatment of religiously different citizens (Muslims and non-
Muslim). He also commends the example of the Prophet Muhammad’s po‐
litical alliance with Jews and Christians, arguing that this was forged out‐
side the period of perfect information and is thus applicable as a model for
contemporary arrangements with non-Muslim citizens.
However, there are caveats. Particularly for Tahir-ul-Qadri, there are
limits to religious freedom; specifically there is no respite for blasphemy
or apostasy. Even if he has not advocated their killing, it would seem that
Ahmadis fall into this blasphemy-apostasy mire and are thus pushed be‐
yond the limits of citizenship. Ghamidi too shows some sensitivity to the
issue of blasphemy, arguing that although ideally citizens should have
complete freedom of expression, they should abstain from disrespecting
the revered personalities of different faiths. There are further majoritarian
aspects to Ghamidi’s thinking on citizenship such as his acceptance of the
official excommunication of Ahmadis from the folds of Islam.
Finally, inclusive citizenship of religious difference is equally a matter
of (violent) exclusion of certain types of difference. In a context of height‐
ened concern about Muslim religious violence, it is ‘terrorists’ and mili‐
tants who must be excluded. The citizenship rights (notably religious free‐
doms) of a religiously heterogeneous populace can only be possible
through the elimination (from the polity) of groups that take up arms
against the state and society. Tahir-ul-Qadri labels them as a continuation
of the historical Kharijites. Ghamidi likens their actions to the Qur’anic
crime of fasad. The presence of rebels in the folds of citizenship makes
the continuing citizenship of religious difference impracticable. In this
way the rebel’s illegitimate violence against religious difference must be
curtailed through the use of legitimate violence to eliminate ‘terrorists’
and rebels.
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Abstract: The role of sunnah in legitimizing violence is a central issue in contem‐
porary discourse in Pakistan. There is an established consensus that the exemplary
way of the Prophet as recorded in Hadith is a foundational source for prescribing
licit behaviour. However, there is disagreement amongst scholars regarding which
facets of the Prophet’s example are applicable. More specifically, is sunnah limi‐
ted to Prophetic testimony pertaining to matters of religion (din), or does this in‐
clude matters of state (dunya) as well? This is a long-standing question amongst
modern South Asian interpreters, and the answer has direct implications upon the
parameters of religiously sanctioned violence. In the extreme, clerics of the De‐
oband (mamati) faction such as Abdul Aziz Ghazi, khatib of Lal Masjid in Islam‐
abad, appeal to prophetic example in order to legitimize attacks not only of gov‐
ernment forces but also of their dependents. This was most dramatically seen in
the gruesome mutilation of students in the Army School in Peshawar (December
16, 2014). Representatives of the Islahi School sternly disagree with this line of
reasoning. A leading example of this position is Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (b. 1952),
a student and then critic of the late Maulana Mawdudi (d. 1979). Ghamidi vocifer‐
ously condemns such attacks as contrary to interpretative consensus concerning
the bounds of tradition. I argue that the central difference between these Sunni in‐
terpreters is their approach to sunnah. Unlike Ghazi, Ghamidi argues that sunnah
does not include the Prophet’s actions as a statesman. In his view, critically veri‐
fied accounts from ahadith and sira literature are not prescriptive unless these per‐
tain specifically to religious practice. This paper sheds light upon the complex is‐
sue of religiously sanctioned violence by tracing these polarized positions back to
the foundational issues of the authenticity and authority of prophetic tradition to
delineate the bounds of Muslim fidelity.
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Introduction
On December 16, 2014, seven Taliban gunmen attacked the Army Public
School in the city of Peshawar, northwestern Pakistan. The militants exe‐
cuted 141 people: 132 students, between eight and eighteen years of age,
and 9 from the faculty and staff. The country has suffered a litany of vio‐
lent attacks conducted in the name of religion, but this was the deadliest
act of terrorism in Pakistan’s history. The events were recounted on televi‐
sion in gruesome detail, and these caused the nation to shudder. The gov‐
ernment became galvanized towards full military engagement; and as
Chief of Army Staff Raheel Sharif stated, ‘Our resolve has taken new
height: we will continue (to) go after these inhuman beasts, and their facil‐
itators, until their final elimination.’1 Somehow in the public mind, amidst
the horrific acts littering the daily headlines, a threshold had been crossed.
For the army, the general public, and even representatives of the infamous
al-Qaeda network, there was a sense of ruprture. As one noted, ‘Our hearts
are bursting with pain.’2 A line had been crossed: this sort of atrocity was
inexcusable.
Of the many blessings promised by Islamic law (Shari‘ah), one is the
agency to limit the ‘ends and means of war.’3 In other words, there are
lines that should not be crossed, boundaries not to be transgressed. How‐
ever as Sohail Hashmi has extensively explored: the foundational sources
from which sacred law is derived, the Qur’an and Hadith, ‘present no sys‐
tematic or, some might argue, consistent theory of world order in general
or laws of war and peace in particular. Thus, it was left to the jurists to
develop such a theory through interpretation of the Qur’an and sunnah, or
example, of the Prophet.’4 Of these two sources, the role of the latter in
legitimizing violence has become a central issue in public discourse
amongst religious scholars in Pakistan and it requires careful considera‐
tion.
1.
1 Asad Liaqat. ‘Inside Army Public School, once upon a time…’ Dawn. 17 Decem‐
ber, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1151410 Accessed January 18, 2016.
2 ‘Al-Qaeda “bursting with pain” over Pakistan school attack-INews – IBNLive Mo‐
bile’. IBNlive. 21 December 2014. Retrieved 18 January 2016.
3 Hashmi, Sohail H. ‘Jihad and the Geneva Conventions: The Impact of International
Law on Islamic Theory.’ In: Sohail H. Hashmi (Ed.). Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Ji‐
hads: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges. New York, 2012,
p. 338.
4 Hashmi, p. 331.
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There is an established consensus among scholars that sunnah is a foun‐
dational source to prescribe licit behaviour. The term sunnah in Arabic lit‐
erally means the ‘way or path’ and has been used to describe the words,
actions, and preferences of worthy persons, most often with reference to
prophets and their companions. Within Islamic tradition of course this per‐
tains primarily to the Prophet Muhammad. As the ‘perfect man’ (al-insan
al-kamil) and the ‘model of conduct’ (al-uswa-i hasana), his sunnah is es‐
teemed as the determinant standard for what should or should not be done.
Thus, the Imitatio Muhammadi as narrated by tradition (khabar, hadith)
has become a corpus that stipulates the Prophet’s preferences, words, and
deeds as observed and consequently practiced by his companions and sub‐
sequent generations of Muslims.
However, within this shared reverence, there is disagreement concern‐
ing what particular facets of the Prophet’s life are not only worthy of imi‐
tation, but also are legally binding. To situate the question of this research,
it is important to underscore that there are long-standing questions regard‐
ing the degree of authority to be placed upon the Prophet’s sunnah vis-à-
vis the Qur’an. The classical consensus, as attributed to Muhammad ibn
Idris al-Shafi‘i (d. 819), defines sunnah as ‘coextensive’ and of equal ethi‐
cal-legal authority as the Qur’an.5 As Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali
(d. 1111) later explained, ‘God has but one word, which differs in the
mode of its expressions. On occasions God indicates his word by the
Qur’an, on others, by words in another style, not publically recited, and
called sunnah’.6 And, again in the words of Ibn Hazm (d. 1064):
The revelation (wahy) from God Almighty to His Messenger, peace and
blessing be upon him, is divided into two types: One of the two is (ritually)
recited revelation (wahy matlu), an inimitably arranged written composition,
and that is the Qur’an. The second is revelation of transmitted sayings, not an
inimitably arranged written composition; it is not (ritually) recited (la matlu),
but it is read: and that is reports that have come from God’s Messenger (peace
and blessings be upon him).7
As seen in the statements of these representative jurists, there is a consen‐
sus that the distinction between the two foundational sources of authority,
5 Brown, Daniel. Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. Cambridge,
1996, pp.1-15.
6 Ibid. p.17.
7 Mumammad, Abu. ‘Ali ibn Hazm, al-Imkam fi Usul al-Amkam’. 1. Ammad Shakir
(Ed.). Cairo, 1987.
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sunnah and Qur’an, is one of form and not of substance. The ‘way of the
Prophet’ is revelation (wahy), and can be codified.8 Islamic revivalism in
the Indian subcontinent has been characterized by the quest to compre‐
hend the interrelation of the Qur’an and the Hadith, the compendiums
from where sunnah can be ascertained. As Aisha Musa has convincingly
argued, Hadith in effect functions as a second scripture, and this has stim‐
ulated ongoing debates that are ‘not merely a modern, Western, Oriental‐
ist- influenced heresy; rather they are an inherently Muslim response to in‐
herently Muslim concerns.’9 Sunnah is a category of revelation, and as
will be considered in this essay, the delineation of its boundaries, that is
what is included in this and what is not, has direct implications upon con‐
temporary views of religiously sanctioned violence.
In extreme cases, certain clerics associated with the Deoband move‐
ment such as Abdul Aziz Ghazi, khatib of the prominent Lal Masjid (Red
Mosque) in Islamabad, appeal to prophetic example to justify preemptive
attacks on the civilian population. This is not limited to warfare against the
military or government forces, but includes the killing of noncombatants
in markets, schools, and places of worship. This was most dramatically
seen in Ghazi’s response to the gruesome mutilation of students in the
Army School in Peshawar described above. Despite severe public pres‐
sure, Ghazi refused to condemn the massacre and the reason he presented
was that the killing ‘was conducted according to sunnah.’10
Most people vehemently disagreed with Ghazi’s claim. Javed Ahmad
Ghamidi (b. 1952), one of the most vociferous detractors, condemned the
school attack as a crime against humanity and as contrary to the principles
of Islam. Ghamidi is regarded as one of the most important living Muslim
intellectuals, and his response is of particular interest here. Like Ghazi, he
is a regular feature on public television and a prominent voice in the pub‐
8 Esack, Farid. The Qur'an: A Short Introduction. Oxford, 2002, p.115. The Qur’an
is rehearsed (wahy matlu, from talawah); Sunnah is unrehearsed (wahy ghayr
matlu).
9 Musa, 12.
10 Faizan Maqsood, Maulana Abdul Aziz Refused to Condemn Peshawar Attack.
Live interview 17 December, 2014, http://www.newsbeat.pk/waqat-news/maulana
-abdul-aziz-refused-to-condem-peshawar-video_81924b6c8.html [13.08.15]. Jave
d Chaudhary. Maulana Abdul Aziz Refused to Condemn Peshawar Incident. Live





lic domain. As a student and later critic of Mawlana Abu ’l-A’la Mawdudi
(d. 1979), Ghamidi works from within the same Sunni and Hanafi intellec‐
tual tradition as Ghazi. Most importantly, Ghamidi directly challenges the
parameters of sunnah put forth by Ghazi to justify the attacks. This creates
a field of comparison between two scholars from the same revivalist her‐
itage that disagree on the boundaries of sunnah and creates radically dif‐
ferent interpretations and visions for religious fidelity.
I argue that the central difference between these interpreters is their
definition of unnah. For Ghazi, sunnah is derived from any recorded tradi‐
tion of the Prophet, and of the four ‘rightly-guided caliphs’ that is deemed
as conclusive authentic (hujjat). For Ghamidi, the same traditions, even if
critically verifiable, are not prescriptive unless they pertain specifically to
the cultic practice of the Ummah as demonstrated across multiple prophet‐
ic eras. Seen in this light, sunnah is the fulcrum of the debate because its
parameters determine the degree of authority placed upon prophetic exam‐
ple. This paper sheds light upon the complex issue of religiously sanc‐
tioned violence by tracing these polarized positions back through the on‐
going debates on the bounds of Muslim orthopraxy in Pakistan.
Pakistan: a ‘hard country’ in context
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was forged through fire. The nation has
endured more than its share of violent conflict, most of which has been in‐
ternal. Analogous in many ways to the creation of the state of Israel as a
homeland the Jews, Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Muslim League succeeded in
carving a homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent.11 The original
constitution pledged equality for all citizens, and Jinnah cast the govern‐
ment as the protector of the minority communities. But at partition, India
suffered a holocaust of its own; and the young state has come to age in an
atmosphere where war and rumors of war have necessitated a strong mili‐
tary establishment. This has stunted democratic processes and allowed
vested political influences—foreign and domestic—to manipulate and
even perpetuate a seemingly perpetual state of war.12
2.
11 Faisal, Devji. Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea. Cambridge, 2013.
12 Jaffrelot, Christrophe. The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience. Oxford,
2015.
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The nation has experienced a devastating amount of violence since its
inception, yet it is difficult to isolate the role of religion per se in foment‐
ing this condition. To borrow Anatol Lieven’s phrase, Pakistan is ‘a hard
country’ to summarize, and the determining factors are far more complex
than portrayed by the journalistic media.13 Anthropologist Akbar Ahmad
has perplexed over this issue and argued that religion repeatedly functions
as a convenient scapegoat for fulfilling other agendas. Pakistan’s constitu‐
ency is an interwoven mélange of tribes, languages, and contested political
economies, and this creates an environment prone to subterfuge. The vast
majority of the population, about 84% by some estimates, is Sunni Mus‐
lim. Pakistan is also home to the second largest contingent of Shi‘ah Mus‐
lims in the world, about 25 million, or roughly 13% of the national popu‐
lation. There has been considerable violence against Shi‘ah population
centres and places of worship, as well as those of the Ahmadiyya, Hindu,
and Christian communities. However, the greatest number of casualties
from terror related attacks perpetrated by Sunni Muslims have been other
Sunni Muslims. Nevertheless, having duly recognized the complexity of
forces at work, the problem remains that religion—whether legitimately or
not— continues to be invoked in order to justify violence against the state,
civil society, and other religious factions.
A striking example of the use of religious rhetoric to justify violence
can be observed in the aftermath of the attack on the Army School in Pe‐
shawar. In the period between 2010 and 2015, fighting between the army
and the Taliban, or parties subsumed under that banner, escalated into a
full-scale invasion of the insurgents’ strongholds in the Federally Admin‐
istered Tribal Areas that border Afghanistan. Unable to withstand the
force of airpower and mechanized troops, the Taliban exerted retribution
by attacking public and government targets across the country. There was
also a rise in attacks of mosques, Shi‘ah imambarghas, Sufi shrines, and
Christian churches. Despite the steady increase of attacks in public spaces
13 Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan: a hard country. New York, 2011, pp.41-80. Lieven pro‐
vides a useful historical summary entitled ‘The Struggle for Muslim South Asia.’
Though beyond the scope of this paper, part of the complexity is the blending of
the practical and the spiritual in the minds and rhetoric of the founding fathers. As
Peter Hardy deftly observed, the Muslim League was more of a ‘chiliastic move‐
ment’ than a pragmatic political party, and the nation continues to be driven by a
sense of millenarian destiny. Hardy, Peter. The Muslims of British India. Cam‐
bridge, 1972, p. 239.
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and the killing of bystanders, the carnage and systematic decapitation and
dismemberment of the students caused an outrage across the country. This
was a watershed that galvanized the collective consciousness.
However, amidst the public outcry, there were those who refused to
condemn the attack because of the perspicuous method by which the
slaughter was conducted. During the siege, perpetrators purportedly exam‐
ined students to verify whether these had reached puberty and were thus
eligible for decapitation. Reminiscent of symbolic methods employed by
IS (Daesh) in later months, the militants in Peshawar sent a deliberate
message to the government and people of Pakistan.14 Although a complete
analysis of arguments for religiously sanctioned violence cannot be ad‐
dressed here, inherent in this message is an appeal to sunnah in order to
legitimize these murders. The message points to a pressing disagreement
concerning the foundations of religious authority in contemporary Islam,
namely whether particular episodes recounted from the life of the Prophet
can be applied analogously to the present situation.
The opposing views of Javed Ghamidi and Shah Abdul Ghazi are par‐
ticularly helpful for explaining the centrality of this issue in Pakistan. The
former was a Professor of Islamic Studies at the government’s prestigious
Civil Services Academy in Lahore. His books and television broadcasts
are popular among the educated middle class, and he is respected as one
who bridges the gap between so called ‘traditionalists and modernists.’
The Islahi School (meaning reform in Urdu) draws its name from the cir‐
cle of scholars associated with the Aligarh Movement like Sayyid Ahmad
Khan (d. 1898) and Shibli Numani (d. 1914). The theological works of
these reformers catalyzed Islamic modernism in South Asia, and beyond.15
Further, as the name implies, these are heirs to the nineteenth century criti‐
cal reformists who have populated the departments of Islamic Studies in
many South Asian universities. Though Ghamidi differs in many ways
from his predecessors, he carries forward a legacy of political moderation
and social integration. Ghamidi rejects the use of violence to propagate or
accomplish religious purposes, and insists that jihad can only be declared
by established governments.
14 Galloway, Chris. ‘Media Jihad: Lessons from Islamic State’s public relations mas‐
terclass’, http://cppg.fccollege.edu.pk/event/media-jihad-lessons-from-islamic-stat
es-public-relations-masterclass.
15 Troll, Christian W. Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology.
Delhi, 1978.
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Ghazi, on the other hand, is a cleric of the Deoband School, a grassroots
revivalist movement that developed in response to the British raj.16 The
loosely affiliated network of madrasas has flourished into South Asian’s
leading educational system for preparing clerics and jurists. Ghazi’s par‐
ticular faction rejects the current governmental structure and constitution
as inauthentic and discontinuous with Islamic tradition. His association
with the Taliban movement is well established, and he has been appointed
as their representative in political negotiations on several occasions. Ghazi
represents a militant position that appeals to religious tradition in order to
legitimize the use of violence to establish a desired political outcome.
These positions can only be understood when placed in context, and now
we will turn towards this.
Divergent pathways
These two positions are useful in comparison not only because they repre‐
sent two competing positions, the modern and traditionalist, but also be‐
cause they proceed from a shared stream within Indian revivalism. They
are both competing heirs to the reforms attributed to Shah Wali Allah Dih‐
lawi (d. 1762).17 These have progressed into diverging streams, but their
development can be traced back to this seminal figure. This is because
from Dihlawi’s time on, as Daniel Brown has convincingly demonstrated,
differences concerning the interrelation of the Qur’an and sunnah became
the central concern for scholars in the pre-modern era.18 More precisely,
there was disagreement concerning how best to reify Islamic practice.
Sunnah functioned as a pillar of authority for interpreting the Qur’an and
for deriving legislative jurisprudence, but this stimulated questions about
what precisely constituted sunnah.
3.
16 Metcalf, Barbara Daly. Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900.
Princeton, 1982.
17 al-Dihlawi, Wali Allah. The Conclusive Argument from God: Shāh Wali Allāh of
Delhi's Hujjat Allah Al-Baligha. Marcia Hermansen (Trans.). Leiden, 1995, pp.
xv-xxxiii.
18 Brown, Daniel. Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. Cambridge,
1996, pp. 2-15. See also Sanyal, Usha. ‘Are Wahhabis Kafirs? Ahmad Riza Khan
Barelwi and His Sword of the Haramayn.’ In: Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis
and Their Fatwas. Brinkley Messick/ Muhammad Khalid Masud/ David S. Powers
(Eds.). Karachi, 1996, pp. 204-214.
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This stimulated a concerted study of Hadith, but also a critical evalua‐
tion of the corpus. Grave concerns arose that many of these reports were
spurious and even politically motivated, and this issue endures today. Re‐
ports had been gathered into compendiums of Hadith (khabar) and authen‐
ticated according to their chains of transmission (isnad) to establish au‐
thenticity.19 However, this did not directly address the correlative question
of authority. The issue of a report’s authority remained opened to interpre‐
tation, or as Hashmi noted above, to the theories of interpretation de‐
veloped by jurists. One consequence of this was the codification of the nu‐
anced distinction between sunnah and Hadith. The definition of Shaykh
al-Hadith ‘Abdul Hameed Siddiqui is broadly representative: ‘Sunnah is
the tangible form and the actual embodiment of the Will of Allah. Hadith,
however, is the report of the words and deeds, approval or disapproval of
the Holy Prophet.’20 And, while this basic definition is readily acceptable
to most along the spectrum of interpreters between Ghamdi and Ghazi, it
begs a vital question, namely what are the parameters for determining the
bounds of sunnah? Is inclusion in this ‘revealed’ source of authority deter‐
mined by the authenticity of a report, or are there other factors as well?21
As background, it is worth noting that there are divergent opinions con‐
cerning which areas of the Prophet’s life are to be included as sunnah.
Some like Hamiduddin Farahi (d. 1930) and Amin Ahsan Islahi (d. 1997),
who Ghamidi refers to as his ‘intellectual grandfathers,’ held that prophet‐
ic guidance pertained only to the cultic and quotidian matters of religion
(din), and not to the mundane topics of world affairs (dunya). As Islahi
succinctly stated, ‘It must be clearly understood that the sunnah is purely
related to the practical aspects of our daily lives [as Muslims]. Matters of
belief, or issues of academic interest, are outside its domain. For instance,
sunnah has nothing to do with articles of faith, history, or occasions for
19 The Muhaddithin usually divide hadith into two main classes: that supported by
multiple sources of evidence (khabar-I tawatur) and that supported by a single
source (khabar-i wahid). For a concise description see Abdul-Jabbar, Ghassan.
Bukhari. London, 2007, pp. 91-120. For a more exhaustive explanation see Bur‐
ton, John. Introduction to the Hadith. Edinburgh, 1994, pp. 106-147.
20 Siddiqui, ‘Abdul Hameed. Mishkat-ul-Masabih. Lahore, 1980, p. xiv.
21 Okarvi, Muhammad Amin. Hadith aur Sunnah men farq. (The difference between
hadith and Sunnah). Maktaba Hijaz, Deoband.19.09.2011.
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revelation (asbab al-nuzul) of Qur’anic verses.’22 In this light, sunnah is
not concerned with matters of theology, but rather with the most basic as‐
pects of a lived faith. For this branch of Shah Wali Allah’s heirs, it was not
sufficient that a report be adequately authenticated: the subject therein
must pertain to a particular sphere of religious life as will be clarified by
the list below. The purpose is not to interpret the Qur’an, or to explicate
the finer points of revelation, but rather to provide the basic structure for
practical events of daily life that testify to one’s being set apart as a believ‐
ing member of the ummah. Second, the content must have been accepted
by the sustained practice of ‘Muslims’ from the known communities (Jews
and Christians) that preceded Islam. The ritual washing, prostrations,
greetings of peace, and even dietary laws associated with faithful Muslim
practice, are assumed by this camp not to have commenced with the
Prophet of Islam; rather, these were affirmed by him and his followers and
carried forward in their present form. As Ghamidi explains, sunnah in Is‐
lam is in actuality the sunnah of Abraham that has been affirmed by suc‐
cessive communal expressions. Thus, sunnah is not established by the
quality of the report (khabar) but rather by its content. One of the primary
functions of the Hadith is to illustrate the practices that the Prophet of Is‐
lam sustained and carried forward. The precepts therein reflect broader
principles that allow for multiple correct answers and acceptable reifica‐
tions, which would be expected over a long and dispersed history of prac‐
tice. One result of this is that Ghamidi presumes an inherent elasticity in
the boundaries of sunnah.
Other Sunni jurists, like Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905) and Muham‐
mad Qasim Nanotawi (d. 1880), founding leaders of the Deoband move‐
ment, advocate a more stringent definition. In their framework, the guid‐
ance offered by sunnah is believed to be pervasive and affecting virtually
every aspect of life.23 The assumption is that the ummah requires not only
interpretative guidance, but social and political direction as well. Hence,
the distinction emphasized by the Islahi between Hadith and sunnah is
minimized, as is the difference between whether reports are authentic and
authoritative. The juxtaposition with the traditions and scriptures of other
22 Islahi, Amin Ahsan. ‘The Difference Between Hadith and Sunnah,’ In: Mubadi
Tadabbur-i-hadith S.A. Rauf. (Trans.). http://www.renaissance.com.pk/jafelif986.
html [10.07.2015]
23 Ingram, Brannon. ‘Sufis, Scholars and Scapegoats: Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and
the Deobandi Critique of Sufism.’ In: The Muslim World 99/ 3, 2009. pp. 478-501.
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‘Abrahamic’ faith communities is of little interest. Thus, the trajectory of
these two camps differs: as to the former, the scope of sunnah in prescrib‐
ing Muslim fidelity is relatively narrow, whereas for the latter it is perva‐
sive.
The position of Islahi interpreters, however, reflects an ancient dilem‐
ma, namely that the testimony of sunnah would be undeniable if only its
sources could be established as authentic. Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762),
doyen for the study of Hadith in this milieu, upheld the traditional view of
sunnah as organically entwined with the Qur’an. However, like others be‐
fore him, many who are associated with the Mu‘tazilah theologians, Wali
Allah was profoundly troubled by the ample discrepancies in the Hadith
literature. More than any other person, Muhammad was uniquely suited to
explicate and even demonstrate the intricacies of fidelity to the Qur’anic
message. However, grave concern had arisen whether the Prophet’s voice
could be isolated from the chorus of testimonies transcribed in the genre
of Hadith, and this concern has heavily influenced the interpretative trajec‐
tory of thinkers like Ghamidi.
Islahi
Concern for the authenticity of Hadith, and consequently its authority,
stimulated the quest for means by which the Qur’an could interpret itself.
Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) was intricately familiar with the progres‐
sion of this enquiry and ultimately concluded: ‘there is no full assurance
that these [Hadith] recount the Prophet’s word or deed (qawl ya fa‘il).’24
The Hadith, for Sayyid Ahmad as for many modern Muslim thinkers in
the early twentieth century, could not provide the assured testimony de‐
sired for Qur’anic interpretation. Sayyid Ahmad’s solution was to seek in‐
terpretative information from within the text of the Qur’an. As he ex‐
plained:
The Holy Qur’an’s own context and tenor (sabak wa siyak), and its own style
and structure (aslub wa nazm) provide the surest means for ascertaining infor‐
mation concerning the occasions of revelation (shan-i nuzul). And, only from
3.1
24 Panipati, Muhammad Isma‘il. (Ed.). Maqalat-i-Sir Sayyid. 1. Lahore, 1962, p.70.
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what is located and mentioned in the Qur’an can [interpretative] principles be
elucidated.25
As his student Hamiduddin Farahi (d. 1930) later explained, traditional
views of the miraculous eloquence (fasahat) render the Qur’an as a ‘piece‐
meal aggregation whose form has no semblance or reason or order.’ Yet, if
the Qur’an is allowed to ultimately interpret itself (al-furqan fi al-furqan),
then ‘the pieces fit together perfectly.’26 This was the birth of the Nazm
(structural coherence) School of Qur’anic interpretation in India. And,
though the subjecct cannot be further examined here, the paradigm applied
to explain the contingency of the Qur’an, its reception and transposition,
differs considerably from that of the mainstream of Sunni exegesis.27 This
excursus is necessary because without it Ghamidi’s view of sunnah could
appear to be a complete departure from Muslim tradition. It is rather, a le‐
gitimate minority position from within a contested discourse on the
bounds of tradition.
So, what specifically qualifies as sunnah for Ghamidi? He succinctly
presents a definition in Mizan, a work now in its ninth edition.28 Our au‐
thor is abundantly clear that his list is conclusive: ‘This is the complete
sunnah in Islam; the remainder is redundant.’29 The sum total is com‐
prised of twenty-four practices:
1. Commence meals by stating the name of Allah, and partake with the
right hand.
2. Greet others by stating as-salamu alaykum.
3. Exclaim al-hamdu li-llah when one sneezes, the correct response
should be yarhamuk-Allah.
4. Proclaim the adhan in the right ear of a newborn, and the Ahkamat in
the left ear.
5. Maintain a trimmed mustache.
25 Razi ul-Islam Nadvi, Muhammad. ‘Sir Sayyid aur ‘Ulum Islamiyya.’ In: Sir Sayyid
ki Tafsir al-Qur’an aur mabad tafsir par uski asrat. Muhammad Yasin Mazhar
Siddiqi (Ed.). Aligarh, 2001, pp. 63-84.
26 Farahi, Hamiduddin. Majmua Tafasir-i Farahi. Amin Ahsan Islahi (Trans.). La‐
hore, 2008, p. 35. This is my translation from Farahi’s exegetical commentary
Nizam ul Qur’an.
27 Abdul-Raof, Hussein. Schools of Qur’anic Exegesis: Genesis and Development.
New York, 2010, p. 82.




6. Shave the pubic area and the armpits.
7. Circumcise male children.
8. Trim fingernails.
9. Clean the teeth, face, and nose duly.
10. Wash the genital region after excretions.
11. Refrain from sexual relations during menstruation and lochia.
12. Bathe after menstruation and lochia.
13. Bathe after intercourse or seminal discharge.
14. Wash the deceased corpse in preparation for burial.
15. Conduct funeral rites.
16. Bury the deceased.
17. Commemorate Eid al-Fitr.
18. Commemorate Eid al-Adha.
19. Cleanse animals for consumption in the name of Allah.
20. Perform weddings and divorces.
21. Offer alms (zakat).
22. Offer prayer (salat).
23. Fast and offer charity on Eid al-Fitr.
24. Retire frequently to the mosque for worship, especially during last 10
days of Ramadan. 
The list is surprisingly short. The contents are practical, and do not pertain
to theology or scriptural interpretation. Furthermore, the directives are list‐
ed as principles, and thus open to accommodate the great variety of inter‐
pretation expressed in the many contexts where is Islam is practiced. For
example, precisely how to pray at particular occasions or locations is not
listed. Or, the manner in which to ‘cleanse’ an animal for consumption is
not stated. Forerunners to this intellectual tradition like Sayyid Ahmad
Khan, for example, argued that the supplicant need not face Makkah in
prayer, and that it was licit for Muslims to eat meat prepared by Christians
and Jews in accordance with their respective religious stipulations.30 In
summary, the principles are supple enough to service a considerable vari‐
ety of opinions on how to perform the basic rituals. These also assume a
broad view of Islam, one that includes diverse monotheistic traditions be‐
neath its umbrella.
30 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad. Ahkam-i ta’am ahl-i kitab. Aligarh, 1868, pp.12-23; Tabyin
al-kalam, 1. Ghazipur, 1862, p. 267.
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This assessment underscores the Prophet’s holy humility and continu‐
ance within the history of revelation. Ghamidi adheres to the view that
‘sunnah precedes (muqqadam) the Qur’an and therefore predisposes its in‐
terpretation.’31 The message is the Qur’an, and neither divinity nor super‐
natural inerrancy is attributed to the messenger. Islam is understood to be
the primordial religion that preexisted the dispensation granted to Muham‐
mad. The elements listed as sunnah echo the practices of Abraham that
have been carried forward by his spiritual descendants. The veracity of
these practices is established by the consensus of Muslims across prophet‐
ic eras. There is no legal pretension. Sunnah pertains to religious practice
alone. Sunnah and juristic law (shari‘ah), as developed in the subsequent
generations, are not conflated. Hence, in this light there is no need to gloss
over or skirt distasteful events recorded in the maghazi literature, or in the
turbulent rule of the first four caliphs. Sunnah does not pertain to states‐
manship or principles of warfare, and thus cannot justify violence perpe‐
trated in the Peshawar school, or condone attacks of the innocent. The re‐
tributive slayings reported in Sira may have happened or not, but these are
not impingent upon Muslim to replicate. For Ghamidi, these events are ex‐
plained as matters of local custom: Arab tribal practices that would be cor‐
rected over time as the transformative influence of Islam worked its way
through the culture.
In this approach, the battles are regarded as exceptions in a life charac‐
terized by sacrificial service. When examined over the course of his min‐
istry, the Prophet’s vision for universal peace overshadows these incidents.
To illustrate this view, Ghamidi emphasizes Muhammad’s final sermon as
the truest representations of his character:
The Prophet of Islam had said in his last sermon during the month Dhu al-
Hijjah pointing to the Baytullah: ‘Just as this house, this month and this city is
sacred to you, the life, wealth and honour of everyone is equally sacred.’
There can be no message of peace greater or more meaningful than this one.
The Prophet meant that no individual has the right to go after anyone’s life,
property or honour. This rule forms the very basis of humanity and is laid out
as such in the Holy Qur’an which says that the taking of life of a single per‐
son equals killing all mankind and a person who saves the life of a single man
in fact saves the life of all mankind.
31 Ghamidi, Javed Ahmed. Mezan. 9th ed. Lahore, 2014, p. 47; al-Din Farahi/ Imam




This final statement provides the foundational principle governing human
relations in Islam. Consequently, Hadith reports and biographical descrip‐
tions of the Prophet’s life must be read critically and sieved in light of the
overarching message of God the merciful and compassionate.
Ghamidi takes a clear position on jihad. First, the purpose must be to
combat oppression. This includes the incursion upon the practice of reli‐
gion and the destruction of places of worship, those of Islam and of other
religions. He writes, ‘It is very unfortunate that non-combatants are killed
when sitting in their houses, walking towards mosques for prayer, going to
churches for supplications or to temples for worship.’32 The implication
drawn is that in the eyes of Allah, places of worship are sacred and it is
imperative for Muslims to protect these from abuse and destruction. ‘He
calls His servants’ Ghamidi explains, ‘to fight in order to save them from
being destroyed.’33 In this light, Islam – correctly interpreted – is the pro‐
tector of other religions for it is impingent to ensure their freedom of wor‐
ship. Furthermore, in times of war there are explicit laws that no harm
should befall noncombatants, and one must avoid killing a person when he
gives himself up in the battlefield and refuses to fight. Despite the tragic
reality of war, there are standards that must be upheld. Second, jihad can
only legitimately declared by a political state. It is not permissible for indi‐
viduals or non-state groups to take up arms against a democratically estab‐
lished regime and call this jihad. Ghamidi argues this point from a Hadith
in Imam Bukhari that states, ‘A government cannot be formed without the
consultation of the believers.’34 Thus, in Ghamidi’s reading, democracy is
the political structure for Islam. And, if political authority has not been se‐
cured, then the offended must conduct their struggle through peaceful
ways. In the present era, democratic methods must be used to address
problems within the public square.
So what of those who seek to overthrow governments, like the Taliban
in Pakistan? He argues that scholars who do not forbid violent regime
change, and who thus are complicit with those engaged in the present con‐
flic, have misinterpreted the Qur’an and committed two massive errors.




34 Ghamidi. ‘Jihad and War in Islam.’ Renaissance. 2009. http://www.monthly-renais
sance.com/issue/content.aspx?id=1158 [18.01.2016].
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They have sanctioned people and organizations to fight in the name of ji‐
had, which has created widespread violence. Their silence is the ultimate
cause fort he suffering of innocent civilians, as is happening around the
world. Their tacit or direct support casts the fighters in the role of the
ta’ifa al-mansura, or the ‘victorious party,’ set apart from all other Mus‐
lims, and granted the power to judge the veracity and fate of Muslim soci‐
eties, their political leaders and religious establishments.35 These scholars
have transgressed their limits, and taken upon themselves responsibilities
reserved for God alone namely, the fate of polytheism and of apostasy
(kufr). For Ghamidi, jurists have the right to punish a thief or an adulterer,
but not to determine the reward or punishment in matters of religion. ‘Al‐
lah has kept this right to himself. This is where the corruption and mis‐
chief starts.’36
Deobandi
A summary of the progression among Deoband scholars is crucial for
comprehending Ghazi’s justification of violence from sunnah. As we shall
see, Ghazi’s position is extreme, even among representatives of this con‐
servative scholarly tradition. The ‘Deobandi’ consist of a decentralized
network of schools and, as luminary Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (d. 1943) under‐
scored, should not be regarded as monolithic. In Thanavi’s estimation,
‘[What] foundational texts clearly demanded was typically a matter of in‐
terpretation and therefore of disagreement.’ 37 Still, general observations
can be made with regards to the founders’ stance on violence. Representa‐
tives of the Deoband movement, refrained from political activism. They
did not overtly demand military resistance to the British, neither did they
take an active role in the independence movement or in the establishing of
Pakistan as a nation state. Furthermore, with regards to the political guide‐
lines set forth for the Ummah, Thanavi refused to accept that the conjoin‐
ing of political and religious roles represented ‘the Islamic – and specifi‐
3.2
35 Cook, David. ‘Fighting to Create the Just State: Apocalypticism in Radical Mus‐
lim Discourse,’ In: Sohail H. Hashmi (Ed.). Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads:
Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges. New York, 2012, p.
375.




cally in the Qur’anic – norm.’38 These views are consistent with the writ‐
ings of Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi, who is recognized as an authority
on the foundational principles (usul) for deriving legislative guidance from
the Hadith. The deliberation, as Anwar Shah al- Kashmiri explains, pro‐
ceeds through the phases of research and selection of a legal cause (tahqiq
al-manat and tanqih al-manat), and then proceeds with the extraction or a
legal cause (takhrij al-manat). ‘Selecting a legal cause and extracting it,’
he explaines, ‘are the tasks of a mujtahid, each of them rivaling the oth‐
er.’ 39 The task of the jurist, like that of the exegete, is a challenging one.
It is a work of interpretation, and therefore of disagreement.
Though Thanavi and Nanotawi continue to be highly esteemed, the in‐
fluence of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi is more strongly perceived in Pakistan
today. Gangohi was on a mission to expunge elements of culture that he
regarded as harmful innovation (bi‘da) to the faith.In his estimation, what
diverges from sunnah is by definition bi‘da, and thus diametrically op‐
posed to right belief and conduct as exemplified by the words and deeds of
the Prophet. Following closely the work of Shah Isma‘il Shahid (d. 1831),
Gangohi linked bid‘ah with shirk, the sin of association, which he classi‐
fied in three ways: a practice that opposes sunnah; a practice done with the
similar purpose or consistency as sunnah though it is not a part of it; or a
conflating the permissible with the obligatory. One consequence of the ap‐
plication of this view of sunnah it stimulated an aversion to all manner of
activities, festivals, and traditions associated with other religious tradi‐
tions, be this Hindu, Christian, or Jewish. As Ingram aptly concluded,
Gangohi was not averse to condemning practices, and even the adorning
of certain clothing, not because these are forbidden in Islam, but because
Jews and Christians practice these, then these are ‘haram’ and ‘acts of un‐
belief (kufr).’40
Ghazi’s logic is an extension of the mainstream Deoband approach to
determining sunnah. This begins with the examination of reports from
three accepted categories, or qualities of report (sahih, hasan, and ḍa‘if).
The chains of transmission are also examined to determine whether these
38 Zaman, 53. Ref. Thanawi, Ashraf ‘Ali. Haqiqat al-tariqa min al-sunnah al-aniqa.
pp. 491–722.
39 Kashmiri, Mawlana Anwar Shah. Principles of Fiqh, Principles of Hadith. Dar al-
‘Ulum Deoband. Zameelur Rahman (Trans.). 13.06.2011, [c.1912].
40 Ingram, 483. For a summary of these points, see Muhammad Isma‘il, Taqwiyyat
al-Iman (Multan: Kutub Khana-i Majidiya), 14–17.
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are recurrent or singular (tawatur, wahid). If the report is conclusive (huj‐
jat), then it is included within the broad category of sunnah. In the case of
governance, this can be examined for consistency with the application of
the ‘rightly guided caliphs’ (Urdu: kulfa-i rashidin). Though Ghazi does
not reference the khabar in the interviews pertaining tot he Peshawar at‐
tack, associates such Shaykh Hasham and the Taliban leader Khalid
Khurasani cite Hadith 1043 from Kitab al-jihad (Fighting for Allah’s
Cause) contained in the authoritative collection of Sahih Bukhari:
Narrated Abuy Sa‘id al-Khudri: When the tribe of Banu Quraiza was ready to
accept Sa’d’s judgement, Allah’s Apostle sent for Sa’d who was near to
him… Sa’d said, ‘I give the judgment that their warriors should be killed and
their children and women should be taken as prisoners.’ The Prophet then re‐
marked, ‘O Sa’d! You have judged amongst them with the judgment of Al‐
lah.’41
Hasham precisely details the rationale. He argues that the students oft he
Army School in Peshawar were not innocent because they were being
groomed to follow in the footsteps of their ‘apostate (murtad) fathers and
brothers in the army of the apostate government of Pakistan.’42 Many of
the boys were between the ages of 15 and 20 and thus would soon be leav‐
ing for the battlefield. ‘According to sunnah because this is what the Holy
Prophet commanded on the day of the Banu Quraiza: to only kill the chil‐
dren that have pubic hair. This can be seen in Sahih Bukhari, 5:148.’43 In
this definition, the means and the ends are justified.
Though there are other accounts which could be cited along with this
one, the occasion mentioned refers to the aftermath of the Battle of the
Ditch (627 CE) when between 600 and 900 of the Jewish Arab Banu
Quraiza tribe were executed. This event is understood by Ghazi as a legal
cause for the slaughter of those who reject or betray the cause of Islam.
The Qur’an apparently refers to this in Surah 33:26 where it is written,
‘He brought those People of the Book who supported them down from
their strongholds and put panic into their hearts. Some of them you [be‐
lievers] killed and some you took captive.’ Some also read Surah 8:55-58
41 Khurasani, Hashaam. Peshawar school hamle ki shahri heseeat (Attack on the Pe‐
shawar school according to Shahria) http://dailypakistan.com.pk/peshawar/18-Dec






to justify this treatment of the Banu Qurayza because they did not uphold
the pact with Muhammad:
The worst creatures in the sight of God are those who reject Him and will not
believe; who, whenever you [Prophet] make a treaty with them, break it, for
they have no fear of God. If you meet them in battle, make a fearsome exam‐
ple of them to those who come after them, so that they may take heed. And if
you learn of treachery on the part of any people, throw their treaty back at
them, for God does not love the treacherous.
The intended result was to ensure that others would not do likewise, which
would have splintered the army and been disastrous for the cause of Islam.
The wisdom is proven in that the army became increasingly victorious and
the unified tribes vanquished foes and went on to establish an immense
empire. The basic rationale is that the Prophet’s action legitimized this
means, and if it is applied then the ummah will again be victorious. In
essence, the sheer brutality conveys the extreme degree of commitment
and determination of the group to accomplish its purpose.
The basic logic is that the brutal attack in Peshawar follows this exam‐
ple. The ‘authentic’ Muslims are at war with the apostate government. The
army’s jets and drones kill women and children indiscriminately. Hence,
retribution is justifiable and beyond condemnation. The severity of the cir‐
cumstances justifies drastic measures. The result is the conflation of dis‐
puted (da‘if) reports, such as found in Sunan Nasa’i (Vol. 2. Hadith 1368;
Vol. 3. 1285; Vol. 2. 1369) that recount the checking whether one has
reached puberty with the events described in Hadith and by Ibn Ishaq’s ac‐
count of the Prophet’s life, to create an analogous scenario that justifies
the beheading of opponents. The precedent has found favour among some
in Pakistan, and beyond. Similar atrocities are committed almost daily by
Daesh/ISIL, a movement that Ghazi and his supporters openly support.44
In light of such discourse, and the promise of similar attacks in the fu‐
ture, there is a pressing need for Deoband scholars to delineate interpreta‐
tive principles with greater precision. The founders of the movement were
not strangers to the challenges posed by imperial influence, nor of the
complexities posed in scriptural interpretation. As Anwar Shah Kashmiri
famously recounted Nanotawi’s view:
44 Mir, Amir. ‘Capital’s Jamia Hafsa declares support for Islamic State,’ In: The
News. 12.08.2014.
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At times only divine accordance could help reconcile between the contradic‐
tions and to solve the problems. [For example]: The plurality of bowing in the
eclipse prayer was established from the Prophet – Allah bless him and grant
him peace – due to a circumstance specific to him, but he advised the commu‐
nity to make one bowing as he said, ‘Pray as the most recent prayer you
prayed from the prescribed prayers.’45
He indicates that there are records of specific statements and actions,
which though verifiable are not conclusive (hujjat), and so should not con‐
stitute sunnah. In one sense, it can be inferred from the interaction that the
Prophet is gracioulsy saying that there are times when you should do as I
say, not as I did, or permitted. May it be so in times of prayer and also of
battle.
Analysis
Sunnah is a foundational source for the practice of Islam. Hence, the
question of ethical violence is situated in two divergent interpretations of
Muslim fidelity. One interprets Sunnah to be practically applicable for ev‐
ery aspect of life; the other limits its role to the specific arena of religious
practice. The former is concerned not only that one pray, but also that the
manner of prayer reflect that delineated by scholars in their access to the
way of the Prophet and the earliest Muslim community. The former holds
that such access is possible; the latter raises hesitant concern. With regards
to violence, the former finds legitimacy for preemptive and punitive at‐
tacks in the example of the Prophet, and of the rightly guided caliphs. The
latter emphasizes the teaching of the Prophet, with special emphasis upon
his final sermon, to abrogate previous actions and decisions, including the
execution of non-combatants or those who have surrendered. The pos‐
itions offer clearly divergent perspectives on how to interpret Islam’s
foundational sources, and ultimately to conclude what it means to follow
the example of the Prophet. The result is a highly polarized community,
each decrying the fidelity of the other.
This in many ways echoes similar discussion amongst Western Chris‐
tians and Jews.
4.
45 Kashmiri, Mawlana Anwar Shah. Principles of Fiqh. 13.06.2011, [c.1912].
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As R. Joseph Hoffman aptly noted in his study of religious violence:
Though theological correctness may cause us to prefer the idea of a refined
essence, so designated, to the historical specifics of any tradition, we are nor‐
mally aware that the sentence ‘Islam is a peaceful religion’ is no different
from saying ‘The Judeo-Christian tradition is about love and tolerance’ – that
is to say, an interpretative generalization not altogether supported by the
weight of history and practice.46
And, lest this blight be cast too quickly upon historical or sociological fac‐
tors, one must not overlook the fact that these actors often justify their
deeds by violence codified in scripture. Christian historian Philip Jenkins
has gone to great lengths to explain that violence glorified in scripture is
not a problem particular to Islam, but rather shared by most religions.
Does Biblical scripture justify violence? Jenkins’s answer is simple: ‘If the
circumstances in which you live make you seek such justifications, then
you will find them, and the same is true of the Qur’an. If you don’t need
them, you won’t find them.’47 The scriptural issue then, as Deoband’s
Nanotawi indicated, is one of interpretation. And, as Jenkins concludes,
the way forward is for interpreters to courageously examine and interpre‐
tatively redress elements passage that have recurrently been used to legit‐
imize the unthinkable.
Indeed, the Qur’anic interpreter actually has less violent material to ad‐
dress than one working from the Biblical text. Fred Donner, at the Univer‐
sity of Chicago, has summarized that the Qur’anic text conveys an am‐
bivalent stance on violence. As Ghamidi emphasized, the oppression of
the weak is sternly condemned, and there are passages stating that believ‐
ers should fight only in self-defense. ‘But a number of passages seem to
provide explicit justification for the use of war or fighting to subdue unbe‐
lievers, and deciding whether the Qur’an actually condones offensive war
for faith, or only defensive war, is really left to the judgment of the ex‐
egete.’48 The point is that violent episodes have been canonized in multi‐
ple scriptures but the place of these in the life of the religious community
is a matter of interpretation.
46 Hoffmann, R. Joseph. Just War and Jihad: Positioning the Question of Religious
Violence. In: The Just War and Jihad. R. Joseph Hoffmann (Ed.). Amherst, 2006,
pp. 47-48.
47 Jenkins, Phillip. Laying Down the Sword. New York, 2012, p. 244.
48 Donner, Fred. 1991, p.47.
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The problem, as expressed in this essay, is that Qur’anic exegesis is in‐
extricably related to the interpreters’ view of sunnah. Bruce Lawrence has
correctly observed that the ‘prism of canon formation,’ or the historical
era following the life of Muhammad, has served to ‘particularize Muslim
notions of authority and identity with power.’49 The rapidly expanding po‐
litical boundaries fostered an ongoing concern for Muslim security and
unity. These were violent times of expansion and conquest, and these were
the circumstances in which the example and sayings of the Prophet were
recounted, interpreted, and eventually canonized. This compelled religious
scholars, in Abu-Nimer view, to revise the notion of jihad as a defensive
war against oppression, to a ‘constant state of war with the unbelievers.’50
Though the process of ‘ethical codification’ (to use Beverly Milton-Ed‐
wards’ terms) only developed gradually over time, by the time of the Ab‐
basid caliphate (ca. 750) the volatility had stimulated the need to legiti‐
mate the means by which regimes change.51 This coincides with the for‐
mative period of hadith compilation, and the collation of the authoritative
compendiums of hadith. The ambivalent stance of the Qur’an then be‐
comes an issue of interpretation shaped primarily by the reader’s view of
sunnah.
This has important implications for contemporary religious thinkers
who are seeking to an ethical statement pertaining to religiously sectioned
violence. Jenkins’s analysis again is helpful. He observes that:
If scripture passage X supposedly inspired terrorist group Y, then we need to
explain why militants chose to draw from that portion of scripture and not
some radically contradictory text. No less important, we must understand why
that same scripture has had no effect on whatever in pushing millions of other
believers towards comparably extreme acts. Some of what we call ‘religious
violence’ may well be authentically religious in its character, but we must
find its origins in places other than the basic texts of the faith.52
49 Lawrence, Bruce. ‘Holy War (Jihad) in Islamic Religion and Nation-State Ideolo‐
gies.’ In: John Kelsay/ James Turner Johnson (Eds.). Just War and Jihad: Histori‐
cal and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Tradi‐
tions. Westport, 1991, p. 143.
50 Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and
Practice. Gainesville FL, 2003, p. 30.
51 Milton-Edwards, Beverley. Islam and Violence in the Modern Era. New York,
2006, p. 37.
52 Jenkins, p. 252.
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Though the ‘origins’ of violence in Pakistan may be found in locations
other than the basic texts, the most radical voices in contemporary dis‐
course seem determined to locate these within scriptural foundations. This
is not altogether unexpected given that one of the basic texts, the hadith,
has been the fulcrum of debate amongst Sunni jurists in South Asia for al‐
most 300 years. The divergence between traditionalists and modernists, in
this case between Ghazi and Ghamidi, the Deobandi and the Islahi, has
yielded two different sets of parameters, each with vastly different social
and political implications. Ghamidi’s view of Sunnah allows for integra‐
tion with present political institutions. Ghazi calls for resistance, through
non-participation but also for direct military confrontation. The people of
Pakistan – thus far – have cast votes in favour of a system informed by a
theology closer to that of Ghamidi, but whether this will change it yet to
be seen.
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Abstract: In post-Soviet Russia, Islam has flourished, revamping a long-pro‐
fessed faith and reconnecting with the global ummah. The combination of old tra‐
ditions with new Islamic influences from abroad has enriched Russia’s Muslim
communities, but has also created social friction. Particularly controversial is the
(self)-positioning of Russia’s Muslims toward the state.
My proposal for this Workshop expands on my research on Russia’s contemporary
discourse on Islam, started with my Ph.D. dissertation, by focusing on Russia’s Is‐
lamic narratives of peace and conflict. Different conceptualizations of cooperation
with versus opposition to the Russian state are being developed.At stake is the full
inclusion of Muslims in Russia's multi-religious society.
Official Islamic institutions embrace the state-supported notion of Russian ‘tradi‐
tional Islam’ (that is, the forms of Islam historically practiced in Russia) and its
contribution to a ‘Russian civilization’. Russian muftis (religious leaders) reject
the assumptions of Islam being a violent religion and of Muslims being enemies
of the state. Some Muslim leaders and some prominent scholars of Islam empha‐
size Islamic wasatiyyah (‘moderateness’, umerennost’) as preventive of social
conflict, even in multi-religious societies.
Conversely, other Muslim thinkers find inspiration in the Iranian revolution, rein‐
terpreted through the lenses of Russian-Soviet history and traditional Russian
messianism, to envision a new society based on ‘justice’ (al-‘Adalah,
spravedlivost’).
Additionally, jihadist proclamations appear throughout the Islamic discourse, es‐
pecially in areas of conflict (North Caucasus). Separatist groups like Imarat
Kavkaz are close to international terrorism, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State, with
which they share arguments and purposes. However, they also face counter-narra‐
tives of Islam by local muftis and by affiliates of Moscow, like the Head of Chech‐
nya Ramzan Kadyrov.
My chapter examines Russian sources about Islam from a variety of outlets to
identify leading figures, explain their arguments, trace their intellectual heritage
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and domestic and international influences, and assess their impact on Russian
polity.
Introduction
In the Russian Federations, Muslims are estimated to be about sixteen mil‐
lion. Most of them are members of communities that have lived in Russia
since imperial times1. Today, the most important communities are Tatars
(about one third of them living in the Federal Republic of Tatarstan), Mus‐
lims in the Republics of Chuvashi‘ah and Bashkortostan, and groups of
various ethnicity in the North Caucasus. Sizeable Muslim groups also live
in major cities, especially Moscow and Saint Petersburg.
The atheist Soviet ideology engaged in violent campaigns to eradicate
all religions from the Union, especially Islam, compelling believers to
hide their faith, and severing Soviet Muslims’ historical international ties.
Thanks to the readmission of religion to public life in post-Soviet Russia,
Muslims have again been able to practice Islam openly, to restore Islamic
institutions, to (re)construct mosques, and to restore their international
connections. The Soviet regime had disrupted the religious structures of
Muslim communities, emphasizing, instead, their ethnic-national identity2.
Therefore, the primary task for Muslim leaders has been to strengthen the
awareness among Russia’s Muslims of their Islamic heritage, including of
their belonging to the international ummah. Their search for the appropri‐
ate place of Muslims in the new, post-Soviet Russian society has generat‐
ed a broad reflection on the relations of the Muslim community with the
Russian culture and the state. Several models of interaction, from full inte‐
gration to armed opposition, have been elaborated. The restoration of tra‐
ditional international relations fostered the educational and financial sup‐
port of foreign Muslim organizations and countries. However, compar‐
1.
1 The first encounters between Slavic pagans and Muslims occurred in the Volga ter‐
ritories in the 8th-9th centuries CE. Subsequently, the domination of the Mongols in
the 13th-14th centuries and, after their defeat, the Russian Empire’s conquests in
Central Asia (from the 16th century) and the Caucasus (from the 18th century) have
increased the familiarity of Russians with Muslims and improved their knowledge
of the Islamic world.
2 Through Stalin’s policy of nationalities.
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isons with Muslims from different Islamic traditions, in particular from
Saudi Arabia, challenged Russia’s Muslims' own interpretations of Islam.
It is within this context that the debate on Islam conducted in Russia
must be interpreted. In this chapter, I focus on arguments of peace and
conflict advanced by Muslims in Russia, both scholars and unaffiliated
thinkers, mostly in the Russian language, in the last ten to fifteen years.
The debate about Russia’s Islam is vast. However, some voices distinguish
themselves in their authority, sophistication, or forcefulness. Prior to pro‐
ceeding to the analysis of their arguments, a conceptual premise is neces‐
sary.
Russian traditional Islam
The forms of Islam historically practiced in Russia (Hanafi Sunnism in the
Volga region and Sufism in the Caucasus) are characterized by the pres‐
ence of Islamic and pre-Islamic habits. Today, they are collectively de‐
fined as ‘traditional Islam’ – a concept introduced in public discourse by
the late Evgenii Primakov, an eminent Russian politician and an expert of
the Middle East, in the mid-1990 s3. Although culturally appropriate, this
definition was also instrumental in drawing a clear distinction in signifi‐
cance and value between Islam as practiced in Russia and all those forms
of Islam that so-called ‘foreign agents’ allegedly intended to introduce in
Russia. According to Primakov, because traditional Islam belongs to Rus‐
sian civilization and history, it is valuable and non-threatening. Non-tradi‐
tional Islam, instead, is alien to Russian4 Muslims’ culture. Its aggressive
exponents try to impose it on Russia's Islamic communities, encouraging
them to adopt an extremist version of Islam (collectively labeled Wah‐
habism) that uproots their legitimate traditions. Furthermore, foreign Islam
is often suspected to constitute a Trojan horse for enemies of the state to
establish their bridgeheads in Russia.
The distinction between traditional and foreign Islam entails a series of
important consequences in Russian social and political spheres, which go
beyond the purpose of this chapter, For the present discussion, it is impor‐
2.
3 Former Russian prime minister and foreign minister, and lately Director of the In‐
stitute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences.
4 If not otherwise specified, with “Russian” I intend either rossiiskii (all-Russian) or
Rossiian (Russian citizen) – to be distinguished from russkii (ethnic Russian).
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tant to note that traditional Islam has been adopted by the Russian official
doctrine of religion as a legitimate component of Russian history and civi‐
lization. Most importantly, it is incorporated into President Vladimir
Putin’s project of a new Russian patriotism, based on the idea of an all-
Russian (rossiiskii) fatherland constructed on a multi-ethnic and multi-reli‐
gious civilization of which each component, including Muslims, is equally
legitimate. Many official Islamic organizations have embraced this view
and granted their support to the central state. In this way, they have been
able to establish themselves as authoritative spiritual centres as well as in‐
fluential political entities. They have also become allies of the state on all
religious issues, in particular Islamic education and the integration of
Muslims recently immigrated from the former Soviet republics.
Primakov’s analysis had distinguished Islamic fundamentalism, inter‐
preted as a strict application of Islamic precepts, from Islamic extremism,
which conducts an incorrect and biased reading of sacred texts5. As such,
in the official view of both the Russian state and Islamic organizations,
traditional Islam has lost its threatening character, while Islamic extrem‐
ism has been increasingly identified with an ideology of terror, and not
with a (deviant) manifestation of a religion. At the same time, despite state
policies towards religious extremism still being blurred, a safe space has
been created in which the discourse about Islam has acquired a high level
of sophistication and includes discussions on political Islam, inter-reli‐
gious dialogue, and violence6.
5 Primakov, Evgeny. A World Challenged: fighting terrorism in the twenty-first cen‐
tury. Washington DC, 2004.
6 Sagramoso and Yarlykapov assert that the official distinction of traditional Islam
has been superseded by the acceptance, in the North Caucasus, of moderate Salafi
groups, which are new to Russia, to participate into official Islamic institutions. It
seems to me, instead, that the concept of traditional Islam has been implicitly modi‐
fied by the process of securitization/desecuritization of Islam. It has been extended
to define all those forms of Islam in Russia that accept the secular Russian state as
political form – thus ceasing to be a threat (Sagramoso, Domitilla/Yarlykapo,
Akhmet. ‘Caucasian Crescent: Russia's Islamic Policies and its Responses to Radi‐
calization.’ In: The Fire Below. How the Caucasus Shaped Russia. Robert Bruce
Ware (Ed). London, 2013. pp. 51-94.
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Muslims as supporters of the secular state: official Islamic institutions
After more than a decade of internal rivalries for doctrinal, social, and po‐
litical supremacy7 Russian official Islamic institutions have clustered
around a few representative centres. Today, the most influential of them is
the Russian Muftis Council (Sovet Muftiev Rossii –RMC)8 based in
Moscow and led by the Tatar mufti Ravil Gainudtin, which now enjoys ac‐
cess to the Kremlin and a prestigious position as representative of Russia’s
Muslims in several official Councils (at par with the Orthodox Church).
Like many Tatar Muslim leaders, Gainudtin is close to (neo)jadidism,
inspired by the Islamic modernist movement which emerged in Russian
Turkestan at the end of the nineteenth century. Of jadidism, many Tatar
leaders today emphasize the importance of a modern, Western-style educa‐
tion (which does not, however, rejects Islam) and the necessity for Mus‐
lims to actively contribute to economic development and the socio-politi‐
cal life9. After an initial, unsuccessful separatist attempt in the early
1990 s, now Tatars have undertaken to contribute to the shaping of Rus‐
sian polity from within10. Unsurprisingly, Muslims inspired by jadidism
openly claim the necessity and desirability of Muslims’ active participa‐
tion to state policies.
3.
7 Silant’ev, Roman. ‘Chetvertaia sila rossiiskogo islama.’ In: Novaya Gazeta- Reli‐
gion. 7 April, 2010. http://religion.ng.ru/events/2010-04-07/2_islam.html [26
April, 2010]; Hunter, Shireen/ Thomas, Jeffrey L. / Melikishvili, Alexander. Islam
in Russia: the politics of identity and security. New York, 2004.
8 Official website: http://www.muslim.ru (in Russian, English and Arabic).
9 Jadidism aimed at the modernization of Muslim society within the Russian Em‐
pire. It advocated the necessity to improve and update the general level of educa‐
tion of Turkestan’s Muslims, including women, with the acquisition of Western
modern knowledge. Through education, it also aimed at a broader and more effect‐
ive participation of Muslims in administrative positions. Very popular among the
merchants, but opposed by the conservative muftis, it looked at Europe for pro‐
gressive knowledge, but also at the nationalist movements that were developing
there. In particular, it was exposed to the pan-Turkism of Ismail Gasprinski’s (or
Ismail Gaspirai, an inspiring figure of jadidism and equally a Tatar, but from
Crimea). Jadidism blossomed during what is considered by Tatars to be their
Golden Age, until the October Revolution. Today, as neo-jadidism, it influences
many Tatar religious and secular thinkers. See Khalid, Adeeb. The Politics of
Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. Berkeley, 1998.
10 Khakimov, Rafael. Rafael Khakimov. Gde nasha Mekka?.Interlos, March 2, 2007,
http://www.intelros.ru/2007/03/02/rafajel_khakimov_gde_nasha_mekka.html [Au‐
gust 13, 2015].
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Among the official Islamic institutions in the Russian Federation, the
RMC is considered the one that most effectively expresses an independent
Muslim point of view, while confirming its support to the state11. After
1991, Russia’s Islamic leaders had to face doctrinal and institutional chal‐
lenges. A series of Islamic terrorist events, in the North Caucasus and
elsewhere in Russia, and the September 11, 2001 attacks challenged the
authority of the Islamic Boards12. In general, most Russian Islamic leaders
have repeatedly condemned what they called ‘Wahhabism’ as a distorted
interpretation of Islam, and as alien to Russia's Muslim traditions. Initially,
their arguments were not very sophisticated, with few references to sacred
texts and only scattered theological reasonings. Like other Muslim minori‐
ties in non-Muslim countries, the Russian community also seemed to be
more preoccupied to counter the perception of Islam in general as a reli‐
gion of violence, than to counter jihadist claims on their doctrinal terrain.
Indeed, some leaders proved less sure of their position on sensitive issues:
In 2003, the Head of the Central Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of
Russia (CDUM), Talgat Tajuddin, publicly approved of terrorist attacks by
Palestinians against Israel (harshly criticized, he withdrew his com‐
ment)13. Gradually, Islamic leaders in Russia have deepened their theolog‐
ical expertise. Their growing mastering of the details of the Hanafi and
Sufi precepts is evident. The results of an intense reflection on their iden‐
tity, which has been supported by the higher doctrinal sophistication of
both leaders and believers, are particularly visible in a programmatic doc‐
ument recently published by the Russian Muftis Council14.
The text recurs to Qur’anic verses (10:19; 49:13) to maintain the equal‐
ity of all nations and the particular respect owed to the peoples of the
Book (Qur’an 2:109). It firmly rejects the idea of a chosen people who
would be superior to all others. As far as Russia’s Muslims are concerned,
the document underscores how they are aware to belong simultaneously to
the ummah, to their national and ethnic group, and to Russia. The idea of
11 Curanović, Alicja. The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy. London, 2012.
12 Russian Spiritual Boards were created by Catherine the Great to harmonize the ad‐
ministrative structure of Muslim communities to the Imperial model (and control
them).
13 As quoted in Laruelle, Marlène. Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire.
Baltimore, 2008.
14 Sotsialn’aia doktrina rossiiskikh musul’man (The social doctrine of Russia’s Mus‐
lims). http://muslim.ru/actual/13636/ [28 July, 2015].
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Russian patriotism is essential in the argument of RMC, because it coun‐
ters the idea that Muslims are extraneous to Russia and, therefore, should
fight to free themselves from its dominance. Instead, Muslims are encour‐
aged to strengthen the Russian state, to participate to military service out
of love for their fatherland and not because it is imposed, and in general to
support the central government.
The RMC’s call to loyalty to Russia, based on ‘historical reasons’ of
coexistence and civilizational community, is further strengthened by reli‐
gious arguments. The document makes reference to the fiqh of the minori‐
ty (fiqh al-aqalliyyat) to legitimate the position of Muslims abiding by the
laws of a non-Muslim government that allows them to practice their faith.
According to the RMC document, state laws are the social expression of a
dialogue that is essential among peoples and individuals – within the
ummah as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims (Qur’an 5:1, 8:58,
and 2:177 are quoted).
Quoting the dialogue between Mohammed and Muadh ibn Jabal, the
author(s) point at the necessity to integrate the Sharia with rules adequate
to face the challenges of the contemporary world. In full agreement with
jadidist interpretations, they emphasize that ‘the fiqh of the minority does
not prevent from working in the government, in some cases it even re‐
quests such activity’, and cite the case of the Prophet Joseph mentioned in
the Sura 12. The document highlights that neither the Qur’an nor the Sun‐
na mention the Caliphate, which was a historical phenomenon, as a form
of Islamic government. Instead, it praises the cooperation of Muslims with
the governments of their fatherlands, as it happens for Russians and Euro‐
peans who ‘consider their fatherland Dar-as-Salam (abode of peace), Dar
al-‘Ahd (abode of dialogue) and Dar-ash-Shahada (abode in which it is
possible to profess one’s religion)’.
The document is very specific in denouncing the incorrectness of ex‐
tremists’ interpretations of jihad. After defining jihad as ‘the internal and
external focus to follow the right, straight path’, it quotes a series of sacred
sources to emphasize the much greater importance of the internal jihad.
Interestingly, it immediately points out what it defines as the fundamental
error of many young people, who leave for the external jihad without their
parents’ consent (a clear address to a worrisome Russian trend). The au‐
thor(s) continue by explaining that the external jihad is not to be com‐
pletely rejected; however, it is allowed only in connection ‘with socio-po‐
litical, and not individual, responsibility’, and it can be launched only by
religious authorities.
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In the effort to counter extremists on their own terrain, the document re‐
peatedly quotes Ibn Taimiya’s ‘full traditional’ interpretation of jihad:
‘your jihad is love, truth, hope, utterance of the name of Allah. For what
concerns the fought jihad, this is a satanic deception for unresolved condi‐
tions and requirements’.
The motivations of jihadists – to substitute a secular or unfair regime
with a true Islamic one – are misplaced, the document explains, because
jihad is not an instrument to ease discontent deriving from political or eco‐
nomic issues – that is the role of the dialogue with the state. For the RMC,
the overall underlying argument that Muslims must live under a Sharia
regime is incorrect. To prove this point, the document reports several pas‐
sages from the Qur’an and the Sunna underscoring Islam’s clear prefer‐
ence for political and social stability as conducive environment for the
prosperity of Muslims. The reader is reminded that the Qur’an abhors any
disorder or instability and that a stable government, able to ensure peace
and prosperity, is to be preferred to any form of social unrest or revolution
– even Islamic ones (Qur’an 2:217; 16:90). This precept is so strong, the
authors comment, that it must be applied even in the case of a slightly un‐
just or repressive government, and even if the intentions of the revolution‐
aries are to rectify the authorities’ wrongdoings and to establish Islam as
the supreme model of justice.
The RMC identifies in a proper Islamic education the solution to the
fundamental problem of the misinterpretation of Islamic texts and the dif‐
fusion of extremism. Many other authoritative Muslim scholars share this
view. Rafik Mukhametshin, the Director of both the All-Russian Islamic
Institute in Moscow and the Russian Islamic University in Kazan’, in par‐
ticular sees in the complex combination of juvenile idealism, doctrinal ig‐
norance, and the failure of foreign-educated young Muslims (including
teachers) to grasp the specific character of Russia’s Islamic traditions, the
primary cause of young Muslims’ sensitivity to religious extremism. This
analysis reveals the influence of neo-jadidist and modernist Islamic
thought15, and it is shared by many observers, including the Russian
state16. However, even when one discards isolated comments that relate Is‐
15 However, this is not a perspective exclusive to the Russian Muslim community.
16 ‘Sistema islamskogo obrazovaniia v Rossii dolzhna gotovit’ musul’manskikh bo‐
goslovov mirovogo masshtaba’ – mufti Mikaddas Bibrasov (‘The system of Islam‐
ic education in Russia must prepare Muslim religious leaders of world level’, says
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lamic terrorism to mental illness17, not everybody agrees on the degree of
responsibility that Russian Islamic religious leaders bear in countering ex‐
tremism.
Islam as an element of Russian political system.
Leonid Siukiianen, Professor of Islamic Law at Moscow’s Higher School
of Economics and an authoritative commentator on Islam, emphasizes that
Islam is not just a religion, but also the carrier of a strong socio-political
model18. The complex nature of Islam requires a trained mind to be com‐
prehended in its entirety, he notes, and it is not understood by Islamic ex‐
tremists, who interpret religious precepts incorrectly. However, Siukiianen
observes, such errors do originate from within the Islamic doctrine, and it
is therefore a mistake to consider Islamic terrorism a non-religious ideolo‐
gy.
In Siukiianen’s analysis19, the fundamental error made by Islamic ex‐
tremists lies in their vision of the Sharia. Contrary to what they argue, the
4.
mufti Mikaddas Bibrasov). 16 April, 2014. http://muslim.ru/articles/96/5397/ [13
August, 2015].
17 The possibility is suggested by the rector of the Moscow Islamic University,
Damir-khazrat Khairetdinov. Vzglyad.ru. 'I tut nachinaiutsia variant vrode dzhiha‐
da’ [And then an option like jihad begins] http://vz.ru/society/2013/10/24/656211.
html. [14 July, 2014].
18 Siukiianen, Leonid R. Musul’manskii opyt mirostroitel’stva: bazovye tseli i tsen‐
nosti, formy poznania i sotsiokul’turnoi organizatsii. Istoricheskii opyt i rossiiskaia
situatsiia. [Muslim experience of the construction of the world: basic objectives
and values, forms of knowledge and of socio-cultural organization. Historical ex‐
perience and the Russian situation]. http://www.intelros.ru/pdf/doklad.pdf [July 7,
2012]; Syukiyanen, Leonid. ‘The State Policy toward Islam in the CIS Countries:
Problems and Perspectives.’ In: Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue for Sus‐
tainable Development. Proceedings of the International Conference. 13-16
September. Moscow, 2007. Russian Academy for Public Administration under the
President of the Russian Federation; Siukiianen, Leonid. ‘Umerennost’ kak strate‐
giia sovremennogo islama’ [Moderateness as strategy of contemporary Islam]. In:
NG Religii, March 1, 2006. http://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2006-03-01/4_umerennost
.html. [7 July, 2012].
19 Siukiianen, Leonid. ‘Islam protiv Islama. Ob Islamskoi al’ternative ekstremizmu i
terrorizmu’ [Islam against Islam. On Islamic alternatives to extremism and terror‐
ism]. In: Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz, 2002, 3/21. http://www.ca-c.org/journal/20
02/journal_rus/cac-03/09.sikru.shtml [10 August, 2015].
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Sharia is not a granitic, immutable set of rules that must be applied by the
letter. Instead, Siukiianen explains, the Sharia must be considered in its
deep meaning and general intent as divine law. Its precepts must be inter‐
preted in the light of historic and socio-political circumstances, according
to the Islamic process of ijtihad. Siukiianen quotes several Qur’anic vers‐
es, along with ancient and contemporary authoritative Islamic scholars
like Ibn Taimiyya and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, in support of his own state‐
ments.
If ijtihad is correctly conducted, Siukiianen remarks, several core prin‐
ciples of the Sharia reveal themselves not only compatible with, but even
beneficial to modern socio-political systems, including democracy. The
core of Siukiianen’s argument lies in the Sharia concept of moderateness
(wasatiyyah, in Russian umerennost’), which expresses Islam’s true vision
of politics and which he translates as ‘prudence, temperance, equidis‐
tance”20. The acceptance of umerennost’ by all Russians (Muslim and
non-Muslim) as a shared value – and not as an imposition – would con‐
tribute to prevent the insurgence of social conflict, thanks to each individ‐
ual’s self-restraint.
Islam’s fundamental approach to the state, Siukiianen argues, is one of
cooperation and support – not of opposition. For Siukiianen, the matter is
not only how to ‘place’ or ‘regulate’ Islam. He advocates the elaboration,
in the Russian system, of a positive conceptualization of Islam intended as
a system of (political) values, and deplores the incapability (at the time of
his writing) of Russia’s Muslims to elaborate a valuable proposal for the
incorporation of Islamic concepts into state legislation21. He admits that
the secular state should abstain from theological debates; however, in the
face of Muslims’ inadequacy, he explicitly encourages the Russian gov‐
ernment to undertake this task in their place.
Like the RMC (and Russian state patriotism), Siukiianen reminds his
audience that Russia’s Islam is inextricably connected to Russian history
and culture. Some general Islamic principles, he notes, have already en‐
tered Russian society through jadidism in Tatarstan and Sufi tariqats in the
Caucasus. A deeper comprehension of Islamic political precepts is there‐
fore both possible and desirable. To strengthen his argument, Siukiianen
adds that the concept of umerennost’ is being gradually adopted in the
20 Siukiianen, Umerennost.
21 Siukiianen, 2007 a, 2007 b, 2007 c, 2006.
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most dynamic parts of the Islamic world, particularly in Kuwait, success‐
fully proving the benefits of its introduction in modern, democratic soci‐
eties. In Russia, besides reducing social conflict, a deeper acceptance of
Islamic values would enhance Russia’s internal inter-civilizational and in‐
ter-religious dialogue. Additionally, he notes, it would upgrade Russia’s
standing in the Muslim world, improving their mutual relations from the
current level of ‘dialogue’ to that of full ‘understanding’ – a much more
promising perspective.
Although Siukiianen openly proposes the adoption of Islamic precepts
by Russia's legislative system and, in a way, by all its citizens, he is very
clear that he does not intend to threaten or uproot the state's secular, mod‐
ernist essence. Instead, his discussion reveals the strong influence of ja‐
didist principles, even when they are not explicitly mentioned. In the end,
Siukiianen offers a strong model of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious
polity that does not just preach tolerance but, on the contrary, solicits the
active contribution of all its parts to the common good.
Islam as revolutionary force
A different scenario, in contrast, is depicted by Geidar Dzhemal’22, the
Head of the Russian Islamic Committee and a popular commentator on is‐
sues of religion and geopolitics. Like other observers, Dzhemal’ empha‐
sizes the crucial role that Islamic values can, and should, play in contem‐
porary societies. At the centre of his argument, though, he puts another Is‐
lamic concept, very important in Shi‘ah theology: justice (al-‘Adalah, in
Russian spravedlivost')23. For Dzhemal’, spravedlivost' holds a universal
5.
22 In his early political career Dzhemal’ had joined the extreme right circles around
Aleksandr Dugin and the Eurasianist movement. Although he distanced himself
from the Eurasianist movement in the late 1990 s, he maintained relations with
many of its exponents. Until his death in December 2016, Dzhemal’ regularly ap‐
peared on the most important Russian mass media, television or radio pro‐
grammes. His arguments have a deep, if eclectic, theoretical foundation, and focus
on the interconnection between (Islamic) religious and political factors.
23 Dzhemal’, Geidar. Perspectivy vosstanovleniia politicheskogo Islama kak glob‐
al’nogo faktora [Perspectives on the restoration of political Islam as a global fac‐
tor]. St. Petersburg, 26 September, 2013. http://kontrudar.com/lekcii/perspektivy-v
osstanovleniya-politicheskogo-islama-kak-globalnogo-faktora. Half Azeri by
birth, Dzhemal’ makes no mystery of his close connection with Iranian religious
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meaning, the application of which would solve the social tensions of con‐
temporary societies. However, he remarks, it does not come about through
conciliation, but through revolution.
According to Dzhemal’, after the collapse of the Soviet communist
model, world societies experienced the ‘enslavement’ to economic forces,
in which most humanity is treated as ‘mere biomaterial’. Dzhemal’ notes
that this condition resembles that of pre-revolutionary Russia. However,
he declares, Marxism can no longer be a solution, because it deals with
outdated issues (class relations and economy). Today, Dzhemal’ claims,
‘the most essential protest is the protest about the religious’24. For him, the
civil movements that criticize capitalism and liberalism are also inade‐
quate, for they merely pursue better economic standards of living, but not
a better human condition25.
Dzhemal’ deems the other religions of the Book (Judaism and Chris‐
tianity) particularly unfit to counter world injustice. In his analysis, be‐
cause Christianity and Judaism modify the message of God through the in‐
terpretation of their clerics/ministers, they preclude humanity from a direct
knowledge of the Divine. This reveals how, historically, they have actively
aimed at preserving the ‘pyramidal’ structure that has been imposed on
world society since the times of Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, he continues,
they still strive to preserve the ‘pyramid’, or ‘matrix’, in place26.
Islam’s fundamental characteristic, instead, according to Dzhemal’ is to
‘open a break’ into the ‘mainstream’ conceptualization of social structure.
Dzhemal’ juxtaposes the systemic ‘matrix’ (which regulates social coexis‐
tence through a rigid normative system) to a ‘spirit’ (dukh) that is free
from the matrix – and always against it. The spirit represents the essence
of religion: It ‘belongs to God’27 and, as such, it is ‘meaning’ (smisl28). Is‐
lam provides the channel through which human beings can connect to God
and therefore discover the meaning of their own existence. The meaning
and political circles. He is a friend to the late Imam Khomeini’s son, and he has
spent a few years in Qom. The influence of Shi‘ah theology and, in general, of Ira‐
nian intellectuals is apparent throughout Dzhemal’’s works.
24 Dzhemal’, Geidar. Politicheskii Islam segodnia – analog kommunizma 19 veka
[Today's political Islam is analogous to nineteenth-century-communism]. 22
February, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V3Q3h_mhfYk, 7 m:47 s.
25 Ibid, 10 m:04 s.
26 Dzhemal’, Politicheskii Islam; Dzhemal’, Perspectivy vosstanovleniia.
27 Politicheskii Islam, 27 m:00 s.
28 Ibid., 34 m:35 s.
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(smisl’) is the basis of justice: This, for Dzhemal’, is the core message of
the Revelation of the Prophets and the fundamental significance of politi‐
cal Islam29.
Today, he claims, the only way to free humanity from its enslavement is
an eschatological struggle, where the flag of the oppressed can only be the
solidarity in the name of a sacral and metaphysical understanding of justice.
But justice lies only in Islam30.
In Dzhemal’’s analysis, every religious protest is about the formation and
nature of the system – not about external formalities such as obtaining le‐
gal permission to interrupt daily activities to pray five times a day. Politi‐
cians avoid defining protests ‘religious’, and label them ‘extremism, ter‐
rorism’ because they fear the formidably subversive nature of the protest.
Indeed, he notes, Islam is a revolutionary force, which has maintained the
same characteristics of its origins, when Muhammad and his companions
were alive and ‘fought against Byzantium and Iran’31. Instead, Dzhemal’
points out, to achieve the purpose of Islam, which is the revelation of the
connection between the spirit and human existence, a complex matrix is
not necessary. He claims that the Sharia alone can regulate the relations
among people, replacing society (matrix) with (Islamic) community.
Like Siukiianen, Dzhemal’ rejects the official position of the Russian
state that deprives Islamic terrorism of its religious character. Instead, he
emphasizes the deep Islamic nature of what he sees as an upcoming revo‐
lution. He shares with jihadists the praise of Islam as it was practiced at
Muhammad’s times, and the condemnation of Islamic legal traditions as
corrupted. Like Islamic extremists, he sharply criticizes the religious, eco‐
nomic, and political conditions of contemporary societies, although he
does not support the idea of a Caliphate (in his opinion, a historical, not
religious, institution). However, he considers most Chechen separatist
leaders ‘Soviet kids’, actually ignorant of Islam and driven by secular, eth‐
nic-based motives. He also declares that suicide terrorists are not true
Muslims and that they are ‘manoeuvered’ by not better specified ‘anti-Is‐
lamic forces’. Further, he refrains from using harsh tones against non-
Muslims. Contrary to terrorists, he rejects fitnah and chaos, and makes as‐
29 Dzhemal’, Perspectivy vosstanovleniia.
30 Ibid.
31 Dzhemal’, Politicheskii Islam 37-38 m.
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surances that a proper Islamic regime will not allow ‘bandits’ to act vio‐
lently ‘under the green flag’.
Dzhemal’’s conceptualization of political Islam reveals a composite, so‐
phisticated intellectual background. Similarly to Qutb and, especially,
Khomeini, who elaborated Islamic political theories constructed on differ‐
ent foundations than Western ones32, Dzhemal’ identifies in Islam’s doctri‐
nal, religious nature the source of its strength as an original political mod‐
el. The centrality of spravedlivo, in Dzhemal’’s intellectual construction,
reveals the influence of Shi‘ah theology. In particular, the systemic con‐
nivance of sacerdotal and political great powers (the matrix) had been in‐
dicated – and condemned – by the Iranian Islamic intellectual Ali
Shari‘ati, prior to the Iranian revolution33. Like Shari‘ati, Dzhemal’ rein‐
forces his critique of the Bible with constant references to Western philos‐
ophy, starting from the ancient Greeks and proceeding through Enlighten‐
ment and rationalism.
The truly interesting characteristic in Dzhemal’’s position is the explic‐
it, direct connection to Russia. The association of Marxism and Islam had
already been made by Ali Shari‘ati, among others. Shari‘ati, though, was
discussing Marxism in its intellectual formulation, rather than in its empir‐
ical implementation. Dzhemal’, instead, specifically refers to the reality of
the Soviet Union. He claims34 that, like in the early twentieth century, the
situation in Russia today is both universal and unique. Russian social rev‐
olutionaries and populists had embraced Marxism because of its promises
of stronger revolutionary ideas and international connections. Despite the
success of the October Revolution however, he concludes, in the end the
situation of Russia was too specific to allow real cooperation among glob‐
al activists.
In 1989, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini had expressed to the then Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev his vision of the beneficial role of Islam as
substitute of the crumbling Communist ideology35. Today, Dzhemal’ an‐
nounces, thanks to Islam Russia can – again – be connected to the global
32 Euben, Roxanne L. Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits
of Modern Rationalism: A Work of Comparative Political Theory. Princeton,
1999.
33 Shari‘ati, ‘Ali. Man & Islam. Houston, 1981, p.15 and following.
34 Dzhemal’, Politicheskii Islam.




forces that can stir the ‘mainstream’. Indeed, Dzhemal’ considers Islam
the successor of Bolshevik-Marxism36. Asked to clarify what is the ‘mean‐
ing’ of life that should be unveiled by an Islamic revolution, he answers:
‘it’s Islamic Marxism under the name of jihad37. Indeed, he claims, inde‐
pendent of the level of self-awareness, every individual who is somehow
‘against the matrix’ has ‘his or her heart beating with a religious beat [and]
sooner or later [he or she] takes to revolutionary struggle38’. He announces
that ‘Muslims will be the organizers of the political process’ that, he pre‐
dicts, will inevitably unfold all over Europe, and ‘[t]he Westerners will be
fined for their hindering of the truth’39
Dzhemal’’s arguments are clearly revolutionary, although elaborated in
a sophisticated philosophical and theological scheme. However, he does
not attack the idea of a Russian nation or state in favor of an Islamic
regime – on the contrary, Dzhemal’ envisions a leading role for Russia as
initiator of the Islamic revolution, which will restore the greatness it had
enjoyed in imperial and, especially, Soviet times. His project is for Russia,
not against it.
A Russian interpretation of jihad
Scholarly works praise the long tradition of Islamic practices in the Cauca‐
sus, the doctrinal knowledge of Dagestani communities, and their contri‐
bution to Russian and Islamic civilizations40. Fiercely anti-Soviet during
the Communist persecution41, in the 1990 s Sufi tariqats of the North Cau‐
casus joined other Muslim Spiritual Boards in the region to defend tradi‐
6.
36 It is noteworthy that one of the fundamental accusations against Ali Shari‘ati was
his being a ‘Marxist’.
37 Solov’ev, Vladimir. Poedinok Vladimir Zhirinovskii i Geidar Dzhemal’ [Duel with
Vladimir Zhirinovskii and Geidar Dzhemal’]. 28 February, 2011. Rossiia 1.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecPkhr9l4AY. [15 March 2011].
38 Dzhemal’, Politicheskii Islam, 1 h.
39 Ibid., 1 h:10 m.
40 Bobrovnikov, Vladimir O. Musul’mane Severnogo Kavkaza: obychai, pravo,
nasilie. Ocherki po istorii i etnografii prava Nagornogo Dagestana [Muslims of
North Caucasus: habits, law, violence. Essays on history and ethnography of law
of Nagorny Dagestan]. Moscow, 2002.
41 Bennigsen called ‘parallel Islam’ the forms of Islam practiced under the Soviet
domination by Sufi tariqats that opposed the anti-religious, anti-Islamic and often
colonialist practices of the Communist regime.
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tional Islam. Throughout the Chechen conflicts42, Sufi leaders condemned
Islamic extremism brandished by jihadists and separatists as both non-Is‐
lamic and non-Russian43.
For this reason, terrorist and separatist organizations have looked for af‐
filiations in the international Islamic extremist scene44, most notably with
Al-Qaeda. Today, separatist groups, since 2007 reunited under the umbrel‐
la of the Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasian Emirate, IK), openly challenge the tra‐
ditional establishment of Sufi leaders (and other local Muslim leaders),
who in turn are becoming reliable allies of the government45.
The main purpose of the IK is to establish an independent Caliphate in
the Caucasus that, possibly, would expand into Southern Russia. The
Caliphate should have an Islamic government strictly following the
Sharia. To reach its objective, the Imarat does not hesitate to employ ter‐
rorist and even suicide techniques – although the details of the attacks
have been revised in time. While former charismatic leader Doka Umarov
(killed in 2014) allowed the targeting of the whole population, including
Muslims, his successor Aliaskhab Kebekov, better educated in Islam, has
banned attacks on civilians and targeted security forces alone. Further, Ke‐
bekov has revoked the admissibility of women suicide bombers (but not of
suicide attacks by men), which Umarov had tolerated46.
Overall, the rhetoric of the IK and the other, smaller separatist groups in
the North Caucasus is very similar to international jihadist narratives,
42 The so-called Chechen conflicts (or Chechen wars) are in fact a series of armed
conflicts that escalated during two periods, from 1994 to 1996, and again from
1999 to 2009, with alternating levels of confrontation.
43 Rossiiskii.
44 Vatchagaev, Mairbek . ‘The Role of Sufism in the Chechen Resistance.’ North
Caucasus Analysis [now: North Caucasus Weekly]. 6/16, 28 April 2005 [15 July,
2015]. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nc/archivesnca/nca2005/?tx_publicati
onsttnews_pi2[issue]=16.; Malashenko, Alexey/ Dmitrii Trenin. Russia’s restless
frontier: the Chechnya factor in post-Soviet Russia. Washington, 2004.
45 Kavkazkii Emirat (Imarat Kavkaz) [Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz)]. Kavkaz
Uzel/Caucasian Knot, 15 July, 2013. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/158730/
[15 July, 2015]; ‘The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (I): Ethnicity
and Conflict.’ Crisis Group Europe Report No. 220, 19 October, 2012. http://www
.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/north-caucasus/220-the-north-caucasus-the-chal
lenges-of-integration-i-ethnicity-and-conflict.aspx[10 August, 2015].
46 Fuller, Liz. ‘New North Caucasus Insurgency Leader Seeks To Avoid Suicide
Bombings.’ Radio Free Europe, 3 July, 2014. http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasu
s-report-suicide-bombings/25444420.html [7 July, 2015].
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which confirms the extension of their global contacts. In the case of North
Caucasus, a strong anti-Russian element, in the sense of anti-colonial re‐
sistance, is present. It is not infrequent for reference to be made to historic
figures of national resistance revered as heroes, the most important of
whom is Sheik Mansur, who rebelled against Catherine the Great in the
18th century47.
Moscow’s harsh repression of Islamic terrorism in the region has been
effectively supported by the Head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov, a Mus‐
lim who has embraced the concept of Russian traditional Islam. Partially
for this reason, many Caucasian jihadists have left to fight in Syria and
Iraq. Some of them have reached high positions in the ranks of the Islamic
State48. This fact, and the growing, solid prestige that the IS is gaining
among Islamic extremists, according to many observers has weakened
Imarat Kavkaz to the point that, in July 2015, it announced its alliance
with the IS49. The consequences of this decision have become immedi‐
ately apparent, with the diffusion of messages in the Russian language ac‐
cording to a strategy that, regarding their content and methods, follow that
of IS50.
However, because of its stronger image and real capabilities, the IS is
expected to take the lead over the Imarat51. As the Islamic State is focused
on conquering Syria and Iraq, and it does not seem to be interested in at‐
tacking Russia, the Imarat may be forced to reduce or eliminate the specif‐
ic anti-Russian, anti-colonialist character of its mission. Indeed, it seems
to have already de-facto abandoned it, as most of its fighters are engaged
abroad52.
47 Kavkazkii Emirat, 2013.
48 Caucasians in the ranks of IS (ISIL). http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/30056/, 28
November, 2014 [14 July, 2015].
49 Imarat Kavkaz (Kavkazkii Emirat) [Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate)]. Kavkaz
Uzel/Caucasian Knot, 11 August, 2015. h t tp ://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/
158730/ [11 August, 2015].
50 Paraszczuk, Joanna. IS Boosts Russian-Language Propaganda Efforts. Radio Free
Europe, 6 July, 2015. http://www.rferl.org/content/is-boosts-russian-language-prop
agangda-efforts/27112518.html [7 July, 2015].
51 Caucasians in the ranks of IS (ISIL), 2014.
52 The completion date of this chapter did not allow to take into consideration the
most recent strategy of Islamic fighters in the North Caucasus, which indeed re‐
flects the developments of the war in Syria.
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Conclusion
The official doctrine of the Russian Federation identifies Russia’s Mus‐
lims as one of the founding (korinnye) groups of the Russian state and an
important contributor to Russian civilization. Historically, though, this
condition has not always been acknowledged by the Slavic dominant ma‐
jority, which has affected the relations among the communities. After
1991, Russia’s Muslims have acquired a stronger awareness of their Islam‐
ic as well as national and civic heritage. Depending on their historical and
specific experiences, such awareness has translated into cooperation with
or opposition to the Russian state. Today, many Muslim communities and
their leaders have embraced the idea of a composite all-Russian (rossiiskii)
civilization, in which Islam has played a significant role, among religions
second only to that of Orthodox Christianity.
Many Muslims intend to participate in the construction of a new Rus‐
sian identity and polity – sometimes through radical processes. Other
groups, instead, reject the vision of a common civilization and fight
against what they perceive to be a colonial domination by Moscow.
In any case, because Russia’s Muslims have belonged, at least de jure,
to the Russian state (be it the tsarist Empire or the Soviet Union) for cen‐
turies, their actions are necessarily those of citizens toward their ‘father‐
land’ (even if it is rejected), and not those of newcomers. For this reason,
Muslims’ relations with the Russian state are much more complex and
closely intertwined than those of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim, secu‐
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Abstract: Unlike some religions, Islam is a universal religion and open to all, and
Allah assures us that it will eventually conquer all other faiths. In order to spread
Islam, Muslims have a duty to preach its teachings. This has led some Islamic ju‐
rists and commentators to think jihad verses in the Qur’an are the divine way of
spreading Islam. This paper will uncover some of the Qur’anic theoretical princi‐
ples that lie behind these jihad verses. By considering this framework, I will
demonstrate the inconsistency of offensive war (al-jihad al-ebtedayi) with princi‐
ples in the Qur’an, concluding that defensive jihad is the real meaning of the jihad
verses.
Universality of Islam
Religions are either universal or regional. In the Qur’an’s view, most are
regional, including some of the greatest divine religions such as Judaism
and Christianity. In contrast, Islam is a universal religion, introducing its
prophet as the last prophet1 who addresses all human beings:
Say, ‘O mankind! I am the Apostle of Allah to you all’.2
Such a global religion needs to be promoted, not only by small groups but
by all its many followers, throughout history. Islam has taught its follow‐
ers to strive for its advancement, and has promised them heavenly re‐
wards.
1.




Divine promise for Islam prevailing
The Qur’an mentions not only that the light of Allah will never be put out,
but also that Allah will perfect His light3. Moreover, Allah says that Islam
will prevail over other religions whatever non-believers may choose to
do.4 Thus, it is right to promote Islam all over the world.
Various approaches have led to different views about what a Muslim’s
duty is in promoting Islam. That is, what are the right ways to promote Is‐
lam and what should be avoided?
A common answer to this question among some Islamic jurists and
commentators is that Muslims have a duty to the jihad. They should strive
to promote Islam over other religions. Naturally there might be some re‐
sistance from followers of other religions, which means Muslims might
have to wage war against the faithless. Consequently, Muslims are asked
to promote Islam even if it involves starting a war. The great commentator,
Tabataba’i explains 9:32-335 as follows:
These two verses encourages Muslims to fight against ahl-al-kitab (people of
the book), and its reference to the necessity of fighting is not hidden, since
these two verses prove Allah’s desire for the propagation of Islam around the
world, that needs obvious endeavour, and because people of the book had pre‐
vented Islam from promotion and tried to put this light out with their mouths,
there was no remedy except fighting against them. The opponents against Al‐
lah’s desire should either be removed or live under Muslims’ rule and pay
jizya.6
This same view is held by several jurists and has provided justification
and may even support the idea of there being a duty to wage offensive war
(al-jihad al-ebtedaee) in order to promote Islam. This sort of ruling pro‐
vides a good excuse and a sacred goal for those Muslims desiring to con‐
quer new territories and benefit from the spoils of war. Naturally, such
wars - even if justified by the notion of a divine goal - cannot be accom‐




5 ‘They desire to put out the light of Allah with their mouths, but Allah is intent on
perfecting His light though the faithless should be averse.’ (32 ).
‘It is He who has sent His Apostle with the guidance and the religion of truth, that
He may make it prevail over all religions, though the polytheists should be averse.’
(33).
6 Tabataba’i, Muhammad Hossein. Al Mizan. vol. 9. Qom, 1996, p. 247.
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to the idea of peaceful coexistence. The main question here is whether or
not Islam permits its followers to fight for its promotion. This paper seeks
for the Qur’anic answer to this question.
The Qur’anic evidences for offensive jihad
Several verses in the Qur’an talk about jihad. The advocates of offensive
jihad argue that the Qur’an requires Muslims to eliminate disbelief and
polytheism, and to promote Islam. In other words, the main evidence for
offensive war being permissible, and even for it becoming a duty, is found
in the Qur’an. All commentators and jurists agree that a worldly goal can‐
not justify offensive jihad. The entire jihad verses only permit Muslims to
wage offensive war for sacred goals, as mentioned above.7
In fact, most jurists and commentators find that the main thrust of jihad
verses8- which instruct Muslims to fight against the faithless – instruct in
relation to when one is justified to start fighting against non-Muslims, i.e.
wage offensive war.9 These verses also refer to defensive war.
The late Ayatollah Khoei discusses when jihad is a duty. In his view -
similar to many other jurists - jihad should be conducted against both the
faithless and also against those Muslims who are aggressive towards other
Muslim groups10. The faithless consist of two parties: people of the book
(ahl-al-kitab) and polytheists. Islamic scholars have explained jihad most‐
ly in relation to these two parties. Muslims should have a distinct approach
towards each of them:
a) The polytheists (the faithless without book)
b) Muslims should approach these people and welcome them to Islam.
Their conversion to Islam would mean that Muslims would no longer
3.
7 See Jassas, Ahmad ibn ‘Ali. Ahkam al Qur’an. vol. 2. Beirut, 1405 AH, p.169;
Tabataba’i, Al Mizan. vol. 2. P. 67.
8 Like 9:29, 9:123, 4:74, 8:65, 9:36, 9:73, 60:9
9 Tusi, Muhammad ibn Hasan. Al Mabsoot. vol. 2. Tehran, 1387 AH. 2; Helli,
Hasan ibn Yousef. Montaha al Matlab. vol. 14. Mashad, 1412 AH. p. 61; Khoei,
Sayed Aboul Ghasem. Menhaj al Salehin. Qom, 1410 AH. vol. 1, p. 360; Najafi,
Muhammad Hasan. Jawahir al Kalam. vol. 21. Beirut. 1404 AH, p. 4; Iraqi, Zia’al
Din. Sharh Tabsera al-Mota’allemin. vol. 4. Qom, 1414 AH. p. 317; Sabzevari,
Sayed Abd al A’Ala. Mohazab al Ahkam. vol. 15. Qom, 1413 AH. p. 81.
10 Khoei. Menhaj. vol. 1. p. 360.
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need to be concerned. If this cannot be achieved, Muslims should fight
against them and kill them11. This obligation to fight arises, in Khoei’s
opinion, from these verses:
• O Prophet! Urge on the faithful to fight12
• Let those fight in the way of Allah who sell the life of this world
for the Hereafter13
• Fight them until faithlessness is no more, and religion becomes ex‐
clusively for Allah14
• Then, when the sacred months have passed, kill the polytheists
wherever you find them15
• Fight all the polytheists, just as they fight you all16
c) People of the book
As before, Muslims should approach them and ask them to choose be‐
tween converting to Islam, paying jizya and being put to death17. It is
argued that this ruling comes from the following verse in the Qur’an:
Fight those who do not have faith in Allah nor [believe] in the Last Day,
nor forbid what Allah and His Apostle have forbidden, nor practice the
true religion, from among those who were given the Book, until they pay
the tribute out of hand, degraded.18
Revising jihad verses in the Qur’an
Before discussing the position of the Qur’an in relation to jihad and fight‐








17 Khoei, Menhaj. p. 361; Helli, Montaha al Matlab. vol. 14, p. 63; Tusi, Muhammad






Although the legal rulings of a religion refer to the behaviour of its follow‐
ers, the roots of these rulings - especially social ones – can be found in the
theoretical principles and beliefs of a religion. In other words, each ruling
originates from or relates to a theoretical view, which forms its ideological
basis. Consequently, it is very important when studying Islamic rulings to
observe its theological roots, so as to understand fully Islamic practical
and jurisprudential rulings. Any lack of knowledge about such related the‐
ological grounds may result in a misunderstanding of the Qur’an’s practi‐
cal commands. Traditionally, religious scholars divide a religion into three
parts: beliefs, morality and jurisprudence. A common method in religious
studies is to look at each part separately, without considering their interre‐
lation. Each study has its own difficulties and its own methods. Conse‐
quently, theology does not usually interfere with jurisprudence or morality.
Similarly, jurisprudence is kept separate from theological problems.
This traditional method gives rise to some problems. While a religion is
a united and related set of teachings, studying its problems in isolation
may lead to unsatisfactory understandings and outcomes. For example, the
followers of ‘the unity of being’ (Wahdat al-Wujud) are called untouch‐
ables by some jurists, while others disagree. The disagreement lies in the
theological and philosophical knowledge of these jurists about the unity of
God and the unity of being, but this difference is played out in jurispru‐
dential rulings.
This methodological revision may not apply to some personal rulings,
due to our ignorance of related theoretical principles, but it may apply to
social issues. In many social rulings, it is possible to find related theoreti‐
cal principles which may form a framework. This framework reveals the
boundaries of the jurisprudential ruling. That is, the ruling must fall within
this framework. So any ruling that lies outside its theoretical framework
needs to be revised, in order to correspond to its underlying principles:
It is a must for a jury to obtain this general view prior to studying the details.
Our jurisprudence is not accustomed to this method. So a jury studies the mi‐
nor issues before working on finding a general view- in which all the details
would be organized. That’s why the rulings are diffused with no connection
and full of exceptions.19
4.1
19 Khashen, Hossein Ahmad. Islam wa Khoshounat. Danesh, Moosa, (Trans. from
Persian). Mashad, 2012, p. 97.
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There should be more depth in working on jurisprudential problems. It is the
basic and infrastructural theories that constitute the superstructure rulings …
These bases should not be considered as irrelevant to jurisprudence. These are
not the diversity of literature, but they should be known as necessary and they
should be found as much as the human potency allows.20
Related theoretical principles of jihad
Accordingly, some Qur’anic theoretical principles should be considered
prior to studying jihad and verses that relate to fighting.
Compulsion is not justified in a religion
An important basic principle of the Qur’an is that belief and faith are not
compulsory. Their nature is incompatible with coercion and everyone
should select his/her beliefs and faith by his/her own will. Religion cannot
and should not be an act of coercion:
There is no compulsion in religion: rectitude has become distinct from error21
This verse is not a legislative rule but a rule of being. Compulsion is an
outer action while belief is an inner action that takes place only through
personal desire and will. So it can’t be forced, and the Qur’an never al‐
lows such compulsion.
God commands His Prophet not to destroy himself with grief over peo‐
ple’s lack of belief in the Qur’an22, since no one can force them to believe
in God and God does not want people to become believers against their
will:
And had your Lord wished, all those who are on earth would have believed.
Would you then force people until they become faithful?23
Some Muslims said to the Prophet that if you compel those you rule over
to convert to Islam, then we Muslims will become more powerful in the
face of our enemies. The Prophet answered: ‘I don't want to come face to
4.2
4.2.1







face with God having carried out a heresy that God has forbidden.’ Then
God revealed the previous verse.24
In the view of the Qur’an, God created human beings with free will and
they should choose freely between virtue and sin:
And say, [This is] the truth from your Lord: let anyone who wishes believe it,
and let anyone who wishes disbelieve it25
The Prophet’s duty is only to communicate
As a consequence of choice and free will, the Qur’an suggests the duty of
the Prophet is simply to convey the message of God, and not compel peo‐
ple to obey. This view is emphasized in more than fifteen verses of the
Qur’an, as in the following:
But if they disregard, We have not sent you as a keeper over them. Your duty
is only to communicate.26
In some other verses, the Qur’an emphasizes more explicitly that the
Prophet's duty is to avoid being tyrannical:
You are not a taskmaster over them.27
We know best what they say, and you are not to be a tyrant over them. So
admonish by the Qur’an him who fears My threat.28
Such verses limited what the Prophet was allowed to do to change peo‐
ple’s faith. His duty was to communicate with people and invite them to
embrace Islam. He was prohibited from carrying out any kind of practical
threat or coercion, like fighting or killing. The previous two verses, in ad‐
dition to the next verse, describe this principle:
Indeed We have sent down the Book to you for [the deliverance of] mankind
with the truth. So whoever is guided is guided for his own sake, and whoever
goes astray, goes astray to his own detriment, and it is not your duty to watch
over them.29
4.2.2
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The latter concept is also emphasized in four other verses: 6:66, 6:107,
10:108, 39:41and 42:6.
God wants people to be drawn willingly towards virtue and perfection,
either individually or as a community, and therefore introduces this volun‐
tary aspect as a goal for His apostles, showing that a movement towards
virtue and justice is valuable only if it is conducted voluntarily. So, justice
should be maintained by the people and not by the Prophet:
Certainly We sent Our apostles with manifest proofs, and We sent down with
them the Book and the Balance, so that mankind may maintain justice.30
If compulsory faith had any kind of value, God could have made all peo‐
ple faithful by sending a form of heavenly proof, but this is not the kind of
faith that God chose for us. Belief and faith cannot be enforced, even by
God:
Had We wanted, We would have sent them a miracle from sky to make their
heads hang down in submission.31
Emphasis on applying reason and proscribing of ignorant following
Another principle in the Qur’an is its great emphasis on intellect and rea‐
son. Thinking is greatly encouraged and people are asked to open their
eyes and their minds to the realities of the universe:
Have they not reflected in their own souls? Allah did not create the heavens
and the earth and whatever is between them except with reason and for a
specified term. Indeed many of the people disbelieve in the encounter with
their Lord.32
On the contrary, the Qur’an blames those who act out of prejudice instead
of reason:
When they are told,‘Follow what Allah has sent down,’ they say,‘We will
rather follow what we have found our fathers following.’ What, even if their








One criterion that Allah uses to evaluate human beings is the depth of their
intellectual and mental reasoning. That’s why this characteristic is referred
to as a merit in the servants of Allah and as an outstanding defect in the
worst people:
Those who, when reminded of the signs of their Lord, do not turn a deaf ear
and a blind eye to them.34
Indeed the worst of beasts in Allah's sight are the deaf and the dumb who do
not apply reason.35
This emphasis proves that in the view of the Qur’an, religious practices
are not the main criteria for evaluating people, but that depth of under‐
standing and reason are the main criteria. This means that the propagation
and promotion of Islam is not wholly defined by enforcing Islamic rulings
and conducting Islamic practices. It stresses the importance of propagating
Islamic beliefs and of developing reason and intellect in people. This
means prevailing over hearts and minds rather than territories. Thus the
following verse will be achieved when Islamic beliefs are propagated be‐
fore Islamic practices:
It is He who has sent His Apostle with the guidance and the religion of truth
that He may make it prevail over all religions though the polytheists should
be averse.36
Human dignity
An important principle in the Qur’an, agreed by almost all Islamic jurists,
is a reverence for human life. Rescuing one life is rescuing all lives, and
murdering one person unjustly is murdering all people:
That is why We decreed for the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul,
without [its being guilty of] manslaughter or corruption on the earth, is as
though he had killed all mankind, and whoever saves a life is as though he
had saved all mankind. Our apostles certainly brought them manifest signs,






A Qur’anic Revision of Offensive War
191
Because of this reverence, Islamic jurists usually take great care in their
rulings about human life.
While there is no doubt about this principle among Islamic jurists, its
domain is a controversial issue. For example, should such a prohibition re‐
fer to all people, or just to the faithful? In other words, what is the basis
for a belief in human dignity in the world: faith or humanity?
A group of jurists, including Khoei, believe that human dignity depends
on faith, meaning that unlike the faithful, the faithless lack dignity. Ac‐
cording to this view, it is faith that confirms humanity, and those who lack
faith lack humanity. Consequently, respecting the faithless is not required,
either with regard to their lives or their property. This view arises from
commands in the Qur’an about killing the faithless:
And kill them wherever you confront them, and expel them from where they
expelled you … 38
… then seize them and kill them wherever you confront them39
The late Ayatollah Khoei believes that:
Starting a war against the faithless is allowed only after inviting them to Is‐
lam. If the Muslims invited them and they refused to accept, fighting against
them is obligatory. But if the Muslims started their war before invitation and
killed the faithless, although they have committed a sin, no blood money
should be paid because the faithless lack reverence either in their lives or in
their properties.40
He also mentions this problem as a reason for ruling that washing the
faithless dead is unnecessary and even forbidden:
The dead ablution is just for his cleanliness and for his respect and honour,
and the faithless have no respect and may not be cleaned as they are untouch‐
able.41
Accordingly, he rules that murdering a faithless person is not allowed be‐
cause it leads to anarchy and not because his life is worthy of respect:




40 Khoei, Menhaj. vol. 1, p. 369.
41 Khoei, Sayed AboulGhasem. Mosoua’ al Imam al Khoei. vol. 8. Qom, 1418 AH,
p. 307.
42 Khoei, Sayed AboulGhasem. Serat al Nejat. vol. 2. Qom, 1416 AH, p. 411.
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This point of view should be reconsidered. There are two distinct kinds of
human dignity mentioned in the Qur’an, one applying to worldly life and
the other applying to other-worldly life. The first type of dignity belongs
to all human beings, while the second type belongs to the inhabitants of
heaven. The Qur’an explains the first kind as follows:
Certainly We have honoured the Children of Adam, and carried them over
land and sea, and provided them with all the good things, and given them an
advantage over many of those We have created with a complete preference.43
Considering the next phrases of the verse, which talks about the worldly
blessings of Allah, they show that the type of honour mentioned in the
first phrase is a person’s worldly dignity. This honour includes all people,
as the verse talks about honouring the Children of Adam, not the faithful
alone. Such a pervasive dignity results in the authenticity of respect for
both the faithful and the faithless, unless they deserve punishment as a re‐
sult of their false practice. The main advice of ‘Ali ibn Abi Taleb to Malik
demonstrates this view:
Habituate your heart to mercy for the subjects and to affection and kindness
for them. Do not stand over them like greedy beasts who feel it is enough to
devour them, since they are of two kinds, either your brother in religion or
one like you in creation.44
So this kind of dignity depends on humanity, not on faith and should be
considered as a basis for all worldly rulings.
The second kind of dignity is described in the following verse:
Indeed the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most God wary among
you.45
This kind of honour belongs to heaven. Those faithless who ‘have hearts
with which they do not understand, who have eyes with which they do not
see, who have ears with which they do not hear’46 lack this kind of digni‐
ty, as they have lost their humanity and intellect, but it doesn’t mean that
they have no honour in their worldly lives. This second kind of dignity
will be revealed in the next world, and is not a criterion for worldly rul‐
ings.
43 17:70
44 Ali ibn Abi Talib. Nahj al Balagha. Qom, 1414 AH, letter 53.
45 49:13
46 7:179
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Revising Khoei’s views on human dignity shows that the necessary dis‐
tinction between these two categories has not been made, and has led to
disrespect for the dignity of the faithless, when they should be allowed
their own rights to life and ownership. So in the Qur’anic view, great care
should be taken regarding both faithful and faithless lives, unless an indi‐
vidual is condemned to death due to certain specific reasons.
In the next pages I will show that the commands of the Qur’an about
killing the faithless - which are cited to deny human dignity to the faithless
- are not absolute commands. They belong only to the state of war, when
Muslims have to defend themselves against aggression by the faithless.
Authenticity of peace
The fifth related principle in the Qur’an is that peace is superior to con‐
flict, and that the main principle in people's lives should be peaceful coex‐
istence. This is a principle that applies to Muslims’ relations to each other
and to their relations with non-Muslims. A thorough survey of the Qur’an
indicates that peace is encouraged in at least five steps:
1. Peace is superior.
And reconcilement is better.47
2. The Qur’an asks Muslims to concentrate on their common traits with
the followers of other divine religions and invites them all to live in
peace:
Say, ‘O People of the Book! Come to a word common between us and
you: that we will worship no one but Allah, and that we will not ascribe
any partner to Him, and that we will not take each other as lords besides
Allah’.48
3. The Qur’an invites all believers in God to embrace peace:
You, who believe, enter absolutely into peace!49
4. Whenever peaceful coexistence is possible, war is not justified at all
and no one is allowed to fight. This interest in and emphasis on peace







prohibits any kind of war against people who seek peace and who do
not want to fight Muslims:
So if they keep out of your way and do not fight you, and offer you
peace, then Allah does not allow you any course [of action] against
them.50
5. God commands His Prophet to accept any request for peace not only
before a war begins, but also during and after a war with an enemy.
This is a compelling and beautiful command. Peace is so important that
Muslims should seize any opportunity to achieve it.
And if they incline toward peace, then you [too] incline toward it, and put
your trust in Allah.51
Literal study of jihad and qital (fighting)
Jihad and qital are two key words used by Islamic jurists investigating the
subject of fighting non-Muslims. Idiomatically both these terms are em‐
ployed for fighting and primarily used among some Islamic jurists for of‐
fensive war, while its usage for defensive war is less common:
There is no doubt that its main meaning is starting a war on Islam against the
faithless, about which this verse was revealed: ‘Warfare has been prescribed
for you, though it is repulsive to you’52; and fighting against the faithless who
attack Muslims is added to jihad although it is defense in fact.5354
The late Ayatollah Khoei mentions that:
Jihad … means hardness and toil and … [also] power and here it means fight‐
ing for the propagation of Islam and the governance of the faith.55
A literal study of these two words reveals that they do not mean a specific





53 Najafi. Jawahir al Kalam. vol. 21, p. 4.
54 See also Helli, Ibn Edris. Al Saraer. Qom, 1410 AH. vol. 2, p. 4; Ravandi, Qotb al
din, Fiqh al Qur’an. vol. 1. Qom, 1405 AH, p. 328.
55 Khoei. Menhaj al Salehin. vol. 1. p. 360.
56 The literal meaning of jihad is of course ‘effort’ which is much wider than just
fighting.
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war. The famous lexicographer, Raqeb, suggests jihad means ‘using the
whole power to ward off the enemy’.57
Ibn Athir describes jihad as ‘fighting against the faithless, that is, striv‐
ing and using entire attempt’.58
So, those verses in the Qur’an, known as jihad verses, may point to ei‐
ther defensive or offensive war. At the same time, the commands regard‐
ing fighting in the Qur’an are not absolute. That is, the commands may
point to a special kind of fighting, and not to all kinds. Conditional com‐
mands to fight (qital) in some verses prove that fighting is a limited term
and doesn’t apply to all circumstances. This issue will be investigated
shortly. However, this difficulty demonstrates that it is not easy to interpret
jihad verses as divine commands to start fighting.
The author of Riyad-al-Masa’il, a Shi‘ite jurisprudential book, believes
that:
The command to fight against the faithless is different from the command to
start fighting against them.59
Consequently, there needs to be some external evidence and reason, (in
addition to literal interpretations), in order to find out the exact meaning of
qital and jihad in the Qur’an.
It should be noted here that, contrary to the common usage of jihad
among some Islamic jurists and groups, the word jihad is not used for
physical fighting (including during military operations) in the Qur’an. It is
used for striving for God’s sake. That’s why Allah asks His prophet for
jihad against hypocrites,60 while early Islamic history reveals that the
prophet never conducted a military operation against them. So the main
term in the Qur’an that refers to fighting is qital.
The doubt that has been cast upon the allocation of ‘jihad’ to fighting against
the non-Muslims for their compulsion to Islam is originated from the defini‐
tions of jihad provided by some Islamic jurists, although these definitions
don’t limit the general meaning of jihad.61
57 Isfahani, Raqeb. Mofradat alfaz al Qur’an. Beirut, 1412 AH, p. 208.
58 Jozri, Ibn Athir. Al Nahaya. vol. 1. Qom. p. 319.
59 Tabataba’i Haeri, Sayed Ali. Riyad al Masa’il. vol. 8. Qom, 1418 AH, p. 59.
60 66:9: ‘O Prophet, strive against disbelievers and hypocrites; act stern with them!
Their refuge will be Hell and it is such a wretched goal’.




However, we keep on using jihad for fighting, because of it having been
used by Muslims and jurists.
Applying theoretical principles to the interpretation of jihad and qital
The principles I have listed are useful in the comprehension of jihad vers‐
es. They express that Allah has based human life on authority and liberty.
That is, both the ways of virtue and sinfulness must be freely chosen and
people should not be forced to accept religion. In this way, Allah explains
His prophet’s duty is just to communicate and introduces him as one who
warns people, and not as a taskmaster or a tyrant over people, and not as
one who is responsible for the conversion of all people to Islam. Conse‐
quently, jihad and qital can’t be defined as fighting in order to convert
people to Islam. Such a goal involves compulsion, which the Qur’an re‐
jects. Rulings that ask Muslims to fight against polytheists, giving them a
choice between conversion to Islam and murder, involve obvious compul‐
sion and eliminate choice. In the same way, giving the right to choose to
people of the book between Islam and jizya – or otherwise being put to
death - is again a case of using force. Is it possible to say that the Qur’an
asks the prophet not to ‘force people until they become faithful’ (10: 99)
but then asks Muslims to do this?! While the Qur’an teaches the truth to
‘let anyone who wishes believe it, and let anyone who wishes disbelieve
it’, how could Muslims ask the faithless to choose between Islam, jizya
and murder?
In addition, how can a Muslim define his duty as developing Islam be‐
yond what was asked of the Prophet? The duty defined in the writings of
some jurists involves one or more steps beyond communicating the faith,
i.e. collecting jizya or fighting, when the Prophet’s duty is only to commu‐
nicate.
These considerations demonstrate that defining jihad mainly as ‘an of‐
fensive war for the promotion of Islam’ exceeds certain principles in the
Qur’an. The same problem applies to rulings about how Muslims should
act against non-Muslims. These contradictions may be answered by revis‐
ing the meaning of jihad and qital. In fact, jihad verses should be inter‐
preted in relation to underlying theoretical principles. These principles
give a general picture of the way Islam should be promoted, by way of
wisdom and liberty, and that does not go beyond communication, and nev‐
er involves compulsion. This method is mentioned in the Qur’an:
4.4
A Qur’anic Revision of Offensive War
197
Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good advice and dispute with
them in a manner that is best.62
Within such a framework, jihad and qital verses can be understood much
more carefully. These principles confine jihad and qital to any kind of
fighting that doesn’t involve compulsion and force to achieve conversion,
in a solely defensive war.
The relevant verses merely encourage Muslims to defend themselves
against aggression from the faithless. If non-Muslims start a war against
Muslims, the faithful should certainly defend themselves. If their enemies
fight them, then Muslims should fight back. In such conditions, letting the
faithless choose between Islam or death (or jizya) is justified, since if they
accept Islam63, their hostility naturally disappears. Otherwise, they are still
aggressive enemies against whom Muslims should resist.
In the same way, the verses that show Allah’s will that Islam should
prevail (like 9:33) don’t justify offensive war, because domination should
be obtained through promoting Islamic beliefs, prior to Islamic practices.
In addition, genuine beliefs are based on thought and perception and not
blind acceptance. This means that the superiority of Islam lies in its intel‐
lectual dominance, which is achieved through reason, deduction and
preaching.
Indeed, the profound and stable dominance of Islam depends on it being
accepted at a profound level. This again depends on the intellectual
strength and rational depth of Islamic beliefs. Thus, the dominance of Is‐
lam originates mainly from its rational beliefs. Promoting these beliefs
doesn’t involve outward force and offensive war, but internal and intellec‐
tual persuasion through wisdom, advice and debate.
Some scholars, like Zohaili, have argued that starting a war is only jus‐
tified when an obstacle is obstructing the path of Islam and has to be elim‐
inated. This gives rise to some serious questions. Although Muslims are
encouraged to invite others to join Islam, what would compensate for the
lives lost during this kind of war? What reasons are there to show that of‐
fering an opportunity to embrace Islam is more important than the lives of
the faithless?
62 16:125
63 There is an important discussion on the meaning of Islam, whether it means peace




The principle of human honour and dignity demonstrates Islam’s re‐
spect for all life, unless a clear-cut reason justifies killing. The important
point here is to be sure that such clear-cut reasons exist when a faithless
person is killed during efforts to promote Islam. The main reasons given
are Qur’anic commands to kill the faithless, but they are far from clear-
cut. They may refer to defensive war instead of offensive war, and this is
enough to nullify such justifications for murdering the faithless. Thus
there are no clearly defined reasons to justify killing the faithless on the
grounds of removing obstacles of invitation to Islam. In fact, concerns for
human dignity confine such invitations to Islam to circumstances when a
person’s life is not put at risk.
Verbal study of the jihad and qital verses
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, it is helpful to study the jihad
verses. This essay on the absolute and conditional commands of jihad
leads to two conclusions:
First, the purpose of the commands regarding fighting is not concerned
with the promotion of Islam or the forceful conversion of non-Muslims.
Second, all these commands address Muslims concerning the aggres‐
sion of others towards them; and prohibit Muslims from starting a war.
The Qur’an merely encourages Muslims to practice self-defense. For
example, in 2:190-193, Muslims are commanded to fight only against
those who take up arms against them:
Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you.64
In other words, the principal condition of this command is the opponent's
aggression. This is a command concerning defensive rather than offensive
war. The second verse clearly confirms this principle:
…And expel them from where they expelled you.65
Another important aspect of this command concerns the end point of a
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eradicated or has converted to Islam, but until the problem caused by their
aggression has been removed.
Fight them until persecution is no more.66
In 4:91 Muslims are commanded to kill the pagans wherever they find
them:
… and kill them wherever you confront them.
This command refers to a special group of pagans: those who will not
leave Muslims in peace, and never stop fighting, relentlessly seeking their
death. This is the only group that God allows Muslims to fight. God ex‐
plicitly states that Muslims are not allowed to fight against those pagans
who offer peace:
... So if they keep out of your way and do not fight you, and offer you peace,
then Allah does not allow you any course [of action] against them.67
This kind of differentiation, between those who keep on fighting against
Muslims, and those who offer peace, shows that this severe command only
refers to any group that is determined to kill Muslims. Muslims should
fight the faithless not for their faithlessness, but for their hostility and ag‐
gression.
Perhaps the most serious commands regarding fighting polytheists in
the Qur’an can be found at the beginning of chapter 9 (Tawbah). In these
verses, God declares that He and His Prophet repudiate the polytheists and
so their peace contract is no longer valid; the Muslims are asked to kill the
polytheists wherever they find them:
Then, when the sacred months have passed, kill the polytheists wherever you
find them, capture them and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every
ambush.68
A concise analysis and comparison of these verses leads to the following
two conclusions:
Firstly, the origin of the command to fight lies with the breach of a






…barring the polytheists with whom you have made a treaty, and who did not
violate any [of its terms] with you, nor backed anyone against you. So fulfil
the treaty with them until [the end of] its term... 69
If Muslims are commanded to fight polytheists on the grounds of their
polytheism, such an exception would not have been made. Consequently,
the reason for fighting polytheists is something else, mentioned in the last
verse: it is on account of the violation of a treaty. Thus this command is a
command to defend oneself against aggression. Moreover, in later verses
Muslims are explicitly told to fight side by side with leaders of the un‐
faithful in the case of a treaty breach, similar to the situation in the previ‐
ously discussed verse:
But if they break their pledges after having made a treaty and revile your reli‐
gion, then fight the leaders of unfaith indeed they have no [commitment to]
pledges maybe they will relinquish.70
Only then does God blame Muslims for not fighting a group which broke
its treaties, was resolved to expel the Prophet, and was first to open hostili‐
ties against Muslims.71 In conclusion, the context of these verses includes
peace breaking (9:4, 9:10, 9:12 and 9:13) and expelling the Prophet (9:13).
Such behaviour is obscene and need to be opposed, because they were ini‐
tiated by polytheists (9:13).
Secondly, the war is not intended to convert polytheists to Islam. This
means that Muslims are not commanded to continue with a war until the
polytheists convert to Islam. If there were such an aim, God would not
command His Prophet in this way:
If any of the polytheists seeks asylum from you, grant him asylum until he
hears the Word of Allah. Then convey him to his place of safety. That is be‐
cause they are a people who do not know.72
A principle in the comprehensive reading of a book – including the
Qur’an- is that when interpreting two commands with the same rulings,
one absolute and one conditional, the absolute command should be inter‐
preted in the light of the conditional one. This principle applies to jihad
verses in which absolute and conditional commands of jihad exist, and the
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Clearly, the conditional commands limit warfare merely to defense. Thus
the absolute ones are relevant only in defensive wars.73
There are other verses in the Qur’an that encourage Muslims to fight
against infidels. Regarding the above mentioned principle, they all inhabit
the same context and only ever call for defense. None of these verses per‐
mit an offensive war.
I would like to conclude with the following remarks:
1. In the view of the Qur’an, compulsion is not in accord with belief and
faith.
2. In the teachings of the Qur’an, the relationship between people, includ‐
ing believers and non-believers, is based on kindness and peace.
3. None of the reasons expressed to justify offensive war can be derived
from Qur’anic principles.
4. There is some encouragement to fight infidels in the Qur’an. On closer
investigation, such verses have a common context: they all refer to cas‐
es where aggression is first exercised by others against Muslims. God
only ever encourages Muslims to defend themselves. God neither en‐
courages Muslims to start a war nor allows them to do so.
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The Rhetoric of Power in Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah’s al-
Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa
Bianka Speidl
MTA-SZTE, Migration Research Institute, Hungary
Abstract: My paper aims to investigate how rhetoric supports a theory of empow‐
erment, conveys the call to action and justifies violence. To date only a few arti‐
cles have analysed rhetorical devices frequently used in modern Arabic religious
and political discourses. Against this background, I will identify the rhetorical pat‐
terns and devices applied by Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah in his al-Islam wa-
mantiq al-quwwa (Islam and the Logic of Power). Fadlallah in the 1970 s attempt‐
ed to construct a coherent system of force and a project of empowerment for the
Lebanese Shi‘ah. In my presentation I plan to examine the rhetorical strategies by
which he persuaded his mainly quietist audience and analyse how the various
rhetorical tools transmit his philosophy of power. The use of rhetoric in Fadlal‐
lah’s al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa, as well as in his other writings and speeches,
are manifold and predominant. They include arguments from scripture, necessity,
virtue and instrumentality. Fadlallah has recourse to rhetorical questions, antino‐
my, metaphors as well as repetition to make his discourse convincing and effect‐
ive. Moreover, he uses master narratives to frame his project of power in Shi‘ah
Salvation history. He supports his argument by Qur’anic references as an ultimate
authority and quotes it widely to legitimise power and the use of force.
In my analysis I am going to prove that Fadlallah’s discourse constructs a reli‐
gious ideology in which force is understood as virtuous, instrumental and in‐
evitable. Each element of his rhetoric is aimed mainly at reassuring the quietists
that the quest for power is justified, and at mobilizing the Shi‘ah to take action,
even if it implies violence.
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah’s al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa was written in
1976 at the outset of the Lebanese civil war while the Phalangist forces bombard‐
ed Fadlallah’s constituency. The book is best described as a manual for the ideo‐
logues and leaders of Islamic movements of, and beyond the awakening Shiʻi
community. In the following I highlight some of the rhetorical strategies employed
by Fadlallah in order to convince the quietist Shiʻah that the quest for power is
justified, and at mobilising them to take action even if it implies violence.
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The present article intends to detect how a Muslim scholar uses rhetori‐
cal devices to make an argument. In the following I describe the structure
of Fadlallah’s reasoning then I outline the internal logic of his arguments
and his understanding of logic. Third, I identify the rhetorical patterns ap‐
plied by him - such as arguments from scripture, necessity, virtue and in‐
strumentality, rhetorical questions, antinomy, metaphors and repetition and
master narratives –, and I study the way the various rhetorical tools trans‐
mit Fadlallah’s philosophy of power. My aim is to prove that Fadlallah’s
rhetoric constructs a religious ideology in which force is understood as
virtuous, instrumental and necessary.
As J. Charteris-Black rightly observed, ‘[p]ersuasion is a multi-layered
discourse function that is the outcome of a complex interaction between
intention, linguistic choice and context.’1 Fadlallah’s aim was to prove that
under certain conditions a violation of a moral rule is not immoral but
morally justified and even required by the religious law. Accordingly, Fad‐
lallah’s al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa endorses a specific rhetoric of vio‐
lence.
The Structure of the Argument
The various chapters of the book deal with the aspects of power such as
the Islamic doctrine, the problematic of standing up to tyranny, faith, spiri‐
tuality, social strength, the question of numerical majority, the means of
change, the link between daʻwah and power, and the ethics of force. Fad‐
lallah’s method of presenting a topic follows a stable pattern. First, he
presents his hypothesis regarding the issue in question. Second, he pro‐
vides quotes from the Qur’an and the hadith. Third, he summarises the
content of the quotes. Fourth, he relates their content to his hypothesis.
Fifth, he draws the conclusion in which he paraphrases the hypothesis.
Fadlallah bases his reasoning on a combination of human experience
and the contextual interpretation of revelation and tradition. He takes hu‐
man experience as a starting point for any analysis and claims that this ap‐
proach guarantees the realism of his reasoning.2 Then he looks for a simi‐
1 Jonathan Charteris-Black. Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of
Metaphor. Basingstoke, 2005, p. 30.
2 Fadlallah. al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa. Beirut, 3rd ed. 1985, p. 286.
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lar situation in the sacred texts of Islam and highlights the parallels be‐
tween the two contexts. His focus at this stage is on the divine intention as
unfolded in the particular situation. Finally, he assesses the present experi‐
ence in light of the divine message. He considers his argument as realistic
but without aspiring to mundane rationalism.
Through this process he aims to uncover the transcendental goal inher‐
ent in any given situation. As a result he designs a new reality of potentials
constructed through a novel way of interpretation and argumentation,
however, inseparable from the Islamic perception of life and politics, and
embedded in the Shiʻi experience.
The Internal Logic of the Argument
Through a set of arguments, he justifies an internal logic of power in the
Daʻwah Islamist political perspective. Fadlallah wants to convince the qui‐
etist Shi‘ah that the Daʻwah tradition, which is committed to justice and
peace, has in fact always promoted power – as well as the means to ac‐
quire it. He repeatedly states that peace is the priority for Islam,3 while the
resort to violence is an exception. However, when a peaceful attitude ap‐
pears as a sign of weakness and compromise, Islam ‘prefers confronta‐
tion’.4 The variable that links nature (power pervades human existence)
and norm (Islam shall bring in peace) is God. It is God who created nature
as power and chose Islam to bring it to peace.
In Fadlallah’s thought, a resort to war is legitimized by its purpose,
which is to halt unlawful practices. In this system, any act is nothing but a
mere means to achieve divinely set goals, and its value is determined by
its intention. This makes Fadlallah’s divine command ethics purposeful,
and places his Machiavellian concept in a frame controlled by religious
law. Similarly, the notion of transgression is evaluated in light of the Is‐
lamic principles and the actual situation on the ground. In this framework
Fadlallah states that both violence and peace can be exercised and legit‐
imized in view of the challenge the Muslim community faces.5
3 Ibid. p. 210, 265, 283, 299.
4 Ibid. p. 204.
5 Ibid. p. 205.
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Rhetorical Tools and Strategies
Argument from scripture
In al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa, the Qur’an stands as the primary refer‐
ence in Fadlallah’s argumentation. The most effective way of citation is
when the verses are embedded into the author’s train of thought. Thus, the
theme evolves through the Qur’anic passages carefully selected by Fadlal‐
lah. The Qur’anic quotes interweave and saturate the author’s discourse to
an extent that the readers feel as if the Qur’an was directly addressing
them through his own ideas. As a result, the narrative contains intermittent
exhortative passages, and the audience gets carried away by the flow of
the Scripture, while being indoctrinated by Fadlallah.
Fadlallah draws on thematic exegesis to cement his rhetoric. At the be‐
ginning of the chapters and sections, he identifies the theme to be elaborat‐
ed on and selects verses or group of verses that are linked to the selected
theme. Subsequently, he comments on the idea present in the citations
rather than engaging in an analytic exegesis of the terms and sequences, or
giving details about the circumstances of revelation (asbab al-nuzul). This
technique establishes an artificial coherence between the quoted verses
and the author’s interpretation, providing the reader with an assumed unity
of meaning all through the passage or section.
From the frequency of the Qur’anic quotations, we can infer that he
gives preference to the Qur’an over the hadith. As explained by Stephan
Dähne, the rhetorical device called ‘equivalence of contexts’ in classical
Arabic literature meant the use of the Qur’anic text with the aim of creat‐
ing an intellectual, emotional setting in which the idea or the situation de‐
picted in the Qur’an echoes the experience of the audience. Thus ‘one
finds the object of the speech subtly interconnected with the object of the
respective Qur’anic passage’.6 For Fadlallah, the Qur’anic milieu provides
a context equivalent to the up-to-date situation of Shiʻah. Another reason
for Fadlallah’s preference of the Qur’an to hadith is that Qur’anic state‐
ments are general, rich in rhetorical elements and open to a wide range of
interpretations.
1.
6 Stephan Dähne. ‘Qur’anic Wording in Political Speeches in Classical Arabic Litera‐
ture.’ Journal of Qur’anic Studies. 3. 2001, p. 7.
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Studying the views of Fadlallah (along with Khumayni’s and Muṭah‐
hari’s), an assumption can be made that the rejection of qiyas in Daʻwah
Islam prompted the activist thinkers to identify the general rules, and infer
opinion from universal ethical principles as revealed in the Qur’an. This
conceptualization gives much less scope for ‘scripturalist absolutism’7
and, at the same time, grants the natural presence of a teleological per‐
spective in activist Shiʻism. Without this teleological perspective, activism
could never win over quietism, because the former, traditional restrictions
(rooted in a sort of doctrinal absolutism) had to be unwaveringly overwrit‐
ten. Based on this analysis, it can be said that, with the help of extrapolat‐
ed general principles, activist Daʻwah thinkers – among them Fadlallah –
attempted to dissolve tension between deontology and teleology, and mo‐
bilised their followers to resort to – even violent – action.
Argument from necessity
Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings claim that in processes of the
justification of political violence, rhetorical tools are strategies that make
certain conclusions inescapable by demonstrating that there are no accept‐
able alternatives.8 One such tool is called ‘necessity arguments’. Agents
justify political violence by claiming that it is a necessity and what is nec‐
essary should be done for the survival of the individual or the community.
Thus, the argument from necessity appeals to the human instinct of sur‐
vival. This is a captivating rhetorical strategy in an Islamic context, all the
more so given that it is justified by the Qur’an and the shariʻah. The
Qur’an supports the permission to fight non-believers on the basis of the
necessity to defend the community of believers. As for Islamic law, it al‐
lows forbidden acts in case of necessity, al-darurat tubih al-mahzurat.
In Chapter 6 (on ‘the moral dimension of power in Islam’) of al-Islam
wa-mantiq al-quwwa, Fadlallah argues for the right of the weak and op‐
pressed to use force in confronting the oppressors. Here, the use of force is
a legitimate right of self-defence. Besides, confrontation can serve to pre‐
vent greater destruction. Fadlallah insists that, without permission to use
force in cases of necessity, no moral principles or nothing sacred could
2.
7 A term used by Daniel Brown in ‘Islamic Ethics in Comparative Perspective’. In:
The Muslim World. 89. 1999, p. 190.
8 Frazer and Hutchings. ‘Argument and Rhetoric.’ p. 193.
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have survived.9 Furthermore, he adds that the legal permission addresses
pious people who, having resorted to fight, are not accountable for the
harm they cause. The exposition is designed to deal with the major con‐
cerns of the quietist Shi‘ah in order to convince them that fighting is not
only allowed but also a duty imposed by the circumstances. In Chapter 7
(on ‘the call and the logic of power’, while examining whether jihad is a
means to call to Islam or not, Fadlallah concludes - referring to the early
Islamic history - that ‘force is one of the means to protect the Call and de‐
fend it from the challenges posed by its infidel adversaries’.10
Argument from virtue
Virtuous violence is defined by the values that motivate it and by ‘the
character of those individuals engaged in it’.11 As a rhetorical tool, virtu‐
ous violence helps to avoid the conclusion that all kinds of political vio‐
lence are necessary and rational. The argument from virtue is reasoned in
two ways. The first one is the assumption that, in specific instances, force
is virtue and since virtue must be realized, it follows that using force in
specific instances is unavoidable. The other way focuses on virtuous
agents. It assumes that everything done by virtuous people is good. Since
virtuous people use force, it follows that using force is good.
Fadlallah differentiates between virtuous and evil uses of force: be‐
tween killing and ‘fighting in the path of God’,12 between the violence of
the oppressors and the violence of the oppressed.13It is God who reveals
the right use of force to Man through the shardya, which is the base of
ethics.14 Fadlallah asserts that ‘The use of power that does not contradict
Islamic values is a moral virtue that helps to establish a decent life.’15
Consequently, the use of force is justified only if it reflects and embodies
the virtues and values of Islam.
3.
9 Fadlallah. al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa. p. 61.
10 Ibid. 228.
11 Frazer and Hutchings. ‘Argument and Rhetoric.’ pp. 181-182.
12 Ibid. p.198.





Besides the focus on virtues, Fadlallah’s discourse is centred on promi‐
nent figures who embody these characteristics. Fadlallah claims that the
Imams refrained from action only when there was no leadership that pos‐
sessed the necessary religious competence to lead the community to victo‐
ry.16 However, he stresses that the Imams supported all movements that
acted according to the Islamic principles. The reference to the Imams as
ultimate models of action is an affective argument through which he se‐
cures the legitimacy of his own discourse.
Fadlallah dedicates two chapters to the ethics of power and several sec‐
tions to interpreting ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’, because
his ultimate aim is to convince the quietist Shi‘ah that fighting for Islamic
goals is virtuous. He reconstructs the meaning of violence as virtue in as
much as it means righteous use of force. Through his references to virtu‐
ous figures such as the Prophet and the Imams who called to power, Fad‐
lallah urges the Lebanese Shi‘ah to take action and expects a ‘keen re‐
sponse’ from his audience.17
Argument from instrumentality
Fadlallah’s repertoire of arguments contains end-oriented justifications
that Frazer and Hutchings describe as arguments from instrumentality.
Such substantiations evaluate violence as ‘“instrumental” for politics be‐
cause it is an effective means for achieving political ends’.18 However, this
kind of justification leaves two major concerns un-addressed: the relation‐
ship between means and ends, and the unpredictability of the outcome.
This is why supplementary arguments19 such as arguments from necessity
and arguments from virtue are applied. This phenomenon points to the fact
that various types of arguments cannot be clearly separated even inside the
same text and in most cases they are present simultaneously.
In the Introduction of the book, Fadlallah radically identifies power as
the essence of life without which no self-esteem or progress is possible.
His assertion is that ‘the weak and oppressed were not able to win battles
in support of their principles, thoughts and interests until they eventually
4.
16 Ibid. p. 272.
17 Frazer and Hutchings. ‘Argument and Rhetoric’. p. 189.
18 Ibid. p. 181.
19 Ibid. p. 181.
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got hold of the means or were in a position of power’.20 At this point, he
carefully mixes arguments from necessity and arguments from instrumen‐
tality. Although Fadlallah’s argument is seemingly built on existential ne‐
cessity, it is a goal-oriented ethics of existence. The implementation of Is‐
lam is the ultimate aim of human life. Thus, mere survival, or refraining
from action, renders existence futile. Muslim life has a unique value only
because it is instrumental to the victory of Islam. If the instrument is en‐
dangered, the supreme goal is imperilled as well. The use of force, there‐
fore, is based on the necessity to secure the existence of the instrument
and, consequently, on the realisation of the supreme Islamic goal.
In the conclusion of al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa, Fadlallah asserts
that Muslims are expected to be strong in order to realise the major Islam‐
ic objectives, and to prevent the aggression of its enemies. For this, mili‐
tary, economic, political, and scientific power is needed, and force serves
as a deterrent. Therefore, violence is justified in as much as it opposes and
destroys oppressive systems and secures the necessary stability for imple‐
menting the Islamic order. Therefore in Fadlallah’s thought power is both
a value in itself and an instrument and none of the aspects of power can be
isolated from the rest.
Rhetorical questions
Fadlallah opens each chapter with a few rhetorical questions. This rhetori‐
cal tool is ‘an assertion in the form of an interrogative statement (…) char‐
acterised by (…) aggressive and polemical content in which two hostile
voices are dialogically opposed’.21 A rhetorical question calls on the read‐
er to choose from among two alternatives the one suggested by the author.
Muhammad A. Badarneh identified four main functions of rhetorical ques‐
tions in Arabic prose: 1. to confer a dialogic quality upon the text, 2. to
launch a hidden polemic against those who have a differing view, 3. to
question the foundation of differing views, and 4. to speak for and create
identification with the reader.22
5.
20 Fa Fadlallah. pp. 17-18.
21 Badarneh, Muhammad A. ‘Exploring the Use of Rhetorical Questions in Editorial
Discourse: a Case Study of Arabic Editorials,’ Text & Talk - An Interdisciplinary
Journal of Language, Discourse & Communication Studies. 29. 2009. p. 639.
22 Badarneh. ‘Exploring the Use of Rhetorical Questions.’ p. 639.
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In the first page of al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa Fadlallah asks:
If Islam believes in force, is it blind force that justifies everything including
aggression? Or is it the force that does not reach the point of aggression (ʻud‐
wan)? (…) How does all this comply with Islamic morals such as forgiveness,
tolerance and patience? Are the latter regarded as weaknesses that encourage
Muslims to be submissive? Or are they aspects of strength that is in line with
the Islamic concept? And [if so], how could this be the case?23
In these questions, Fadlallah addresses some of the essential issues dealt
with in the book, and right at the outset makes his style polemic. The first
two questions are in fact clauses of one single statement in which the opin‐
ion of those who promote unrestricted violence is presented in the subordi‐
nate clause, and as such it is undermined by the rhetorical question in the
main clause asserting that Islam does believe in force but not in a blind
one. The following four questions embrace another topic, the problem of
morality with respect to strength and weakness. Here, the answer is pro‐
vided in the concluding question that refers back to his preferred interpre‐
tation, thus disqualifying any differing views. In these questions, Fadlallah
summarizes the essence of the book, declares his opinion, and addresses
both the quietist and those who opt for spontaneous and limitless use of
force. The cogency of the concluding rhetorical question lies in the fact
that it contains the ideologically and rationally24 viable alternative that is
in line with the cultural code of the readers who are, therefore, expected to
take it as self-evidently true.25
In Chapter 7, where Fadlallah examines the relation between the call to
Islam and the Islamic concept of strength, he poses a rhetorical question
where he applies the technique of double voicing.26
Are violence, force, compulsion, fighting and the like considered as accept‐
able ways to bring people into Islam? Was there no other option for those who
refused conversion but submission regardless of their beliefs? And can we
consider that the force used in the Islamic conquests was the prime means of
spreading Islam across the world?27
Here, Fadlallah expresses ideas that are associated with critiques of Islam.
He takes these questions as opportunities to present critical opinions and at
23 Fadlallah. al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa. p. 13.
24 Badarneh. ‘Exploring the Use of Rhetorical Questions.’ p. 650.
25 Ibid. p. 652.
26 Ibid. p. 643.
27 Fadlallah. al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa. p. 217.
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the same time reduce their weight through the interrogative form. Later
on, he dedicates the whole chapter to denying these statements and bases
his argument on primarily Islam-friendly Western sources. With this, his
aim is to question the very foundation upon which critical discourse is
built, to attack and cast doubt on the legitimacy and integrity28 of their ar‐
gument.
Fadlallah’s consistent resort to rhetorical questions – characteristic of
khutba style rather than of a well-thought written treatise – proves his de‐
termination to further bolster the contrast between ‘us’ and ‘them’. He sets
the scene for two antagonistic discourses: that of his readers and that of his
opponents inside and outside of his community. As the two types of
rhetorical questions demonstrate, his aim was to persuade the insiders and
to discredit those who are adversaries of Islam. This polemical tone is re‐
flective of the style of al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa generally, and makes
the book similar to a chain of extended khutbas.
In each case, Fadlallah dedicates the entire chapter to answering the
rhetorical questions posed in the introduction. As Badarneh terms it, he
speaks for the reader.29 Fadlallah skilfully creates the illusion that there is
space for the reader to interact with the text, but in fact he establishes false
dichotomies and designs the discourse in a way to leave only one option to
the reader.
Repetition
One of Fadlallah’s most important rhetorical tools is repetition. He follows
and makes use of a long tradition of Arabic prose in general, and reli‐
gious-political discourse in particular, in which redefinition of an idea is
considered as a logical proof. As Barbara Johnstone indicates, the linguis‐
tic forms and expressions that provide the argument with cogency ‘are at
the heart of the [Arabic] language, the discourse, and the rhetoric’.30 Fur‐
thermore, she claims that ‘persuasion is a result as much, or more, of the
sheer number of times an idea is stated and the balanced, elaborate ways
6.
28 Ibid. p. 656.
29 Ibid. p. 654.
30 Barbara Johnstone. ‘Presentation as Proof: The Language of Arabic Rhetoric.’ In:
Anthropological Linguistics. 25. 1983, p. 56.
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in which it is stated as it is a result of syllogistic or enthymematic ‘logical’
organisation’.31
Johnstone’s remarks apply to Fadlallah’s argumentation in al-Islam wa-
mantiq al-quwwa as well. He uses diverse tactics for repetition that in‐
clude repetition of certain expressions, parallelism (repetition of form),
and paraphrasing (repetition of content) in various ways. Out of the many
examples of repetition that pervade the text and interconnect the various
chapters, highlight only showcases. The first one illustrates Fadlallah’s use
of syntactic parallelism, both ‘listing’ – repetition of entire clauses cited to
provide examples or details32 – and ‘cumulative repetition’ – in which se‐
mantically each one builds on the previous one and thus has a kind of cu‐
mulative effect.33 In Chapter 6, on the moral dimension of power, Fadlal‐
lah lists the reasons why Muslims need to resort to force in 5 points.
1. Making efforts to construct a life based on faith in God (al-ʻamal ʻala bina’
al-hayat) (…) makes the movement stronger and faster (…) provides the ac‐
tors with the feeling of confidence (…)
2. Protecting (himaya) religion against the persecution of its enemies (…)
3. Supporting (intizar) the oppressed, exploited, and helpless groups against
the oppressors (…)
4. Weakening (id‘af) the power of the nonbelievers, so that disbelief cannot
hinder Islam from progressing (…)
5. Defending (difa’i) ourselves, and stopping all kinds of aggression against
people, lands and sacred places, and fighting oppressors.34
In the passage quoted above, the goal of using force is emphatic, placed at
the beginning in each statement, and put in masdar form. The use of ver‐
bal nouns provides the required action with a somewhat abstract sense –
describes it as a value – but without depriving it of its dynamism, and thus
presents it as a tangible duty for the reader.
In the same section, applying the same pattern gives the passage an in‐
ternal rhythm. Two of the masdars are synonymous (protect, defend), the
rest – ‘making efforts to construct’, ‘weakening the nonbelievers’ and
‘supporting the oppressed’ create an intellectual context in which the use
of force appears as constructive, purposeful and value-based. The explana‐
tions that follow the introductory statements cited above repeat the very
same values and tasks: protecting Islam and the oppressed and weakening
31 Ibid. p. 52.
32 Ibid. p. 50.
33 Ibid. p. 51.
34 Fadlallah. al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa. pp. 201-202.
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disbelief and oppressions. This common motif is present as a central idea
in each of the five statements, however extended with a particular addi‐
tional aspect in each instance.
The second example from the Introduction to Chapter 3 on spiritual
strength, illustrates Fadlallah’s use of reverse paraphrase ‘in which the
same action or event is described from two opposing perspectives’.35
It is spiritual strength that generates the sense of value in the human soul and
detaches life from feelings of fear, sadness, anxiety, loss and laxity, and fills it
instead with feelings of confidence, happiness and resoluteness in order to
provide it with confidence, steadfastness, and clarity [of vision] in planning
and stance. It is through spiritual strength that Man possesses power to con‐
front his enemies. Lacking this would cause a sense of weakness, uncertainty
that leads to internal destruction, fills the soul with terror, and crushes all
preparations for resistance (…)36
The extended paragraph combines reverse paraphrase with cumulative
repetition. Fadlallah makes the same statement twice to emphasise impor‐
tance of spiritual strength. In the first half of the passage, Fadlallah states
that possessing spiritual strength generates further values, while lacking it
leads to the reverse of those values (fear vs. confidence, happiness vs. sad‐
ness etc.). In the second half of the passage, he repeats the same features
and broadens the perspective with the anticipated consequences of both at‐
titudes. This method carries away the reader’s attention and creates an
emotional identification with the message in which happiness is inherently
linked to the capacity of resistance. Linking instinctive human desires to
political stance through their connection to the identical source actually
creates an imprinting in the reader’s mind.
Fadlallah uses paraphrase on a large scale and in diverse ways. One of
them is summarizing preceding statements.37 Another means is applied in
the case of some ideas that pervade the texture of the book such as the
obligation of ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’ and its interpreta‐
tion as a call to force. Fadlallah deals with the topic in three chapters: in
Chapter 2 on ‘the use of force against tyranny’, in Chapter 4 on ‘social
strength’ and in Chapter 8 on ‘change and force’. In each case, the core
message is repeated and broadened with new elements corresponding to
the main theme of the respective chapter. Thus, the idea becomes domi‐
35 Johnstone. ‘Presentation as Proof.’ p. 51.
36 Fadlallah. al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa. p. 73.
37 See e.g. Fadlallah. al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa. p. 45.
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nant in the book and provides a legal perspective to Fadlallah’s arguments
for power and force.
Finally, it is necessary to mention some key expressions in the book
such as ‘realistic vision / perception’, ‘corresponding to Islamic goals’,
‘standing up to tyranny / oppression’, ‘Islamic morality’, ‘defending the
oppressed’, ‘resisting exploitation’and ‘complying to responsibility’.
These words and notions and their synonyms are repeated in each chapter
countless times and gradually wear away the readers’ intellectual defences
against debates and arguments on the use of force.
With Johnstone’s words in mind – ‘repetition... is the key to the linguis‐
tic cohesion of the texts and to their rhetorical effectiveness’38 – we can
assume that repetition guaranteed the coherence of Fadlallah’s system of
thought. Also, it provided the book with a logic based on the internal co‐
herence of the text. Although sometimes annoyingly repetitious, the text is
able to fulfil its primary goal: to inculcate in the reader a sense of identifi‐
cation with the author’s point of view.39
Master narratives
As Halverson [et al.] explained, narratives ‘provide every society with its
own sense of rationality’.40 To understand how a narrative gains this logic-
constructing capacity, its rhetorical organisation needs to be studied. Fad‐
lallah’s narrative is based on coherent scriptural master-narratives of em‐
powerment. To reassure the contemporary Shi‘ah that their battle now is a
continuation of past struggles, Fadlallah provides analogies that help them
reinterpret the experienced reality. By reinterpreting master narratives he
provided a frame within which his audience could evaluate events and atti‐
tudes through their relation to the desired strength and power. Moreover,
this perspective presented acquiring power as a sacred obligation and even
inevitable for salvation.
7.
38 Johnstone. ‘Presentation as Proof. p. 47.
39 See: Johnstone’s reference to Deborah Tannen’s ‘Spoken and Written Language
and the Oral literate Continuum.’ In: Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Meeting of
the Berkeley Linguistics Society. Berkeley, 1980, p. 7.
40 Halverson, Jeffry R./ Goodall, Jr. H. L./ Corman, Steven R. Master Narratives of
Islamist Extremism. Basingstoke, 2011. p. 17.
Rhetoric of Power in Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah’s al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa
217
In my attempt to study the elements of Fadlallah’s narrative of Daʻwah
history, I rely on the categorization of J. R. Halverson [et al.].41 They de‐
fine master narrative as a comprehensive and ‘culturally embedded view
of history’ that provides a systematic understanding of the past, the
present and the future of a community.42 It shapes the communal as well
as the individual identity and merges them into a coherent whole through
ideology and required action.43 Any master narrative is made up of narra‐
tives, a ‘coherent system of stories’44 that aim to provide a solution for a
problem in the present by creating ‘a narrative trajectory’45 of conflicts,
participants, actions, and events. Narratives employ archetypal characters
– set in binary oppositions – relationships – alliances or conflicts – and
‘standard actions’ required from the agents of the story.46 The solution to
the ideological problem exposed in the narrative can only be found
through the resolution of the original, real life conflict.
Fadlallah evokes all the key elements of the Daʻwah master narrative:
the Karbala’ event, history as a venue of salvation from corruption, and
the problem of occultation. The elements of his master narrative convey
one message, that of the Manichaean perception of history that permeates
Fadlallah’s discourse. The basic conflict to be solved is the prevailing in‐
justice and oppression in the contemporary reality versus the desire to
change the state of affairs in accordance with the divine law that grants
righteousness. For this Fadlallah constructed a new, universalistic master
narrative of power as an essential means of realizing justice that ultimately
brings about salvation. It is based upon the ‘narrative trajectory’ that
presents inner strength and tangible power as inevitable in order to wipe
out injustice, as part of the divine mission assigned to human beings.
The account of Karbala’ in Fadlallah’s narrative of power
Fadlallah claims – contrary to the prevailing perception – that al-Iusayn
engaged in the fight not only ‘to carry out the Imam’s divine duty’ with
7.1
41 Halverson et al. Master Narratives.
42 Ibid. p.12.
43 Ibid. pp. 21-22.
44 Ibid. p.23.
45 Ibid. p.19.
46 Halverson et al. Master Narratives. p. 24.
Bianka Speidl
218
full awareness of his destiny, but he was above all determined to restore
‘the just Islamic rule’.47 In Fadlallah’s narrative, Karbala’ took place as a
result of circumstances that are ‘familiar’ (ma’luf)48 to his readers, an act
of resistance to be repeated by all the faithful. Put in the new frame, Kar‐
bala’ is not only an open-ended conflict, but also a manifestation of power,
courage, and hope. It is about accepting the allotted mission as well as
about transforming the reality. The reinterpreted Karbala’ is the symbol of
‘noble sacrifice’49 but also that of determined action. As such it appears as
part of the obligation of ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’.
Furthermore, Fadlallah does not linger on portraying Muʻawiya and
Yazid as archetypes of oppressors in order to describe the nature of evil.
His narrative focuses on mobilisation and change. The inner conflict be‐
tween weakness and strength is resolved by al-Husayn the warrior, whose
figure takes primacy over the archetype of al-Husayn the martyr. Fadlallah
provides a new direction to the trajectory of the master narrative of Kar‐
bala’ in which martyrdom and resistance are not values in themselves, but
only means leading to the final goal: power and justice.
The role of the Mahdi in Fadlallah’s narrative of power
Fadlallah asserts that true change is never detached from the Islamic path
and the final victory of the movement is realized with the return of the
Mahdi.50 However, he tackles the issue from a de-mystified and pragmatic
perspective and insists that ‘the need for an order and state’51 is not re‐
stricted to the era of the Prophet and the Imams. He inserts two brief sec‐
tions on the problem of the absence of the Mahdi in the context of the ne‐
cessity of Islamic governance (‘Islam – a call and a state’)52 and the per‐
mitted means of change (‘Change by leniency and violence’).53
This framing renders the problem of occultation secondary and deals
with it simply to deny any views that oppose activism in the absence of
7.2
47 Fadlallah. al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa. p. 269.
48 Ibid p. 270.
49 Halverson et al. p. 92.
50 Fadlallah. p. 274.
51 Ibid. p. 263.
52 Ibid. p. 260.
53 Ibid. p. 264.
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the Imam. It is power and authority put at the service of implementing the
shariʻah that ‘lays the foundations of justice in life,’54and as such they are
detached from the requirement of infallible leadership. With this statement
Fadlallah echoes the Sunni position and puts aside a basic Daʻwah condi‐
tion of legitimacy. Power inasmuch as it serves justice is legitimate, it en‐
joys priority over infallibility, and it is accessible to every committed
Muslim.
Salvation history in Fadlallah’s narrative of power
In Fadlallah’s narrative the events of salvation history as described in the
Qur’an – and thus preserved in the collective system of belief – are to
prove the legitimacy and necessity of resorting to violence in certain situa‐
tions. The first Muslims did not use force out of mere habit but fought for
the just cause, in the same way as the contemporary Lebanese Shi‘ah are
expected to do. He invokes relevant episodes of this salvation history and
interprets them as necessary manifestations of the legitimate use of force.
Thus, Fadlallah provides a constant moral framework of using force for
his audience.55 This connection between the narrative of the past and the
mobilisation in the present is a crucial aspect of Islamist discourse.
Antinomy (tibaq)
In the justification of the use of force, Fadlallah’s argument is based on the
claim that it is Islamic as opposed to other non-Islamic forms of power
and aggression. This approach necessitates the perception of a bipolar
world in which what is Islamic is by essence good, and what is non-Islam‐
ic is essentially bad. Maintaining the constant tension between the two is
indispensable for the internal logic of his reasoning. Therefore, in order to
preserve the coherence of the argument, Fadlallah depicts the world
through mutually exclusive antinomies (tibaq), a prominent rhetorical fea‐
ture extremely popular in the current and past Arabic political and reli‐
gious discourses. In this rhetorical figure, concepts with irreconcilably op‐
7.3
8.
54 Ibid. p. 263.
55 Hume, Mo. ‘Questioning Violence: Meanings, Myths and Realities.’ Bulletin of
Latin American Research. 28. 2009, p. 50.
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posing meaning are juxtaposed in the same sentence or paragraph and
shape the style and the argument of Fadlallah’s discourse.56
The most prevalent tibaq pairs in al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa are the
following: positive (ijabi) vs. negative (salbi); goodness (khayr) vs. evil
(sharr); falsehood (batil) vs. righteousness (haqq); strength (quwwa) vs.
weakness (daʻf); faith (iman) vs. disbelief (kufr); right (maʻruf) vs. wrong
(munkar); leniency (luṭf) vs. violence (ʻunf ); realistic (waqiʻi) vs. idealis‐
tic (mithali).
However, with a double twist, Fadlallah sometimes reconciles binary
oppositions.57 For example, he asserts that ‘strength is neither the toler‐
ance in times of peace to preserve life, nor is it the violence in times of
war that demolishes life (…) Islam advocates both peace and war to pre‐
serve freedom, as well as all the virtues and principles it believes
in’.58Thus, he presents Islam as a comprehensive system in which the
seemingly mutually exclusive means can be equally legitimate by render‐
ing them Islamic.
Fadlallah’s division of the world into ‘us, the believers’ and ‘them, the
infidels’ exempts the believers from the burden of rationally defining what
is right and what counts as wrong. In H. L. Goodall’s words, this approach
‘serves to simplify a complex world that is otherwise threatening, un‐
known, ambiguous, different, and often unfair, so much so that it becomes
the duty of all true believers to rid the world of “them” [even] by force.’59
This observation fits Fadlallah’s emphasis on the inevitable clash between
the opposing forces of corruption and righteousness, and the inherent
moral aspect of this combat. In this the ‘Islamic system / order’ (al- nizam
al-islami) appears as ‘righteous’,60 as opposed to the ‘order of disbelief’
(al-nizam al-kafir).61 Through dichotomies - Fadlallah establishes a new –
political – myth in which collaboration, quietism and compromises are as‐
sociated with decay and deviation, while resistance, revolt, and activism
56 Heinrichs, W. P. ‘Tibaq.’ In : Encyclopaedia of Islam. P. Bearman et al. (Eds.). 0.
Leiden, 2000, pp. 450-452.
57 Fadlallah. al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa. p. 243.
58 Ibid. p. 205.
59 Goodall, Jr, H. L. ‘Blood, Shit, and Tears: The Terrorist as Abject Other.’ (a paper
presented at the conference on ‘Managing and Legislating Workplace Abjection.’
University of York, United Kingdom, 23 September, 2009). Quoted in Halverson
et al. 22.
60 Fadlallah. p. 272.
61 Ibid. p. 257.
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are the inevitable constituents of the Islamic revolution and equal life
force.
Metaphors of battle(field)
Among the rhetorical tools applied by Fadlallah, metaphors have a special
significance. In the following, I will look at one of the most recurrent of
them in al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa: the notion of maʻraka battle(field).
As Jonathan Charteris-Black observed, the systematic nature of metaphor
choices informs us how social relations are perceived in a given context,
and how beliefs ‘are conceived and communicated’.62 In Fadlallah’s use,
the metaphor of battlefield is ascribed to various actions suggesting an un‐
derlying ‘conceptual metaphor’ that life is conflict. The conceptual (un‐
derlying) metaphor, ‘life is a battlefield’ determines the choice of words
such as ‘submission’, ‘collaboration’, ‘destruction’, ‘subjugation’, ‘de‐
struction’, ‘confrontation’, ‘escape’, ‘neutral’ and ‘steadfast’. Acts of the
believers are described with the terminology of warfare, leading to either
victory or defeat as if they were part of a military campaign.63 Inherently
related to this perception is the idea that religion was revealed to guide
Man in the ongoing mythic cosmic clash of the good and bad.
Fadlallah imbues the book with the notion of maʻraka, insinuating that
life in its all aspects is a battlefield where violence can be a basic and nat‐
ural human response to the various challenges and dangers posed to the in‐
dividual and to the community. His use of the notion ‘battlefield’ both
metaphorically and literally (references to Hittin,64 Badr,65 Uhud,66 al-
Ahzab,67 and Hunayn68) connects the two realms into a coherent unity.
Fadlallah’s technique is based on reification, the reference to abstract phe‐
nomena – such as tensions and confrontations characteristic to human ex‐
istence – by the concrete notions of battle and battlefield. Battle(field) as a
metaphor can refer to acts of resistance as well as the social, economic,
9.
62 Charteris-Black. Politicians and Rhetoric. 3.
63 Ibid. p. 90.
64 Fadlallah. al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa. p. 236.
65 Ibid. pp. 293-296.
66 Ibid. p. 270.
67 Ibid. p. 270.
68 Ibid. pp. 175-8.
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political, and intellectual fields of life, and to the psyche of the believer.
Accordingly, the enemy can be all those who criticize Islam in any form,
who cause a rift in society, who resort to quietism, and those who act with‐
out self-restraint.
Terming every aspect of human life as a potential or actual battlefield,
Fadlallah made use of the power of metaphors in binding the ‘conscious
and unconscious means of persuasion – between cognition and emotion –
to create a moral perspective on life’.69 Thus, through the use of
metaphors, Fadlallah managed to influence the emotional associations of
the Lebanese Shi‘ah and re-interpret the Daʻwah ethos. Charteris-Black
claims that metaphors relate abstract notions and ‘ideologies’ to daily ex‐
perience and thus make them affective and accessible.70 The use of a par‐
ticular metaphor, which in turn legitimates a proposed ideology or policy
is embedded in a particular social and cultural value system that can trans‐
form a metaphor into a myth. By myth, I mean ‘a narrative that embodies
a set of beliefs expressing aspects of the unconscious [and] provides an
explanation of all the things for which explanations are felt to be neces‐
sary’.71 ‘Political myths’ are created by binding novel modes of action to
traditional values through metaphors. The evaluation implicit in figurative
language, thus, appeals to the emotions of the audience and the resulting
political myth provides a new perception of a given problem.
The historical battles mentioned carry a political meaning as well. Con‐
sidering the context in which the book was published – 1976 Beirut – the
early battles of the Muslim community are supposed to recall the poten‐
tials of the righteous minority – the Shi‘ah- and the importance of faith
and organisation. In this discourse, the problems and enemies of the past
are re-materialized in the present, with the same significance although in a
different setting.
In Fadlallah’s argument, we can also detect ‘a slippage from a
metaphoric relation of association to a logical relation of causation’.72In
the ‘metaphor frame’, the political establishment, the quietist Daʻwah tra‐
dition, and non-Islamic ideologies are related as causes to the social-eco‐
nomic problems, and to the political weakness and deprivation of the com‐
munity as effects.
69 Charteris-Black. p. 13.
70 Ibid. p. 22.
71 Ibid. p. 22.
72 Charteris-Black. Politicians and Rhetoric. p. 100.
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Concluding remarks
The present article is intended as a contribution to our understanding of Is‐
lamist discursive practices. Accordingly, special emphasis was paid to the
relationship between the author, his text, and the reception of his intended
audience, in particular, by analysing the rhetoric and ideas that he em‐
ployed to persuade them. Many of the studied features use or create a bi‐
nary opposition to create and cement the notion of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’. Refer‐
ences were made to certain aspects of intellectual and social history to sit‐
uate the author’s discursive practices in relation to the values of his in‐
tended audience.
In sum, we can assume that Fadlallah’s rhetoric constructs a religious
ideology in which force is understood as virtuous, instrumental and neces‐
sary to promote the interests of the Shi‘ah minority. In this framework any
act is nothing but a mere means in achieving divinely set goals, and its
value is determined by its purpose. Fadlallah’s use of scripture and master
narratives served to prove that a tradition committed to justice always pro‐
moted power and the means to acquire it. The various tools constitute a
coherent rhetorical strategy due to their interrelatedness in serving the un‐
derlying idea: the justification of power and legitimizing the means that
lead to it.
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Jawdat Sa‘id and the Muslim Philosophy of Peace
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Abstract: Jawdat Sa‘id (born in 1931) is known as the Gandhi of the Arabs and
Islam. He was trained at al-Azhar and influenced by Gandhi, M. Iqbal and Malik
Bennabi. Nowadays, he is the foremost advocate of non-violence in modern Islam.
He contested S. Qutb’s ideology and led an ascetic life until he left Syria recently.
Sa‘id opposed confrontation between the Syrian regime and Islamists. He de‐
veloped a unique pacifist stance in the Muslim world, based on the principle of
prophetic disobedience. This paper will address Sa‘id’s philosophy of peace and
its impact on Islamic thought. Furthermore, I will look at his historicist epistemol‐
ogy, the main asset of his pacifism. Sa‘id believes in causality and learning from
human history, experience and science as tools for reinterpreting the Muslim tradi‐
tion.
Introduction
It must be said, this is a depressing time for peace in the Muslim world.
Political violence affects most of the 57 members of the Organisation of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC). In addition, radical Islamic movements, all
over the globe, hold a bloody and suicidal campaign of nihilist terror. As a
general rule, as it stands, Muslim societies have only two violent options:
repressive regimes or chaos. Over and above this, there seems to be no ef‐
fective counter-movement for peace; violence and its perpetrators are con‐
demned, but no wide and critical movement of Islamic thought is endorsed
to question the anthropological, religious and political - very much interre‐
lated - nature of violence in the Muslim world.
Yet, all is not sinister. Movements of civil society and intellectuals sus‐
tain the promise of peaceful Muslim societies. Although rarer than red sul‐
fur, to use a metaphor from Arabic literature, Muslim intellectuals who
dedicate their lifelong projects to peace do exist. Recently, M. Keshavjee
and R. Jahanbegloo reminded us of some central ideas of peace to be ex‐
ploited in Muslim ethics (ex. mercy, rahma) and figures (ex. Khan Abdul
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Ghaffar Khan).1 In the last decade, there is indeed an active quest of paci‐
fism in Muslim thought.2
Of all current Muslim pacifist intellectuals, Jawdat Sa‘id (born in 1931)
is incontestably the most outspoken voice. Since 1960, he wrote and led
activities that promote peace from an Islamic perspective. He is even
known as the Gandhi of the Arabs. Nevertheless, there is no doubt, at least
in the Arabic speaking countries, that he is the foremost advocate of non-
violence. Be that as it may, his half-century intellectual and political
itinerary attracted very little attention. No scholarly study has been dedi‐
cated to him in any European language and the few discussions of his
ideas in Arabic do not do justice to his project. This paper constitutes the
first comprehensive attempt to present Jawdat Saʿid’s thought to a scholar‐
ly public.
This study begins by presenting a few elements of Sa‘id’s biography
and context in order to discern the specificity of his itinerary (1). Then, I
will briefly look at his theoretical foundations of peace, mainly his theory
of knowledge (2). Subsequently, I will come to the core of this paper
which examines Sa‘id’s major ideas and arguments for peace. Finally, I
will show the limits of his system of thought (4), especially in his reading
of Muslim history and tradition.
Jawdat Sa‘id: A profile of peace
Sa‘id’s context is marked by three circles of violence. The first conflict
was between Syria and Israel. Sa‘id was born and spent most of his life in
the village of Bi’r al-‘Ajam (the Golan Heights). The village was occupied
and destroyed by Israel in 1967. After 1973, the village was returned to
Syria, and a movement of reconstruction and repopulation, in which Sa‘id
participated, took place. A second conflict emerged between the Muslim
1.
1 Keshavjee, M. Dispute Resolution. In: Amyn B. Sajoo (Ed.). A Companion to Mus‐
lim Ethics. London, New York, 2010, pp. 151-166.
And Jahanbegloo, R. ‘Nonviolence’. In: Amyn B. Sajoo (Ed.). A Companion to
Muslim Ethics, p. 187-199.
2 See for example:
Halverson, Jeffrey R. Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of
Islam. Washington, 2012.
The work of K. D. Crow, Mohammed Abu-Nimer and Asghar ‘Ali Engineer de‐
serves special attention in this regard.
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Brotherhood and the Baath regime in the sixties, leading to a bloody con‐
frontation in the seventies and early eighties. Sa‘id was very close to Is‐
lamic movements, as an observer and a critic. The major circle of vio‐
lence, however, is the one that burst out in 2011, between the Syrian
regime and the Syrian rebels and people, which killed hundreds of thou‐
sands. Within this context, Sa‘id engaged in the heated debates about non-
violence and social change in Islam.
He was trained at al-Azhar in the 40 s and 50 s where he graduated in
Arabic language studies. He also lived in Saudi Arabia for a short time. He
was a secondary teacher of Arabic in Damascus during the sixties, a pris‐
oner and victim of the regime’s repressive policies on several occasions.
In 1973, he decided to rejoin his village and live an ascetic life as a
farmer, albeit engaged in Syrian intellectual debates and politics.3 He left
Syria in 2012 after the bombing of his village by the Syrian regime and
the death of his brother.4
Sa‘id is known to be one of the earliest voices to challenge S. Qutb’s
Islamist ideology. In 1966, he published his Madhhab ibn Adam al-awwal
aw mushkilat al-ʿunf fi al-ʿamal al-Islami, the first pacifist book in Islamic
thought, a revolutionary step in the context of the sixties. In this book, the
influence of Gandhi (d. 1948) and Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) are evident.
In his subsequent books, he seeks to explain the foundations of pacific
change in the Muslim world, with a particular interest in the philosophy of
history, society and knowledge, displaying the clear influence of the Alge‐
rian thinker Malik Bennabi (d. 1973). This can be seen in his works Hatta
yughayyiru ma bi-anfusihim: bahth fi sunan taghyir al-nafs wa-l-mujtamaʿ
(1970), Fuqdan al-tawazun al-ijtimaʻi (1978), al-ʿAmal qudra wa-irada
(1983), Iqra’ wa-rabbuka al-akram (1988) and Riyah al-taghyir: qadaya
al-insan wa-l-ʿilm wa-l-taʾwil (1995). His later works are engaged with
the problem of violence (Kun ka-ibn Adam, and La ikrah fi al-din : dirasat
wa-abhath fi al-fikr al-Islami, 1997) and that of law (al-Din wa-l-qanun :
ru’ya Qur’aniyya, 1998).
In Islamist circles, Saʿid’s thought was known in the eighties. In the
nineties, intellectuals, both Islamist and secular, became interested in his
3 Crow, K. D. ‘Nurturing Islamic Peace Discourse’. In: American Journal of Islamic
Social Sciences. 17. 2000, pp. 64-66.
4 Jawdat Saʿid daʿiyat al-la ʿunf
http://www.syriancenternews.net/ar/news/print_news/10459 [15.08.15].
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discourse as radical Islamist violence devastated Algeria and Egypt.5 He
was regularly invited to universities and academic conferences to speak
about dialogue, democracy and peace. It is 9/11 that brought him to a larg‐
er audience in the Arab world. His appearances on al-Jazeera since 2004,
made his voice heard.6 In 2001, his niece ‘Afra’ Jalabi translated into Eng‐
lish a long article Sa‘id wrote for the Journal of Law and Religion, sum‐
marizing his ideas, thus becoming known to a Western audience.7
Knowledge as a foundation of peace: insights into Saʿid’s epistemology
It is indeed a particularity of Sa‘id to adopt one of the most rationalist, ma‐
terialist and historicist views in Islamic reformism. He does not lean on
the Qur’an as the source of knowledge, but as an indicator of knowledge
to be acquired by reason from both our nature and history. Sa‘id sees
knowledge as the means to peace, and ignorance as the way to violence.
There is both naivety and scientism in his thought. Let us consider this
passage:
Knowledge is the mother of peace. Through knowledge, human beings realize
the possibility of human reform without disrupting or destroying humanity,
because the one with little knowledge and little tricks has resort to demolition
and destruction, and sometimes adopts the attitude of (‘Let me die with the
Philistines!’) instead of heading toward knowledge that would turn enemy to
a close friend.8
Rather than seeking the matrix of peace in divine knowledge, as Muslim
reformists do, Sa‘id pursues it in human knowledge in so far as it leads to
reform, patience and human alliance. Conversely, ignorance results in de‐
2.
5 The first monograph on his thought was published in 1995:
Sa‘id, Jawdat/ Mahmud, Ibrahim. al-Hijra ila al-Islam: hawla al-‘alam al-fikri li-
Jawdat Sa‘id : hiwar, dirasat, ta‘qib. Beirut, 1995.
A Festschrift dedicated to him and his works was published in 2006:
al-Marzuqi, Abu Yaʿrub (Ed.). Jawdat Sa‘id : buhuth wa-maqalat muhdat ilayh.
Damascus, 2006.
Both studies lack any critical appraisal of his ideas.
6 For example, see his interview in the famous al-Shari‘ah wa-l-hayat show:
Saʿid, Jawdat. Sunan al-taghyir fi al-afaq wa-l-anfus. May 2005.
www.aljazeera.net/News/archive/archive?ArchiveId=125687 [15.08.15].
7 Saʿid, Jawdat. Law, Religion, and the Prophetic Method of Social Change. Afra Jal‐
abi (Trans.). In: Journal of Law and Religion, 2000–2001, 15, pp. 83–150.
8 Saʿid, Jawdat. Iqra’ wa-rabbuka al-akram. Beirut, 1988, pp. 15-16.
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struction, suicide and dysfunction. It is not an idealist view. For, it is a pro‐
cess to which he dedicates several books to explain its minutiae. Behind
the lines, one can observe an Islamic view of the world: in the Muslim
imaginary, jahiliyya is thought to be a state of ignorance as well as of per‐
manent violence. Thus, Sa‘id endorses the reformist paradigm and glori‐
fies early Islam as embodying knowledge and peace, only to criticise cur‐
rent suicidal Muslims and give full credit to science.
Probably, where Sa‘id markedly breaks with the reformist paradigm, is
in the link he perceives between nature and history in harmony with the
Qur’an. He believes in the unity and complementarity between them at
one and the same time. The Qur’an is an indicator of the laws of nature
and history. It is a guide to these laws, which everyone is called to discov‐
er. As he puts it:
Muslims fly from joy if they see something of the signs of the horizons and
the selves, supporting their religion, but what they do not pay attention to ac‐
curately is that the signs of the horizons and the selves if they become a well
defined approach with a solid structure and constant foundations in the verses
of the book, the promised God’s knowledge to overcome corruption in the
land and shedding blood, and conversion to the ways of peace will turn into
reality (There has come to you from God a light, and a Book Manifest where‐
by God guides whosoever follows His good pleasure in the ways of peace,
and brings them forth from the shadows into the light by His leave) (Q.
5:16).9
This is a critical view of the so-called scientific miraculous nature of the
Qur’an, the Muslim concordism. Sa‘id diverges from Islamic reformism,
which embraced concordism as an answer to the challenges modern sci‐
ence addressed to Islam. He is a scientist and believes science, not reli‐
gion, can solve human problems. Here is what he has to say about it:
Astronomy is a clear and close example about how the signs of the horizons
and the selves unite the understanding and eliminate conflict and strife. After
the signs of the horizons and the selves testify for astronomy, there is no con‐
troversy or strife and the world's understanding of the functioning of the earth
and the sun, moon and stars unite. And they do not dispute over the texts and
do not engage in the push and pull, misinformation and excommunication.
Thus, if we have seen the horizons and the selves and we were able to show
them to the others there vanishes conflict and appears harmony, and so they
9 Saʿid, Iqraʾ, pp. 225-226.
Arberry, A. J. The Qur’an Interpreted: A Translation. New York, 1996, p. 191.
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can see truth (We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in them‐
selves, till it is clear to them that it is the truth) (Q. 41: 53).10
Obviously, Sa‘id does not endorse an apologetic attitude. Instead, he be‐
lieves that religious texts, taken alone, cause disruption between humans
and only science can unite them. Thus, he imagines a different future from
that of the reformists. While the latter expects humanity to finally admit
the truth of the Qur’an, Sa‘id looks forward to seeing humans come to re‐
alize the harmonious order they can build together on the basis of science.
It is this attitude that pushes his fundamentalist critics to accuse him of
materialism. For example, ʻAdil al-Tall considers him, along with M.
Iqbal and M. Shahrur, as materialists. Al-Tall bases his criticism on Iqra’
wa-rabbuka al-akram in which Sa‘id argues that matter is the steady exist‐
ing thing to which human beings should have recourse whenever there is
divergence about reason or tradition.11
Sa‘id is a semi-Qur’anist; he does not reject sunna’s authority, but his
arguments are mostly based on the Qur’an. He repeatedly criticizes the
ways Muslims read the Qur’an and the tools they use in their readings.
Sa‘id believes that the effective reading of the Qur’an should be a contem‐
porary Qur’anic understanding, fahm qurʾani muʿasir, a posture rather
than a method, whereby the reader thinks about the Qur’an in terms of hu‐
man knowledge today. As such, he discards the exegetical legacy because
it is outdated as knowledge. Central to his Qur’anic approach is the uni‐
tary reading of the Qur’an, history and nature. He goes further, calling on
an evolutionary understanding of history and nature in reading the Qur’an.
He calls evolution sunnat al-tatawwur al-ta’rikhi. Science should not op‐
pose religion because the Qur’an directly refers to science. All that pre‐
cedes modern science should be considered outdated and unable to help
reading the Qur’an. History evolves and so should the reading of the book.
His understanding of the interpretation of the Qur’an, ta’wil al-kitab is re‐
alization. The Qur’anic meaning, even if revealed in the 7th century, finds
its meaning today only with the spectacular development of human knowl‐
edge.12
10 Saʿid, Iqraʾ. p. 226.
11 al-Tall, ʿAdil. al-Naz‘a al-maddiyya fi al-ʻalam al-Islami : naqd kitabat Jawdat
Sa‘id, Muḥammad Iqbal, Muhammad Shahrur ‘ala daw’ al-Kitab wa-l-sunnah.
‘Amman, 1995, pp. 85-100.
12 Sa‘id, Jawdat. Riyah al-taghyir: qadaya al-insan wa-l-‘ilm wa-l-ta’wil. Beirut,
1995, p. 99 ff.
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Sa‘id's philosophy of peace
In his philosophy of peace, Sa‘id finds inspiration in the Qur’anic narra‐
tive of prophetic disobedience.13 Since Adam, the prophets taught humani‐
ty to reject violence as a way of change. He asserts, in particular, that
Muhammad's experience with moral, social, and political issues was based
on persuasion rather than violence. In his view, the khilafa (632–661) is as
peaceful as Muhammad's order. Willing to idealize the early figures of Is‐
lam, he falls into a defense of jihad. For him, jihad is war for a just society
and should be preceded by persuasion in a peaceful society. That is, only
an elected government can wage jihad. He claims early Muslims did not
use violence for the sake of worldly goals. They endorsed the Qurʾanic
view of peace and violence that consists of fighting unjust violence with
justice. Sa‘id supports his claim by citing Muhammad's refusal to use vio‐
lence in the Meccan period, who wanted to transmit a peaceful message by
peaceful means. Sa‘id reinterprets the Medinan prophetic jihad as a tool to
establish justice in Medina. He does not see in Islam a universal message
that should be spread, as S. Qutb does. Reason is universal and all humans
should make their own peaceful and just societies.
According to Sa‘id, peace is the primary attitude Muslims should adopt;
they should not initiate conflict in any circumstances. Calling to Islam
should be peaceful, and peace should be the basis of an Islamic society.
Violence is only permissible if a society agrees to use it to establish justice
and to end persecution. In this case, violence should only be employed by
a mature and rational authority. Force should be used proportionally to re‐
move injustice. He thinks that peace creates spiritual force, science,
democracy, and justice. In the field of international relations, Sa‘id criti‐
cizes Muslim attitudes toward external occupation and American hegemo‐
ny. He thinks world peace is only relevant if Muslims make peace essen‐
tial to their societies. Although he vehemently rejects American hegemo‐
ny, based on violent policies, he focuses on building a Muslim rationalist
and humanist ethos. He often calls on his followers to learn from the
Japanese experience after the Second World War: coping with the Ameri‐
can hegemony through science, democracy, and economic development
rather than emotion and violence. For current Muslim societies, he preach‐
es peaceful resistance to occupation and despotism. Naturally, this idea is
3.
13 Sa‘id. Law. pp. 123-126.
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resisted by many opponents. However, he also dismisses the policies of
current regimes. Further, he totally rejects the Islamic movements, which
he compares to khawarij—violent Muslim dissidents in early Islam.14
The doctrine of the first Son of Adam
Sa‘id calls pacifism the doctrine of the first Son of Adam (Abel).15 To il‐
lustrate this doctrine, he often quotes the following Qur’anic verse ‘Yet if
thou stretchest out thy hand against me, to slay me, I will not stretch out
my hand against thee, to slay thee; I fear God, the Lord of all Being’
(5:25).16 The doctrine of the Son of Adam consists in rejecting violence
against adversaries. It is the way of the prophets and the way Muslims
should follow. Muslims should not call to murder, assassination, impose
an opinion by force on others, nor should they change their minds under
force. One also has to endure all sorts of suffering for the sake of princi‐
ple, and one should not make others suffer for their own principles. Fur‐
thermore, Sa‘id highlights the sense of sacrifice in the biblical story: offer‐
ing oneself in order to guide others, becoming thus an example of ethical
behaviour. It is also the case that one should not commit oneself to some‐
thing one cannot fulfill and be prepared to to adopt it in front of all peo‐
ple.17 The mission of the prophets is to build peaceful societies of believ‐
ers, as can be seen in the examples he gives of the lives of Noah, Hud,
Moses, Shu‘ayb, Jesus and Muhammad.18
Sa‘id was aware that in 1966, when he wrote his book, the application
of Islamic law, the quest of the Islamic state and the violence that goes
with them, were generally unquestionable in the Islamist circles. Sa‘id was
one of the earliest voices to distinguish between two roles: that of calling
to Islam (daʿiya) who peacefully builds an Islamic society and that of
judge (qadi), who applies Islamic law in an Islamic society.19 This distinc‐
3.1
14 Sa‘id. Law. pp. 136-144.
15 The son of Adam and Eve. Sa‘id misses the opportunity here to acknowledge
motherhood as equal to fatherhood, and to eliminate patriarchal biases, another
form of violence in human history.
16 Arberry, A. J. The Qur’an Interpreted. p. 132.
17 Sa‘id, Jawdat. Madhhab ibn Adam al-awwal aw mushkilat al-‘unf fi al-‘amal al-
Islami. Cairo, 1993, pp. 93-94.
18 Ibid. pp. 103-126.
19 Ibid. p. 128.
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tion might have inspired Hasan al-Hudaybi’s Du‘at la qudat. At any rate,
Sa‘id takes a position against Qutb’s radical Islamism. He claims that the
‘deviated’ society - preferring this term over that of the jahili society -
should be reformed by way of communication, preaching and advice.
Spreading Islam should be peaceful.20 Believing that Islam is superior to
other beliefs and, therefore, should be spread is one of the most violent
ideas and acts, still almost unanimously accepted by Muslims. It stems
from the belief that ‘our sacred’ is more ‘sacred’ than that of others. Fur‐
thermore, if every believer in a religion wishes to expand its sphere of in‐
fluence, peace cannot be hoped for.
Jihad and khuruj
Still, this romantic image of the early Islamic period as a model of peace
cannot erase the practice of jihad by the Prophet and his companions. To
respond to this challenging claim, Sa‘id makes here another distinction be‐
tween jihad and khuruj. While he understands khuruj to mean the use of
force and violence to reach power, jihad, for him, is the use of force, after
reaching power with the will of people, to prevent compulsion in religion,
in case no other means is possible. Sa‘id considers that the Prophet called
first to God, with wisdom, good preaching and disputation in the best
manner, until he reached power with the will of people and their convic‐
tion. The Prophet reached power without force, save the force of persua‐
sion and ideas. The people of Medina received him as their leader. At that
moment, the Prophet started to practice jihad fighting those who deceive
people about their religion and combating those who oblige people to fol‐
low their religion. Thus, in his understanding, fighting aims at protecting
religious freedom.21
Sa‘id states that his jihad has two conditions: a condition in the case of
the fighter and another in the enemy. The first entails acquiring power by
the will of people and the second is that the enemy should be forcing peo‐
ple to convert to a religion or preventing them from joining a religion, like
Quraysh and all the nations Muslims fought in early Islam. So, he declares
Islam innocent from violence. Moreover, it maintained the freedom of be‐
3.2
20 Ibid. p. 132.
21 Sa‘id. Madhhab. pp. 41-42.
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lief, before any other civilization.22 In this argument, Sa‘id is no different
from the Muslim reformists; his interpretation of early jihad as good jihad
ignores the fact that freedom of belief is a modern notion. In pre-moderni‐
ty, wars were not declared to protect freedom of belief. As the ridda wars
and the law of apostasy show, the very notion of freedom of belief in Is‐
lam is not so evident.
According to Saʿid’s conditions of jihad, Islamists today are dissidents,
khawarij. They all understand jihad as khuruj. Sa‘id goes further main‐
taining that all Muslims are khawarij today: the quietist dissidents, qa‘ada
who are dissidents in their beliefs but do not carry out violence, and the
activist dissidents.23 As he puts it, ‘Muslims consider the killers of ‘Ali as
dissidents because he was a rightly guided Caliph, but call those Muslims
who killed ‘Ali infidels and dissidents. Therefore, Muslims’ actions are
different from those of the dissidents. But what they forget and do not con‐
sider is that the dissidents considered ‘Ali an infidel and that killing him
was for the good of Muslims’.24 Here, he makes a double point: that of
reciprocity (if A acts violently, B is likely to respond violently) and that of
the vicious circle (as long as A acts violently, B will act violently). So, ev‐
ery time A kills B for the reason of dissidence, it pushes B to use violence
for the same reason.
Sa‘id admits that most Muslim jurists today understand jihad to mean
fighting disbelief. He was delighted that M. S. Ramadan al-Buti, an emi‐
nent jurist in Syria (killed in 2013), in his much debated al-jihad fi al-Is‐
lam, claimed that disbelief is not a reason to declare jihad. Sa‘id thinks
that this is the first step toward reform. He also agrees with al-Buti that
priority should be given to understanding and knowledge rather than force.
This can change the whole direction of the Islamic movement.25
Misconceptions about peace in Islam
Beyond semantics, Sa‘id is conscious that pacifism challenges some fun‐
damental tenets of Islam. One of the criticisms Islamists levied against
him is that pacifism leads to abolishing jihad all at once. Unable to go that
3.3
22 Ibid. p. 43-44.
23 Ibid. p. 34.
24 Ibid. p. 57.
25 Sa‘id, Jawdat. Kun ka-ibn Adam. Beirut, 1997, p. 275.
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far, he concedes that jihad should stay until the end of time but should be
practiced in an independent society, whose faith is clear and solid. Reach‐
ing the independence of Muslim society should not be achieved through
fighting and the use of force, but through persuasion and preaching. The
best jihad is saying the just word. It is a tool to be used in every circum‐
stance and does not need a specific society.26
Another argument Sa‘id’s opponents advance against him is that ethics
are ineffective with persons who do not commit themselves to peace. They
probably have in mind the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Sa‘id takes
here an optimistic view. If that is true, he states, ‘one could not distinguish
between justice and injustice or the good and the bad. In any case, doing
evil because the others do the same cannot create any good, and Islam dis‐
tinguishes itself from opportunism’.27 Closely related to this argument, the
promoters of violence argue that saying the truth without force has no ef‐
fect. They argue that uttering the just word to a tyrant is useless as you
might end up being slaughtered like a sheep. They assert that those who
told the truth left no trace, and if they were killed rather than killers, their
death was in vain. People are used to listen to those with the stick and
force, thus, is inevitable, as they put it. Sa‘id looks for the answer to this
objection in the prophetic model which suggests how the clear uttering of
truth shakes the world. Sa‘id turns the argument around. Islamists today
are unable to reproduce the prophetic model: their call to Islam is compro‐
mising and they believe that the call to Islam cannot change things. Thus,
they worship power as much as the others do.28
Sa‘id considers these ‘misconceptions’ as symptoms of a polluted reali‐
ty which lost its balances and rules. All counter-arguments against paci‐
fism prefer imposition over persuasion, sacralizing the use of force and
giving it authority in changing human beings and societies. They commit
the errors of obliging others through violence or submission to violence.29
In his view, the good questions are the following: Why is it that people
worship? Is it fear? Or is it incapacity? Is peace a withdrawal or negativi‐
ty? Sa‘id believes that pacifism is positive and effective. Every time hu‐
man beings understand the meaning of humanity and truth, they realize the
importance of pacifism and its effectiveness. Difficulties are possible, but
26 Sa‘id, Madhhab. pp. 157-159.
27 Ibid. pp. 161-162.
28 Ibid. pp. 163-167.
29 Ibid. pp. 181.
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there is much less hardship in pacifism than in using violence. The real
threat to Muslims, Sa‘id maintains, is that of intellectual stupidity. In fact,
Muslim activists suffer as the public does not support them, except per‐
haps with sympathy. So, they are alone in their fight. In many cases, hearts
are with the activists and swords are against them. The real reason people
are afraid is that Islamic activism is related to violence. Sa‘id claims that
any Muslim would resist oppression and persecution much more if ac‐
cused of being a Muslim, rather than of preparing a coup.30
It is evident that Sa‘id recommends an exit from the vicious circle of
violence. The dominating theology, law and history of Islam make his pos‐
ition sound out of place. On the whole, the ‘misconceptions’ are real expe‐
riences in the Muslim societies. Unless one would criticallly question the
relationship between the sacred and violence (in the manner R. Girard31
did), Islamic violence would appear ‘normal’ to most Muslims and ‘abnor‐
mal’ to Sa‘id.
Does peace go by the book or by reality?
In modern times, several Muslim thinkers have developed, in divergent
manners, a theology of peace in Islam. The basic idea of this theology is
that peace goes by the book: the belief in Islam and the application of its
laws create a pax islamica. In this regard, the most popular work among
Muslim activists is al-Salam al-‘alami wa-l-Islam by Sayyid Qutb (printed
15 times so far). According to Qutb, in Islam, peace is a rule and war is a
necessity. However, war is continuous and should be sustained until the
achievement of divine order on earth. People would be free from servi‐
tude, except to God. His idea of a link between Islamic monotheism and
peace is recurrent in the modern literature on the subject. There is a neces‐
sity to sustain war, Qutb argues, because aggression towards Islam by non-
Muslims is to be driven out. Qutb claims that the call to Islam, da‘wah, is
universal and should be allowed to achieve its mission. Any attempt to
prevent it would be seen as war on Islam. In case enemies prevent the call
to Islam, like Quraysh did with Muḥammad, war should be launched.32
3.4
30 Ibid. pp. 176.
31 Girard, René. La violence et le sacré. Paris, 1972.
32 Qutb, Sayyid. al-Salam al-‘alami wa-l-Islam. Cairo, 1993, pp. 169-174.
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On this matter, Sa‘id takes an opposite view. For him, peace comes
from reality. Fear of God did not dissuade Muslims and did not create
peace between them in 14 centuries, starting from the first Muslim civil
war (656–661) until the recent Gulf wars. However, the nuclear weapon
created peace between the major actors in international relations. The di‐
vine and religious dissuasion fails to create a spontaneous peace. In the fi‐
nal analysis, the nuclear dissuasion might be considered divine in so far as
it is a divine habits (sunan) on earth. It is not a shortcoming of Islam if it
fails to establish peace, for evidence should be sought and evidence can
only be found in reality. It is then from reality that we should start to build
peace and not from the book. 33 This reasoning reflects Sa‘id’s epistemolo‐
gy which has been shown to rely on nature and history as sources of
knowledge.
Peacebuilding
When it comes to peacebuilding, Sa‘id has very little to say.34 He is aware
that peacebuilding, in the modern sense of the process, is despised in the
Muslim world. He goes so far as to call it the greatest craziness. However,
he invites Muslims ‘to think about the state of the Muslim world had it
chosen to live in peace, and had they believed that the best among them is
who starts peace, and that the Muslims should make peace and not God
who is in the sky’35. One of the major obstacles against peace is the firm
belief that all problems stem from external powers. No effort has been
made to analyze the religious, the social and the political structures of vio‐
lence.
Thus, Sa‘id is unable to formulate anything but a series of rhetorical
questions about endless Muslim conspiracy theories. For example, he asks
the following question: Don’t we forget our external enemies when hatred
comes between us? Despite this rhetorical tone, Sa‘id challenges the
whole Arab political mythology, constructed by Arab nationalism and lat‐
er by Islamism. He draws attention to the misrepresentation of the world,
3.5
33 Sa‘id, Jawdat. La ikrah fi al-din: dirasat wa-abhath fi al-fikr al-Islami. Damascus.
1997, p. 107.
34 He signed the Damascus Declaration in 2005 and led peaceful demonstrations in
2011 in Syria, but a year later he went into exile.
35 Sa‘id. Kun. p. 92.
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which Muslims formulate in religious terms.36 His criticism has the merit
of shaking up the current political discourse which consists in the belief
that Islam is under attack. It is certainly deficient to build peace on criti‐
cism, but it is a necessary step to liberate the mind.
World peace
Sa‘id promotes democracy and equality as the way towards world peace.
If such world society comes to exist, it will realize the will of God and the
wish of the prophets. Religions imagined long ago a peaceful world soci‐
ety. He denies any opposition between democracy and religion in the ob‐
jective they seek. The call of the prophets and God’s unity are best repre‐
sented by democracy, Sa‘id asserts. History evolves, making it possible to
reach a world society today. Back in time, the prophets called for equality
between people. Evolution takes time and humans are ready now, through
democracy, to establish peace. Yet, the ideal of the prophets is practiced
partially in some democratic ‘islands’; world peace is still under construc‐
tion.37
However, Sa‘id argues, prophethood differs from democracy in the
tools it uses to reach the objective of peace. Democracy allows for creat‐
ing societies in blood while prophets insist this should be done by persua‐
sion and non-violence. In the end, democracy acknowledges that establish‐
ing a society of law by violence is illegitimate, but the modern cultures
that sustain democracy accept violence.38 He sees the veto right in the
UN’s Security Council as an example of the contradictions that exist in the
international system.39 Conversely, he believes that the prophets forbade
the use of violence to create the society of law because it is impossible to
create an effective peaceful society with violence; there is a contradiction
between the two. That is the reason the prophets forbid self-defense. Cre‐
ating society with violence makes violence a cult and strengthens the law
3.6
36 Ibid. p. 93.
37 Sa‘id, Jawdat. al-Din wa-al-qanun : ru’ya Qur’aniyya. Beirut, 1998, pp. 137-138.
38 It seems to me that there is here an incoherence in Sa‘id’s thought. As he considers
nature and history as sources of knowledge, he should acknowledge that violence
is a biological and cultural human behaviour. Modernity and democracy, in line
with science and history, support this.
39 Sa‘id. al-Din. pp. 141-142.
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of the jungle where power rules. As he puts it, ‘a different world is possi‐
ble the moment you stop to change society by violence and forbid this
over your self. When you do that you feel you have the right to claim for‐
bidding violence’.40 In other words, a peaceful world society can only be
ruled by law. For law assures equality between humans.
Sa‘id claims that the establishment of the European Union made the
idea of equality in the face of law and on the basis of the people (of Euro‐
pe) a reference. It is not Napoleon or Hitler who united Europe, but law as
he said. Moreover, there is no veto in the EU. He goes on saying that the
United Nations cannot be an example of world union until it endorses one
law and abolishes the veto. For him, the EU bears the promise of world
union and peace.41
Yet, Sa‘id does not explain why religions could not unite humans in any
institution to date. In reality, religion can also be a source of conflict, as
one can observe today in Africa and Asia. Europe also had its religious
wars until recently.
Limits
One of the limitations of Saʿid’s philosophy of peace is that it lacks the
support of history. A historical gap exists between a supposedly early peri‐
od of peace in Islam and fourteen centuries of violence. It is a fundamen‐
talist standpoint, a characteristic of Muslim reformism, to believe that the
foundational moment is guiltless while the community’s historical devel‐
opment was anomalous. History does not back his position on early Islam
either. He refers to the Meccan period as an ideal of peace. However, the
Prophet took up arms in Medina. The Medinan period was not only defen‐
sive and violence was not practiced for the sole reason of implementing
the law, to defend justice or protect religious freedom. Wars against the
Arab tribes and the Byzantine Empire during the life of the Prophet were
aggressive wars, clearly intended to spread Islam. The Rightly guided
caliphs took the action of the Prophet further and conquered large areas in
Asia and Africa. This was not done peacefully. Sa‘id ignores the volumi‐
nous chapters on jihad in the compilations of hadith and the Sira. It is then
4.
40 Ibid. pp. 145-146.
41 Ibid. pp. 146-147.
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a double limitation: the absence of a history of peace and the prevalence of
a forceful history of violence.
Apologetic bias is another major concern with Sa‘id’s thought, a result
of ignoring history, as he argues that Islam did not establish itself by
sword, but ‘that Islam created the sword that never commits injustice or
supersedes somebody by way of falsehood. This is the result of piety,
preaching and patience. The function of the sword is to overtake the trans‐
gressor, zalim’.42 This relies on a distinction he makes between Islam (as a
divine message) and the realities of Muslims. Thus, the reality of Muslims
today should be changed and defending the divine’s Islam should not be
confused with the defense of today’s Islam. He borrows this distinction
from Iqbal: a revealed Islam = the Qur’anic Islam = the true Islam vs an
invented Islam = false = the non-Qur’anic established by non-Arab con‐
verts to Islam, in order to falsify it.43 His apologetic and polemic tone is
particularly at work in his comment on the assassination of Kaʿb b. al-
Ashraf (a Jewish rival of Muhammad) by the commands of the Prophet.
He justifies the act, claiming that Muslim society was built and indepen‐
dent, and when war is declared by Muslim society, such is not the time of
pacifism ; assassination could be such an act of resistance, executed by
guerrilla fighters who enter the camps of the enemies to sabotage them.44
Another serious weakness with Sa‘id’s project is its minimalist theoreti‐
cal and conceptual apparatus. He acknowledges this problem and calls for
a more theoretical work to deepen the ideas he defends. When we examine
the philosophers he quotes or relies on, we are struck by the absence of
Kant, for example. The European thinker he engages with often is A.
Toynbee, on his philosophy of history. More strikingly, one notices the ab‐
sence of Sufis and Muslim philosophers from his references. In general,
Sa‘id pays no attention to the ethics of Mu‘tazilis, Sufis or Muslim
philosophers. He is not interested in the Western philosophy of ethics ei‐
ther. This could explain to a certain extent his limited reputation among
non Islamist thinkers. 
42 Sa‘id. La ikrah. p. 162.
43 Ibid. p. 201.




The most obvious finding to emerge from this study is that Jawdat Sa‘id
owes his pacifism much to philosophy, especially the philosophy of
knowledge. His belief in nature, reality and history as sources of knowl‐
edge, rather than the religious texts, allows him to promote universal
peace. The Qur’an is an indicator of this knowledge-in-the-world, promot‐
ing the unity of prophethood, at the heart of which lies the peaceful doc‐
trine of the first Son of Adam.
Can science, which Sa‘id perceives as the matrix of peace, solve human
conflicts? In principle, modern science has much improved the human
condition, but perpetuated some old and created some new ways of vio‐
lence. In addition, that human beings agree on the scientific results of as‐
tronomy does not mean that they would agree on the economy, politics or
religion. Quantifiable science solves only measurable problems in specific
areas of human activity.
Despite his belief in historical evolution, micro history, on the other
hand, seems to weaken Sa‘id’s argument. He is in difficulty arguing for his
philosophy of peace on the grounds of Islamic history, while he is elo‐
quently at ease when it comes to arguments from reason or the Qur’an.
There is, therefore, a definite need for engagement with history. The prob‐
lem appears at two levels: the history of pacifist views in Islam yet to
come forward and the critical approach of the sacred as violence in early
Islam.
Sa‘id’s ideas have the merit of questioning the Muslim legacy in law,
theology and history. A wider discussion of his ideas could be one of the
ways to think about the Islamic ethics of peace.
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III. Jus in bello

Lying in War: Different Ethical Justifications
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‘It is crystal clear that peace and war are among the most important
concerns in the world. And in both we have no choice but to lie because
war, as the Prophet of God has said, is deception’.1
 
Abstract: This paper tackles a very challenging issue. On the one hand, lying is
held to be a vice and forbidden from an Islamic viewpoint. On the other hand, it is
common ground among Muslim ethicists and jurists, or al-fuqaha’, that Muslim
armies are justified in lying during a war. But the question is how do they justify
this position? I hope to provide answers to this question, referring to a number of
methodological positions.
 
All Muslim scholars without exception believe that lying in war is permis‐
sible. Muslim jurists, (or al-fuqaha’), the traditional narrators, (al-muhad‐
dithun), and ethicists, often devote a chapter of their academic works to
this issue, with titles such as ‘Lying in War’, al-Katheb fi al-harb, and dis‐
cuss the problem from various perspectives. Briefly, Muslim scholars, or
al-‘Ulama’, argue that Muslim fighters are permitted to lie during war. But
how is it permissible and what are the grounds for this exception? Lying is
considered one of the deadliest sins in Islam, and in many verses of the
Qur’an God condemns liars in various ways, assuring them that they will
go to hell. For example, one verse reads, ‘the curse of Allah be upon
them’. So, if lying is a grave moral crime, how can we justify it in certain
situations, such as war?
Not a single verse in the Qur’an justifies lying in war. To my knowl‐
edge, no one has yet found a text from the Qur’an that defends lying in
war.
1 Al-Tha‘alibi, Abu Mansur. Tahsin al-qabih wa taqbih al-hasan (The Improvement
of the Bad and Condemnation of the Good). Baghdad: 1981, p. 37.
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The permissibility of lying in war is mainly found in certain traditional
narratives, or hadiths, attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. Sunni and
Shi‘ite scholars claim that the Prophet Muhammad authorizes Muslim
fighters to lie in war. These accounts cover much the same ground. Ac‐
cording to the most renowned hadith, the Prophet Muhammad says that
war necessarily involves deception, al-harb-o khoda, and this hadith is ac‐
cepted by both Shi‘ite and Sunni denominations. For instance al-Tabari,
the great Muslim historian, Qur’an commentator and jurist, in his book
The Purification of the Sayings, Tahthib al-Athar, deals with this hadith in
some detail, discussing different aspects in considerable detail. The hadith
is greatly respected by all Muslim scholars and jurists, and accordingly it
forms the basis for the permission to lie in war.
However, this hadith requires some clarification. Firstly, there is the
question of how we pronounce the term khoda. The most common pro‐
nunciation is khoda, but some philologists claim that khada is more cor‐
rect, and others take the view that khoda is correct.
What is the meaning of this hadith? Indeed, what does it mean to say
that, ‘war is deception’? By analyzing some examples of when this hadith
has been mentioned, we can come to a better understanding.
According to one hadith, in the war of Ahzab, or the Parties War, Amr
ibn ‘Abdewod, a pagan general, came to fight Imam ‘Ali. To distract his
attention, ‘Ali said to him: ‘you are one the very best Arab fighters, so
why do you need other fighters to help you?’
Amr looked behind him to see to whom ‘Ali was referring, but as he
did so ‘Ali cut both his feet off with his sword, and killed him. When ‘Ali
came back to Muhammad with his sword covered in blood, the Prophet
asked him, ‘did you deceive him?’
‘Ali, answered that he had: ‘O, yes. War is deception.’
The second and most famous hadith relevant to our subject is also at‐
tributed to the Prophet Muhammad. According to this hadith, a woman
called Umm Khulthum is the narrator. She said, ‘The Prophet only ever al‐
lows lying in three cases: in war, for making peace between people, and in
marital disputes.’ It is worth noting that this woman only narrates this one
hadith about the Prophet, but it is accepted as a true hadith, or al-hadith
al-sahih. All Muslim narrators, commentators and ethicists from different
schools of thought, have accepted it. This Umm Kulthum was ‘Uthman,
the third Caliph of the Prophet’s stepsister, and an early Muslim believer.
No one has written anything against her and it seems that all commenta‐
tors have accepted her honesty and accuracy. We cannot be sure that this
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hadith was quoted literally, word for word. Indeed we don’t know what
the exact words of the Prophet Muhammad were in this exceptional case,
which does allow for the possibility of different interpretations.
There are other hadiths that frankly assert that lying in war is allowed.
Laying aside some minor differences, all Muslim scholars believe that
Muslim fighters can tell lies in war. Thus the most important issue here is
to define the meaning and boundaries of lying in war.
The boundaries and interpretations
Lying is only permissible in a state of war. Muslim scholars assert that ly‐
ing is permissible only during a war, and on the battlefield. So no one can
extend this permission to other situations during a time of conflict, such as
a no-war no-peace state, a ceasefire, or even during a temporary ceasefire.
For example, Muslim fighters cannot propose a peace agreement or seek
an appeasement when their real intention is to deceive the enemy. There‐
fore, lying, however it is defined, is confined to the battlefield and to war
tactics and strategies. With this limitation in mind, some hadith narrators
have included a chapter in their commentaries entitled ‘the prohibition of
any kind of deception, even those of a trivial nature’, (Tahrim al-ghadr
walow Shi‘ahyessira). They have collated relevant hadiths, asserting that
deception refers to all, even the enemy. One hadith attributed to the
Prophet Muhammad reads, ‘If anyone has an agreement with another party
then they should not do anything to contravene it, until the agreement has
come to an end’. This teaching is rooted in the Qur’an. According to this
fundamental Muslim scripture, all Muslims are obliged to obey such
solemn commitments, unless the other party in an agreement violates it
first. If this happens, Muslims are obliged to inform the other side who
have invalidated the agreement, that they are now no longer bound by its
content.
Thus, lying is permitted only in the state of war, or to be more accurate,
on the battlefield. Lying in such a situation involves all kinds of deceptive
tactics, including exaggerations and withheld information in order to mis‐
lead the enemy. However, when it comes to peace talks, ceasefire, and
armed peace, then any kind of deception, include lying, is strictly forbid‐
den. Lying becomes a form of treachery and infidelity, and it is against Is‐
lamic teaching.
Lying in War: Different Ethical Justifications
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Why lying in war is permitted?
In what follows, I will discuss the main approaches and arguments for and
against lying in war. The various positions can be summarized as follows:
1. When lying in war is permissible, because God, or Shari‘ah, has al‐
lowed it.
2. When lying in war is permissible, because it is necessary.
3. When lying in war is not permissible, but deception is.
4. When lying in war is basically prohibited.
When lying in war is permissible, because God, or Shari‘ah, has
allowed it.
According to this approach, there is nothing intrinsically bad about lying.
God prohibits lying, but he himself has allowed it in wartime. Ibn Hajar
al-Asqalani, attributes this position to Abu-Bakr ibn al-‘Arabi, the great
Maliki jurist.
This justification is rooted in the Ash‘ari school of thought, equivalent
to the divine command theory in Christianity.
The strongest defender of this interpretation is al-Ghazzali, (1058-1111
the great Sufi and Ash‘ari thinker and jurist. In his masterpiece, The Re‐
vival of Religious Sciences, he devotes a chapter to the evils to do with
slander, (evils of the tongue). In this chapter al-Ghazzali introduces and
addresses twenty vices and evils of the tongue, including backbiting, curs‐
ing, false promising, mocking and lying. ‘Lying is,’ he writes, ‘one of the
worst sins and an abomination of defects’. Then he narrates many hadiths
attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, including the sayings of his com‐
panions. According to one of these, the Prophet said, ‘the worst betrayal is
that you tell your brother something and he believes you, when you are ly‐
ing.’ Furthermore, he quotes from ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib - one of the most im‐
portant Imams of the Shi‘ite school - ‘the most heinous sin in the sight of
God is the lying tongue’.
Al-Ghazzali mentions more than thirty hadiths and sayings with a sin‐
gle theme: lying is a grave and heinous sin and should be condemned. The
sole argument for him is what the Prophet said against lying. Thus, he be‐
lieves, according to the Ash‘ari school of thought, that lying is utterly for‐
bidden, because God and the Prophet have said so.
1.
Seyed Hassan Eslami Ardakani
252
At the end of this discussion, he adds that lying is not forbidden per se,
but because of its harmful effects on the victim. The least of this harm is
that the victim is made to believe something that is not true. On the other
hand, some forms of deception may have merit, so it follows that any form
of lying that falls into this category may be permissible, and may some‐
times be obligatory. Maymon ibn Mehran has said that lying in some situ‐
ations is preferable to telling the truth. Suppose a man with a sharp sword
is chasing an innocent man in order to kill him. Then he comes to you and
says, ‘Did you see a man running away?’ What do you say? Don’t you
say, ‘No, I didn’t see him’? You would not tell him the truth. This kind of
lying is obligatory.
Accordingly, al-Ghazzali continues, we say that speech is a means to
certain goals, and a desirable goal may be achieved either by lying or by
telling the truth, even though lying is strictly speaking forbidden. But if
we can only achieve our goal by lying rather than telling the truth, as long
as our goal is permissible then lying is permissible too. If the goal is oblig‐
atory, such as saving the life of a Muslim, then again, lying is obligatory.
Therefore, if telling the truth could lead to the death of a Muslim fleeing
from a would-be assassin, then we have to lie. And if our purpose in a war
requires lying, or making peace between people requires lying, then we
are permitted to lie. Nonetheless, we should avoid lying whenever possi‐
ble, because there is always a danger that we will learn to lie in situations
where it is not necessary.
After this analysis, al-Ghazzali adds that the main reason for this excep‐
tion is to be found in the words of the Prophet Muhammad, permitting ly‐
ing in certain situations, including during war.
To summarize, al-Ghazzali denies the necessary evil of lying, declaring
that there are situations when we are permitted to lie in war.
Lying in war is permissible, because it is necessary
War is an emergency situation and thus lying can be acceptable. In war
there will be bloodshed and many innocent people, including civilians, are
killed. So Islam does not approve of it, except in very limited situations. If
war, which is the supreme example of violence, is justified in some situa‐
tions, then lying in war, which is less violent and less harmful than offen‐
sives carried out during a war, can be justified. Abod al-Rahman Hassan
Habanke, a contemporary Muslim writer, following this kind of argument,
2.
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writes, ‘it is clear that war involves deception and trickery. War and killing
is basically forbidden, but in cases of necessity they are allowed. Similarly
lying to the enemy during a war is permitted, and lying in many cases is
less harmful than killing’.2 According to this kind of justification, lying in
war is permissible as a lesser evil.
Lying in war is not permissible, but trickery is
According to this approach, what happens in war involves deceiving the
enemy, rather than lying to him. There is a fine line between lying, decep‐
tion and trickery. When I lie, I state something, by writing or speaking,
which I don’t believe to be true, to mislead the listener or the reader. For
example, if as a general I declare that from tomorrow we will unilaterally
end the war, but in fact I have no intention of doing so and merely intend
to deceive the enemy, then I have blatantly lied. But if I order my soldiers
to withdraw, without saying anything about my intentions, and then secret‐
ly get my troops ready for attack, then this is a permissible wartime decep‐
tion. In both these two cases my enemy has been deceived. In the former it
is because of my outright assertion, while in the latter I have not said any‐
thing about my intentions, but the enemy, without any rational justifica‐
tion, has mistakenly interpreted my actions as a sign of wishing to make
peace.
According to this interpretation, I am only responsible for my words,
but I have no responsibility for the mistaken interpretations of my enemy.
In fact, martial withdrawal has at least two equally important possible
meanings: the first is an informal sign of good will and ceasefire, but the
second is evidence of troops being readied for attack. It follows that it is
the enemy army’s leaders who are responsible for interpreting my actions
accurately and logically.
Muhallab, as ibn Hajar claims, defends this viewpoint, and strongly as‐
serts that Islam never permits any kind of clear-cut lying.3 So lying is nev‐
3.
2 Habankah Al-Midani, Abd al-Rahaman Hassan. Al-akhlaq Al-Islamieh wa ‘Ososo‐
ha (Islamic Ethics and its Foundations). Damascus: Dar Al-Qalam, 1407 AH, vol.
1, p. 554.
3 Ibn Hajar Al-Asqalani. Fath al-Bari besharh sahih al-Bokhari (The Victory of God
in the Interpretation of Sahih al-Bokhari). Beirut: Dar Al-Adyan, (No date), 6. p.
184..
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er justified, but we can behave in such a way that the enemy misunder‐
stands our intentions and is deceived.
Lying in war is basically prohibited, and there is no room for lying in
the war
This interpretation is based on an analysis of lying and its essence. If we
lie, as rational human beings, we lie intentionally and purposefully. Our
main intention in lying is to deceive someone, because we think that by
deceiving them we can achieve our goal. To achieve this goal, we behave
as if we are stating the truth, to make them believe us. Our victim will be‐
lieve us, only when she or he trusts us. So, we need to be trusted to be
believable.
Now, the question is, who should we trust? And what kind of behaviour
leads to trust? We only trust people whom we think are honest, truthful
and benevolent. Based on our experience, we decide to trust or distrust a
person, and this decision is usually made according to some criteria, such
as honesty, truthfulness and benevolence. Yet, we believe, rightly or
wrongly, that our enemy is neither honest, nor truthful, nor benevolent. So,
we have no reason to trust them, and we have to put aside this charitable
principle when we interpret their words and actions. Furthermore, we have
to look at what they say and do with suspicion. The Greek myth of the
Trojan horse is a caution against ignoring such suspicions. After the wood‐
en horse is taken within the walls of Troy, the young Trojan soldierscon‐
sider it to be a symbol of good will; the sages of the city think otherwise.
The tragic results of such blind trust in an enemy demonstrates that the
best policy in war is distrust. If we take this analysis on board, then we
should not trust our enemy, because trusting an enemy is both dangerous
and foolish. The basic rule of war is to distrust our enemies, unless we
have sufficiently good reasons to think otherwise. In this situation and on
the battlefield, the fighters should use any tactics available to deceive their
enemy, and this right applies to both sides. No one would be wise to be‐
lieve their enemy or interpret their actions according because they want to
think the best of people. On the contrary, it is better for each side to be
cautious and not trust their enemy, unless there are good reasons to do so.
Therefore, lying in war is permissible, because there is no trust, and be‐
cause abusing an enemy’s trust is the name of the game. So, we can con‐
clude that lying in war is not an exception to the proscription against ly‐
4.
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ing, as it is in effect not lying at all – rather it is a kind of acceptable trick‐
ery in the context of wartime tactics.
Conclusion
In this brief paper, I have attempted to classify different justifications for
lying in war - which may well be incomplete and need further amendment.
But my main point here is that though we cannot live a good life and be a
liar, we cannot avoid lying altogether. It seems to me that we may agree
that lying is a moral sin and unacceptable, but at the same time, most of us
believe that there are some situations in which lying is acceptable. For ex‐
ample, lying in the face of torture or other forms of duress is acceptable.
No one, for example, condemns the nun who lied to Inspector Javert to
save Jean Valjean in Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables. Kant, an absolutist
philosopher who opposed any kind of lying and for any reason, had no
choice but to allow it in certain situations. In his essay, ‘On a supposed
right to lie from altruistic motives,’ he declares that when we have only
two choices, telling the truth or lying, it is our unique and single duty to
tell the truth even to the murderer at the door. However, in his lectures on
ethics, he asserts that in some situations, being truthful to an enemy, or to
someone who wants to hurt us, may result in our becoming a defenceless
victim.
So, the question is not whether we are justified in lying in any circum‐
stances, or whether we have an absolute duty to tell the truth, rather when
and in what circumstances we are justified in lying. On the battlefield and
when fighters are perpitrating the worst atrocities, lying, which is less vio‐
lent than other crimes, is an ethically permissible option. Moreover, we
may take the view that we have no obligations towards an enemy and that
our first and foremost duty is to save our own lives.
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The Institute of Theology and Peace (ithf) is a research organization in
Hamburg, Germany that has studied since 1978 the theological and ethical
aspects of peace and war from a Catholic-Christian perspective. The insti‐
tute has supported also several projects on peace ethics in other religious
traditions including Judaism and Islam as a contribution to interreligious
dialogue and mutual understanding. ITHF has launched since 2013 a long-
term research project on peace and war in the Islamic tradition, focussing
on the contemporary discourses. The task of the Institute of Theology and
Peace is to research the ethical foundations of peace and incorporate them
into the current political discourse on peace. Through the publication of
the book series Studien zur Friedensethik (Studies on Peace Ethics) the In‐
stitute aims to intensify political debate on foreign policy and security
with a greater emphasis on peace ethics. In endeavouring to achieve this
goal, it suggests what policies will be of greatest assistance to people who
are threatened by violence, poverty and lack of freedom today and which,
at the same time, will help to establish a peaceful international order in the
future, in which security, justice and respect for human rights are guaran‐
teed for all.
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